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The first chapter of the dissertation analyzes how characteristics of a firm’s brand affect 
financial decisions by using a proprietary database of consumer brand evaluation. It 
demonstrates that positive consumer attitude alleviates financial frictions by providing 
more net debt capacity, as measured by higher leverage and lower cash holdings. Brand 
perception reduces the overall riskiness of a firm, as strong consumer evaluations 
translate into lower future cash flow volatility, higher Z-scores, and better performance 
during recession. Creditors favor strong brands by demanding lower yields on corporate 
public bonds. The results are more pronounced among small firms and non-investment 
grade bonds, contradicting a number of reverse causality and omitted variables 
explanations.  
The second chapter develops a framework that shows how exactly market 
timing and trade-off forces coexist. The idea is that market timing benefits dominate 
trade-off costs when firms are close to their target leverage, but become offset by the 
rebalancing considerations when firms are farther away. Two sets of empirical results 
support the validity of the framework. First, the sensitivity of equity issuances to past 
stock performance is the highest among firms close to the target leverage. Second, the 
long-run performance of equity issuers is also a function of their deviation from target 
leverage. The lower the leverage of issuing firms is relative to the target, the worse their 
after-issuance returns are, consistent with higher market timing incentives compared to 
other issuers. 
The third chapter studies whether investors value dividend smoothing stocks 
differently by exploring the implications of dividend smoothing for firms’ expected 
returns and their investor clientele. First, it demonstrates that dividend smoothing is 
associated with lower average stock returns in both univariate and multivariate settings. 
Some of this return differential can be attributed to lower risk, captured by return co-
movement among high (low) smoothing firms. Second, the chapter shows that 
institutional investors, and specifically, mutual funds, are more likely to hold dividend 
smoothing stocks. Last, firms that smooth their dividends issue equity more frequently.  
Together, these results are consistent with the role of dividend smoothing in mitigating 
the impact of agency conflicts on the cost of capital.   
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CHAPTER 1: 
BRAND PERCEPTION, CASH FLOW STABILITY, AND FINANCIAL 
POLICY 
Abstract 
This paper explores the determinants of asset pledgeability by examining the impact of 
intangibles on corporate financial policy. Specifically, we use a proprietary database 
of consumer brand evaluation to analyze how characteristics of a firm’s brand affect 
financial decisions. We demonstrate that positive consumer attitude alleviates 
financial frictions by providing more net debt capacity, as measured by higher 
leverage and lower cash holdings. We also show that brand perception reduces the 
overall riskiness of a firm, as strong consumer evaluations translate into lower future 
cash flow volatility, higher Z-scores, and better performance during recession. 
Creditors consider favorable brand perception by demanding lower yields on corporate 
public bonds. The results are more pronounced among small firms and firms holding 
non-investment grade bonds, contradicting a number of reverse causality and omitted 
variables explanations. 
*** 
“If this business were split up, I would be glad to take the brands, trademarks 
and goodwill and you could have all the bricks and mortar—and I would fare 
better than you.” 
—John Stuart, the Chairman of Quaker, ca. 1900 
Extensive theoretical and empirical literature has examined what asset 
characteristics determine optimal capital structure. Given incomplete contracting 
2 
frictions, an important factor affecting creditors’ willingness to lend is asset 
tangibility, which determines the final cash flow that debt holders receive after 
repossessing a firm’s assets in liquidation (Titman and Wessels (1988)). Recent 
studies demonstrate that there is substantial variation within characteristics of tangible 
assets, and properties such as salability and redeployability (Benmelech (2009), 
Benmelech and Bergman (2009), Campello and Giambona (2010)) have an impact on 
capital structure and debt maturity, forcing a firm with a high proportion of tangible, 
but difficult to redeploy assets to hold less debt. 
At the same time, little is known about the link between characteristics of a 
firm’s intangible side and its financial policy. Capital structure literature has largely 
assumed that intangibles are not pledgeable, as their value is destroyed in liquidation. 
Yet, intangible assets, such as copyrights, patents, trademarks, and intellectual 
property account for a large proportion of a firm’s market value, and play an important 
role in strategic management of a firm. Moreover, anecdotal evidence indicates that 
intangibles can also be sold separately from other assets. For example, the trademark 
and Web site of Linens ‘n Things, a home furnishing retailer that filed for bankruptcy 
in May 2008, were acquired by a joint venture and since then the new entity has been 
successfully operated online, despite the liquidation of the brick-and-mortar stores. 
This paper investigates what determines asset pledgeability by examining the 
impact of intangibles on financial decisions. Since there is substantial heterogeneity 
across their nature and characteristics, we focus our attention on brand, which is one 
of the largest components of a firm’s intangible assets. According to the 2010 
estimate, brand value accounts for over 100% of the book value of equity for the S&P 
500 firms, and the numbers have been exponentially increasing over the past decade.1 
Therefore, analyzing brand characteristics is the first important step in understanding 
                                                 
1 “The Brand Bubble” (pp. 9–11).  
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the role of intangibles in financial policy. We demonstrate that favorable perception of 
a firm’s brand plays a role in corporate decisions by relaxing some of financial 
frictions and providing higher debt capacity. Our data comes from a novel database, 
Brand Asset Valuator (BAV), which is the world’s largest study of consumer 
evaluation across different product brands.2 Research in marketing demonstrates that 
positive consumer evaluations of a brand are associated with higher loyalty and 
quality perception, as well as larger purchase probabilities (Starr and Rubinson (1978), 
Rao and Monroe (1989), Dodds, Monroe, and Grewal (1991)). As a result, consumer 
favorable view of a firm’s products can provide information about characteristics of its 
intangible assets, not reflected in the balance sheets. 
We start by gauging a mechanism through which characteristics of a brand can 
be linked to financial decision. Which firm characteristics are shaped by consumer 
brand perception and how do they affect financial decisions? A critical assumption of 
perfect competition is that sellers provide homogeneous, or standard, goods. However, 
in practice, the majority of firms produces goods with somewhat different properties 
(or at least perceived differently by consumers). Product differentiation creates 
“monopolistic competition,” in which a firm’s market becomes separated from its 
competitors (Chamberlin (1933)), and clienteles of consumers with varying degrees of 
product loyalty evolve. Loyal consumers, in turn, create brand capital for the firm, as 
they are willing to stick with the product they like over time, and are less likely to 
switch to competitors. In two theoretical models, Gourio and Rudanko (2011) and 
Belo, Lin, and Vitorino (2011) demonstrate that brand capital affects investment and 
financial policy of a firm, and reduces the overall riskiness of its cash flow. As a 
result, although intangible, favorable consumer attitude affects asset pledgeability by 
                                                 
2 Published academic studies in marketing, based on BAV data, include Mizik and Jacobson (2008, 
2009), Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dube (2007, 2009) and Romaniuk, Sharp, and Ehrenberg (2007).  
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reducing the cash flow riskiness, and improving the probability that a firm will meet 
its financial obligations to debt holders. 
We examine the validity of the mechanism by empirically testing whether 
favorable brand perception reduces the riskiness of the firm. Our main proxy of 
consumer brand perception is brand Stature, which measures how familiar households 
are with the brand, and whether they have a positive regard towards it. We evaluate a 
firm’s riskiness in a number of different ways, and find that our results are consistent 
with implications of the theoretical models by Gourio and Rudanko (2011) and Belo et 
al. (2011). Firms with higher brand Stature experience lower forward-looking 
volatility at both individual and industry-adjusted level, and have lower probability of 
getting into financial distress. We also demonstrate that credit ratings of non-
investment grade bonds improve with high brand perception of a firm’s products. All 
our results remain significant after adding commonly used historical measures of a 
firm’s cash flow volatility. Finally, we examine whether firms with strong brand 
perception suffer more during recession, and find that this is not the case: Firm with 
high brand Stature experience better operating performance than their less valued by 
consumers peers. 
After establishing the link through which brand relates to a firm’s fundamental 
characteristics, we ask whether debt holders consider brand perception when 
determining the premium they require. We estimate credit spreads on public debt 
outstanding as a function of brand Stature and control variables, and find that higher 
brand Stature induces creditors to charge lower premium. The results are more 
pronounces among short-term maturity bonds, and not significant for long-term 
maturity, consistent with younger and riskier firms having access to short-term credit 
only. 
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Finally, we analyze the implications of a strong brand perception for financial 
policy. We estimate leverage and cash holding levels and find that firms with stronger 
brand perception hold more leverage: a one-standard deviation increase in brand 
Stature increases market leverage of a median firm in our sample by at least 1.7%. A 
firm with stronger brand perception also holds less cash, compared to firms with 
otherwise similar characteristics. The effects are more pronounced and about twice as 
strong in magnitude among small firms. A one standard deviation increase in Stature 
allows for over 4% of additional debt capacity, and reduces cash holdings by 4.5% for 
a firm in the 25th percentile. 
The higher impact of brand on small firms, along with the findings that firms 
with low-grade rated bonds and bonds with relatively short maturities benefit more 
from the impact of Stature, is hard to reconcile with a number of alternative 
explanations, suggesting that a firm may actively attempt to alter consumer opinions 
about its brands by improving the quality of their products or through advertising. If 
this were the case, however, we would find that the effect is stronger among larger and 
more mature firms with good reputation in external capital markets, allowing them to 
allocate more resources to strategic brand management. A similar argument would 
hold for omitted variables explanation, which may affect both the brand stability and 
access to external capital markets. Our evidence indicates that firms with relatively 
limited access to external capital markets are the ones that obtain more financial 
flexibility when they have strong brand. Taken together, the results suggest that brand 
perception is important in explaining financial policy of a firm, and support the 
validity of the underlying mechanism. 
Overall, this paper makes several contributions to the existing research. First, it 
adds to the literature on product market and financial decisions by identifying 
potential mechanism that link characteristics of consumer product demand to financial 
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decisions of a firm and evaluates their impact. Also, while most of the existing studies 
focus on relationship between financial policy and industry variables, such as 
concentration ratio and competition (Chevalier (1995a, 1995b), Kovenock and Phillips 
(1995, 1997), Phillips (1995), Khanna and Tice (2000)), firm’s relative technological 
position (MacKay and Phillips (2005)), and interdependence between operation of a 
firm and its rivals (Lyandres (2006)), this paper shows how characteristics of 
consumer demand at a firm level affect financial decisions. 
Second, our paper complements research that examines the link between cash 
flow volatility and other firm characteristics. Brand Stature can be viewed as an 
alternative, forward-looking measure of cash flow volatility, which helps explain 
mixed empirical conclusions on the relations between commonly used historical cash 
flow volatility and capital structure.3 In addition, this work investigates cross-sectional 
differences in cash flow volatility from the perspective of product market. Exploring 
this link is especially important given the recent findings by Irvine and Pontiff (2009) 
and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) that document an increasing trend in cash flow 
volatility over time, which they attribute to more intense economic competition. 
Lastly, this study contributes to a small number of finance papers that map 
marketing concepts, such as advertising and brand perception, into financial theory. 
Most of those studies look at the link between firm characteristics and advertising 
(Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004)), Chemmanur and Yan (2010a, 2010b)). 
Additional studies examine the relations between advertising and capital structure 
decisions (Chemmanur and Yan (2009), Grullon, Kanatas, and Kumar (2006)). 
Finally, Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) examine the impact of brand on a firm’s 
ownership structure. Our study incorporates a new data set that captures consumer 
subjective evaluation of a firm’s products and demonstrates that, in addition to 
                                                 
3 Parsons and Titman (2008) provide an overview of existing literature on the topic (pp. 14–16). 
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visibility, marketing characteristics interact with firm’s financial decisions through the 
channel of cash flow stability. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I develops the main 
hypotheses of the paper; Section II describes the data; and Section III explores the link 
between brand perception and different measures of a firm riskiness. In Section IV we 
test the implications of brand perception to financial policy; Section V discusses 
alternative explanations and verifies the robustness of our conclusions. Section VI 
concludes. 
I. Hypotheses Development 
In this section we develop the hypotheses of the paper. We start by explaining 
how consumer attitude towards a firm’s products translates into intangible asset 
characteristics. We then generate hypotheses about how brand perception affects 
capital structure and cash holding policies. 
Homogeneity in product characteristics and consumer preferences is a central 
assumption of perfect competition, allowing individuals to choose between different 
sellers based solely on price. However, in reality, consumers are surrounded by 
dozens, if not hundreds, of brands, which they value differently. Therefore, the actual 
heterogeneity in product and brand characteristics on one side, and consumer 
subjective preferences on the other, led Chamberlin (1933) to define a concept of 
“monopolistic competition”: Whenever there is product differentiation (whether real 
or subjective), buyers will be paired with sellers according to their preferences, and the 
actual sales of the product will depend on the manner in which brands are 
differentiated from competitors. The more unique and appreciated the characteristics 
of the brand are, the more customers value the product, and the more loyal they 
become. 
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Empirical research has found support to this theory. Literature in industrial 
organization, using detailed data on household purchase behavior over time, shows 
that consumers do take into account specific characteristics of the product (such as 
color, styling, and quality) just as much as they consider prices of the brand and its 
competitors in their purchase decisions (Thomas (1989), Kwoka (1993), Landes and 
Rosenfield (1994)). Marketing studies, based on surveys and laboratory experiments, 
demonstrate that favorable consumer evaluations translate into the actual buying 
behavior. For example, using survey questions, Starr and Rubinson (1978) find that 
loyal consumers have higher repeat rates of purchase, lower probability of switching, 
and lower price elasticity of the demand function. Based on an experimental approach, 
Dodds et al. (1991) show that when brand perception is more favorable, the overall 
willingness to purchase the product is greater. To summarize, the two groups of 
studies provide evidence that within narrowly defined product markets strong brands 
with appealing to consumer characteristics enjoy higher purchase and lower switching 
probabilities, and increase the certainty of contemporaneous and future sales for the 
brand. It is possible then that these findings can be used to derive the effect of brands 
on the cash flows characteristics of the entire firm. 
Two recent theoretical papers analyze the impact of brand on the value and 
riskiness of the overall cash flow of a firm. Gourio and Rudanko (2011) and Belo, Lin, 
and Vitorino (2011) study the role of brand capital on investment policy of a firm, its 
value, and the level and riskiness of the cash flow. In the first model brand impacts 
cash flows through consumer search costs for the product. Trying to minimize those 
costs, consumers become loyal to the product in the long-run, and turn into a firm’s 
intangible capital, which the firm takes into account while making its investment 
decisions. The model predicts a negative relationship between the degree of search 
cost frictions and cash flow volatility of a firm. On the other side, Belo et al. (2011) 
9 
model brand capital as an accumulation of all the past advertising expenses, and 
assume that together with prices, brand capital defines demand function for the firm 
products. A firm maximizes its profits given an option to invest in brand capital 
through advertising, and makes the decision of whether to raise external capital or not. 
The model is solved numerically, and the results indicate that cash flow sensitivity of 
firms with higher level of both physical and brand capital to market risk is lower. 
While theoretical implications of the two studies are consistent, and infer that 
brand reduces volatility of the firm riskiness, their empirical results are different. 
Although both studies use advertising expenses to proxy for brand capital, Gourio and 
Rudanko (2001) find that advertising increases firm volatility, while Belo et al. (2011) 
show a decrease in riskiness, as proxied by market beta. A number of industrial 
organization studies have also looked at how advertising intensity affects market share 
stability, and found mixed results.4 
A possible reason for the mixed empirical pattern is that advertising is not a 
good proxy for brand capital and consumer loyalty. According to the informative 
view, developed in industrial organization literature, advertising may, in fact, facilitate 
competition and new entry, rather than creating barriers of entry, by creating visibility 
and providing consumers with information about new products (Bagwell (2007)). 
Therefore, using surveys of consumer attitude towards brands provides a better 
measure of brand capital. Moreover, advertising is just one of many inputs that a firm 
uses to affect consumer view of a product, together with promotions, public relations, 
events, and other tools of strategic brand management (Aaker (1996)). Therefore, 
brand perception measures the outcome of all the cumulative efforts of a firm to 
market the product, as well as exogenous factors, such as the fit between consumer 
preferences and product characteristics. 
                                                 
4 See Bagwell (2007) for an overview of existing studies (pp. 1729–1731). 
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Given the conceptual differences between advertising expenses and brand 
perception, our first step is to test the implications of the theoretical model, described 
above, using survey data on consumer brand perception. If the predictions of the 
models are correct, and consumer loyalty indeed creates a buffer that reduces the 
volatility of a firm’s profits over time, we should observe a negative relation between 
brand perception and cash flow volatility. 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with stronger brand perception have lower cash flow 
volatility. 
After confirming the validity of the mechanism through which brand 
perception affects firm characteristics, we ask whether the market participants take 
this into account in their investment decisions. Existing capital structure literature has 
long emphasized the importance of cash flow stability in contracting between equity 
and debt holders. In the world of uncertainty, the more stable the future cash flow of 
the firm is, the smaller is the probability of financial distress, which may lead to losses 
to creditors through reorganization, Chapter 11 settlements, and finally, firm 
liquidation. Thus, the overall pledgeability of a firm’s assets is determined not only by 
the final cash flow that debt holders can obtain after selling the repossessed assets, but 
also by the probability of having to do so in the first place. Therefore, firms care both 
about the overall costs of financial distress and about the probability of getting into 
one. This discussion suggests that stronger brand perception that generates a loyal pool 
of satisfied consumers who value the brand more and therefore, securing the debt 
holders future payments of the debt contract. As a result, debt holders will be willing 
to charge lower rates on their debt. To summarize: 
11 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with stronger brand perception have lower cost of 
debt. 
Finally, we establish the impact of this channel on financial policy of a firm. A 
firm with a strong brand perception will be able to enjoy the benefits of higher 
stability and lower costs of debt by taking on more credit. Therefore, incorporating 
consumer brand evaluation capital structure estimation can contribute to explaining 
the leverage, beyond commonly used controls. First, brand perception describes the 
quality of intangible assets in a firm’s possession, so it should provide information 
which is not captured by the ratio of tangible to total assets. Existing literature has also 
used the historical measures of cash flow stability to estimate the probability of 
distress, but with mixed empirical findings. One possible explanation is that past-
looking measure is not necessarily a good indicator of future performance, as the true 
cash flow stability comes to test during recession, entry of new competitors, and 
predatory behavior by competitors, events that may have not occurred in the past. As a 
result, brand perception should enhance debt capacity after controlling for historical 
cash flow volatility. 
Hypothesis 3a: Firms with stronger brand perception have higher 
leverage. 
In addition to affecting debt capacity, more secure, and less volatile cash flow 
also has implications on the cash holding decisions of the firm. Firms choose to insure 
against potential operating and financial losses associated with low cash flow 
realization by holding more liquid assets (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(1999), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)). Since raising external capital is typically 
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costly (either because of the direct fees to the intermediary or as an outcome of 
asymmetric information problems between the firm and outside investors), firms hold 
a certain proportion of their retained earnings in cash and other liquid assets as a 
cushion. When a firm has a secure stream of future cash flows, as well as a better 
access to external capital markets, the need to hold cash for precautionary reasons 
declines: Operating cash flow provides a ready source of liquidity and allows a firm to 
maintain lower levels of cash at any given point (Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998)). 
In addition, firms usually hoard cash as a means to fight peer predation. Brand capital 
in terms of a pool of loyal consumers increases the costs of predatory behavior for 
competitors, and as a result, a firm with strong brand perception can hold less cash. 
Hypothesis 3b: Firms with stronger brand perception have lower cash 
holdings. 
II. Data 
1. Brand Asset Valuator 
Brand Asset Valuator (BAV) is a proprietary brand metrics model, developed 
and managed by Brand Asset Consulting, a subsidiary of Young & Rubicam Brands. 
Brand Asset Consulting uses the model to help clients evaluate their brand and 
improve the strategic direction of its management by analyzing different aspects of 
brand image. The model is widely known among both marketing researchers and 
practitioners and is incorporated in major marketing textbooks (see, for example, 
Aaker (1996) and Keller (2008)). 
The BAV model has several advantages over other marketing models that 
measure brand value. Most importantly, it relies on a customer-based approach. This is 
in contrast to a financial valuation approach, which uses accounting and financial data 
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to estimate the brand value. For example, models by Interbrand and BrandFinance 
2000 are based on cash flow forecasts. As a result, the BAV model is exogenous of 
accounting and market variables, such as stock prices, B/M ratios, and revenues. 
Second, the model has a wide base of respondents: It is a survey of nearly 16,000 US 
households who evaluate each brand with respect to a wide range of characteristics.5 
The sample of US households is constructed and managed to represent the US 
population, according to the following factors: gender, ethnicity, age and income 
groups, and geographic location. Households are offered a $5 compensation for their 
participation, and the response rates are more than 65%. The pilot surveys have been 
conducted in 1993, 1997 and 1999, and starting from 2001, the survey has been 
undertaken yearly. 
The list of brands has expanded over time and as of 2010 included more than 
4,500 US and international brands and sub-brands.6 The survey is not limited to 
companies that are customers of Brand Asset Consulting and is continuously updated 
to include new brands and remove the brands that exit the market. Overall, the sample 
of firms is representative of all industries and is not biased towards the clients of 
Brand Asset Consulting, as the company tries to maintain a fair representation of all 
the major industry competitors. To make the questionnaires manageable, the overall 
sample of brands is split into 30 groups, so that the average number of brands to be 
evaluated per questionnaire does not exceed 120.7 BAV metrics uses a randomization 
approach in organizing the brands in the questionnaires in order to not impose 
associations with a certain industry or firm competitors. 
                                                 
5 In addition to US studies, BAV also conducts international studies of consumers. 
6 Additional models, based on customer based approach, are Landor Associates, which covers around 
300 brands, and EquiTrend, which covers more than 1,000. Landor Associates’ ImagePower, which 
was the first model of consumer-based surveys, was expanded into BAV in the early 1990s. 
7 See Appendix 1.A for an example of a questionnaire page. 
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BAV questionnaire consists of two types of questions. The first type asks 
respondents to evaluate the following aspects of a brand on a 7-point scale: general 
knowledge of the brand, personal regard and relevance. The second type evaluates 
different aspects of brand image and asks participants to mark an “X” if a certain 
characteristic applies. The examples of the characteristics are: unique, innovative, 
traditional, good value. Additional questions ask respondents about the frequency of 
use of a certain brand, and also some demographic information. 
The overall results are aggregated across respondents for any given brand-year, 
so that we observe the overall score on a certain brand’s image characteristics but 
cannot identify individual respondents. Some of the brand-image results are 
aggregated into pillars that capture different aspects of brand value, and some are used 
for additional marketing analysis of brand characteristics. Brand Knowledge and 
Esteem constitute brand Stature, which we use as our main measure of brand loyalty 
and quality perception. The components of Esteem are (1) the proportions of 
respondents who consider the brand to be of “high quality,” a “leader,” and “reliable”; 
(2) brand score on Regard (“how highly you think and feel about the brand” on a 7-
point scale). Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dube (2007, 2009) use the percentage of 
responses to the “high quality” question, as well as the response rates to two additional 
questions, “good value” and “best brand,” as their main measure of demand-related 
brand performance. We follow their approach, but use all the components of Esteem, 
as well as consumer’s Knowledge of the brand (“how well are you familiar with the 
brand and its products?” on a 7-point scale). The reason for using a more general 
measure is twofold. First, the BAV model describes brand Stature, the combination of 
Esteem and Knowledge, as an indicator of the current perception of a brand by 
consumers (Gerzema and Lebar (2008), pp. 44–45), and we do not have a theoretical 
reason to exclude any of its components. Second, the knowledge of a brand is an 
15 
essential part of capturing demand for a product, as consumers who are not familiar 
with the brand should be excluded. While we believe that brand Stature is a more 
general measure of consumer demand than the one that includes only selective 
components of Esteem, we address additional definitions in the robustness section. 
Stature is computed as a product of Esteem and Knowledge. Since the two 
components are estimated on different scales its absolute value is meaningless. For 
convenient interpretation of the results, we transform the measure into a z-score. 
The BAV questionnaire is constructed at a brand level, so in order to merge it 
with the commonly used financial data, which is reported at a firm level, we have 
manually created a bridge that links between BAV and Compustat. Specifically, we 
identify a representative brand for each firm by finding a brand with the most closely 
matching name, and use its scores. Appendix 1.B provides a detailed description of the 
algorithm we apply to construct the link, as well as alternative ways of aggregating the 
data across brands, which we use to verify robustness. 
2. Financial Variables 
The financial variables are selected based on the widely cited literature on 
capital structure and cash holdings.8 We merge several different databases to construct 
them. First, we use Compustat data to obtain accounting and financial variables. Sale 
is the total net sales, expressed in millions of constant 1993 dollars. Age of the firm is 
calculated starting from the first year the firm appeared in the Compustat database. 
The two variables capture the size and relative positioning of the firm in the real and 
financial markets. Market to book ratio (M/B) is the market value of equity plus the 
                                                 
8 See, among others, Hovakimian, Opler, Titman (2001), Fama and French (2002), Faulkender and 
Petersen (2006), Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), and Kim, Mauer, and Sherman 
(1998). 
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book value of assets minus preferred stock9 plus deferred taxes, all divided by the 
book value of assets. It captures the future prospects of the firm, as well as the total 
value of the firm assets, including the intangibles. Incorporating the measure in our 
analysis helps disentangling the implicit value that a brand has from its impact through 
cash flow stability. We also proxy for a firm’s overall profitability with EBITDA, 
which is the ratio of earnings before depreciation to total assets. Leverage is the sum 
of short-term and long-term debt, scaled by book or market assets. We measure the 
tangibility of a firm’s assets with two measures. First, we use Tangibility, defined as 
net property, plant, and equipment, divided by book assets. We employ Depreciation, 
scaled by assets, as an additional measure in our robustness tests. 
We measure advertising and R&D expenses in two ways. For the sample 
description, we scale advertising expenses and R&D by assets. For multivariate 
analysis, we use the natural logarithm of the overall amount of advertising and R&D 
(in millions of constant 1993 dollars) (variables log(advertising) and log(R&D), 
respectively).10 Following Grullon et al. (2004), we do not scale advertising by assets 
or sales to capture its overall scope.11 If advertising affects consumer tastes, it should 
be captured by the overall amount of advertising consumers were exposed to. An 
advertising campaign of a large firm can be effective even if it represents only a small 
proportion of a firm’s revenues. For the same reason, we use log(R&D) rather than its 
ratio over assets or sales to capture a potential impact of a firm on consumer attitude 
                                                 
9 The book value of equity is the book value of total assets minus book liabilities minus preferred stock 
plus deferred taxes. Preferred stock equals to the liquidation value if not missing; otherwise I use 
redemption value if not missing; otherwise the carrying value. 
10 We add a value of 1 to advertising and R&D expenses, before converting them to logarithms, to 
capture the values of zero. 
11 Differently from Grullon et al. (2004), we assign values of zero for missing values of advertising 
expenditures. Since firms do not have to report advertising expenses (following the SEC’s Financial 
Reporting Release No. 44 FRR44)), this is not entirely accurate. However, it preserves the number of 
observations. For robustness, we repeat the main analysis using only non-missing values of advertising 
expenses, and the results are almost the same.  
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through improving the quality of its products. Using the overall amount of advertising 
and R&D in our empirical estimations will better differentiate the effect of exogenous 
brand characteristics from the firm’s attempts to alter consumer demand through 
advertising and R&D and make our tests more conservative. R&D also proxies for 
asset uniqueness, as technological innovations make capital and labor skills used by 
the firm, more specific, and potentially less re-adjustable to business and production 
model of competitors in case of liquidation. 
We measure cash holdings in two ways. Our main measure is Cash/Assets, the 
ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. For robustness, we also scale 
cash by sales (Cash/Sales). Following Opler et al. (1999), we use working capital net 
of cash holdings (Wcap), scaled by assets, to capture additional liquid asset substitutes 
available to a firm. Since a firm with more projects to finance should hold more cash, 
we use a measure of capital expenditures (Capex) to proxy for required investments. 
S&P500 is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm belongs to the S&P 500 index 
and zero otherwise. This dummy variable is another proxy for size and also a 
reflection of additional stock characteristics, such as visibility, liquidity, and the 
number of shareholders. DivDummy is an indicator variable to whether a firm pays out 
dividends to its shareholders. 
A potential concern of a study that relies on brand data is that conceptually, the 
idea of a brand may be industry specific. To avoid capturing industry, rather than firm 
product characteristics, we control for industry characteristics by including industry 
fixed effects in all our specifications. Industries are defined using the SIC two-digit 
code. It is important to note, though, that brand perception is not another proxy for 
market concentration. While industry concentration is an important determinant of a 
firm’s financial and operational decisions, there is still a potential variation in 
consumer demand characteristics among different firms for any degree of industry 
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concentration. To support this claim, we create a Herfindahl index (HHI) by summing 
up squared market shares of all the publicly traded companies in each industry, 
defined by the SIC four-digit code, and include the measure in the descriptive 
statistics. 
We obtain stock performance information from CRSP. We use average 
monthly stock returns (Return) over a year as an additional control variable used in 
our robustness tests. CRSP’s PERMNO is also used to link the bond data (see Section 
III.4). 
For the multivariate analysis, the variables Size, Sales, and Age are converted 
into natural logarithms. Before merging the Compustat data with BAV, we remove all 
observations with missing values for the following variables: Size, Cash, EBITDA, 
Tangibility, M/B. We also trim the top and bottom 1% of those variables to mitigate 
the effect of outliers. After merging BAV data with financial variables from 
Compustat, the final sample consists of 468 firms and 2,585 firm-year observations. 
3. Sample Characteristics 
Table 1.C.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the financial variables for 
BAV-matched sample. Overall, the firms in the sample are relatively large and 
profitable: an average BAV firm has an EBITDA of 14.8% and log(Sales) of 7.90, 
which is equivalent to about 7.3 billion of dollars. The sample firms also have a 
relatively high M/B ratio, consistent with the marketing view that brand is an 
intangible asset: branded products enjoy higher prices than the generic products, 
resulting in higher market valuation of firm assets, even if the production technology 
is somewhat similar. About half of the BAV firms belong to the S&P index. While the 
descriptive statistics raise some concerns about the representativeness of the sample, 
several things should be noted. First, the concept of brand is not applicable to some 
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industries. Industries based on business-to-business approach (such as mining, 
construction, and agricultural production) may not need to conceptually differentiate 
their products, as they either work based on contracts with customers or operate as 
suppliers to other industries. Therefore, the mere idea of product differentiation is 
potentially relevant only to a subset of firms. Second, even though the sample is 
relatively small in terms of the number of firms, its market capitalization represents 
20% of the market capitalization of all Compustat firms. 
The last column of the table reports correlation of the variables with Stature. 
Larger, more mature, and more profitable firms are associated with stronger demand, 
as measured by Stature. Tangibility is only weakly correlated with Stature, supporting 
the argument that consumer brand evaluations are not just another proxy for the 
amount of intangible assets within the firm. Advertising has almost no correlation with 
Stature when scaled by sales. However, when measured in logs, correlation increases 
to 0.32 (unreported). These results are consistent with the idea that from the 
consumers’ perspective, it is the overall amount of advertising rather than its relative 
share of revenues, which increases their familiarity with the firm and affects their 
preferences. This provides additional evidence for using the overall advertising 
expenses, rather than the scaled version, in the multivariate regressions. R&D/Sales 
has a negative correlation because of the impact of Sales in the denominator, 
suggesting that consumers do not shape positive opinions about products based merely 
on their quality, and other factors, such as brand image and personal taste, are more 
influential in determining consumer loyalty and quality perception.12 
                                                 
12 Experimental marketing studies provide additional evidence that consumer differential perception of 
brands is not based on objective differences between products. For example, Keller (2008, pp. 61–62) 
shows that consumers report different opinions regarding branded and unbranded versions of identical 
products.  
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We also examine the distribution of the BAV sample by industry. Table 1.C.2 
summarizes the results. The first two columns present the distribution by the number 
of firms. BAV is more biased towards consumer nondurables and retail sectors, which 
is not surprising given the nature of the business: most of the firms in these sectors are 
business-to-consumer firms. Financial services and utilities are underrepresented, but 
these industries are typically excluded from the sample in most financial papers. The 
rest of the segments are quite comparable to the overall Compustat universe of firms. 
The results become more similar to the overall sample when the distribution is 
constructed based on market capitalization. The gap between the BAV sample and 
Compustat in the non-durables sector is less significant, and the rest of the segments 
have weights similar to the overall sample of firms.13 The evidence in Table 1.C.2 
suggests that even though the BAV sample is rather restricted by definition, the 
distribution of the market capitalization of the firms that it includes is representative of 
the overall industry.14 
III. Brand Perception and Firm Risk 
1. Future Cash Flow Stability 
We start the empirical analysis by examining whether positive and strong 
perception by consumers translates into more stable operating and financial 
performance. Specifically, we look at how the overall riskiness of future cash flows 
depends on consumer perception of its brand. 
                                                 
13 In unreported results, we create a distribution of the number of firms in the BAV sample by the SIC 
two-digit code and find that none of the industries’ weights exceeds 10%. 
14 To verify that our results are not driven by overrepresentation of firms in non-durables sector, we 
repeat the main results after removing non-durables from the sample. The results are very similar to the 
ones reported. 
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To analyze future cash stability, we construct two measures of future cash flow 
stability. The first measure is forward-looking cash flow volatility, defined as standard 
deviation of a firm’s annual profitability (EBITDA) during period (t+1) through (t+5). 
It is possible, though, that cash flow volatility of a firm reflects specific characteristics 
of different industries, not captured by industry dummy variables. For example, 
industries that manufacture non-durable goods may be less volatile than industries 
producing durables, as the last ones are purchased less frequently. To account for that 
possibility, we construct the second measure, which is forward-looking relative cash 
flow volatility. It is computed by first averaging industry profitability across firms in a 
given industry (based on a SIC two-digit code), and then calculating standard 
deviation of the resulting average five years forward. Relative volatility is an 
individual firm’s forward-looking volatility, scaled by the industry forward-looking 
volatility. 
We estimate absolute and relative volatility of a firm’s earnings as a function 
of brand stature and control variables, and report the results in Table 1.C.3. Panel A 
demonstrates that the effect of brand stature on future cash flow volatility is negative 
and significant in both specifications, and the magnitudes are not affected by adding 
advertising and R&D expenses. Interestingly, coefficients on those variables are 
positive, implying that investment in advertising and product development may be ex-
ante risky, and only if they are absorbed in consumer attitude, the intangible asset is 
created. It is also interesting that adding historical volatility does not change the 
magnitude and significance of the Stature coefficient, and suggesting that Stature 
measures forward, rather than past-looking volatility, and captures certain firm 
characteristics that historical measure does not. The statistical significance of Stature 
is lower in Panel B, suggesting that some of the future variation may be driven by 
industry characteristics. Still, the effect the coefficient magnitude is persistent in both 
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specifications, and suggests that a one standard deviation increase in brand perception 
reduces the volatility of an average (in its industry) firm by 8-9%. The one standard 
deviation in Stature can have several interpretations. Cross-sectionally, it is equivalent 
to the difference in brand perception between Tyson Foods and ConAgra Foods, or 
Campbell and General Mills. Firms can also increase/decrease their brand Stature by 
one standard deviation over time. Examples of firms that enhanced the consumer 
perception by one standard deviation over time are Canon and Starbucks. At the same 
time, the brand perception of Hilton and McDonalds eroded by one standard deviation 
over the sample period.15 
To verify the robustness of the results, we calculate historical volatility of 
EBITDA based on the past 10, 5 and 3 year period, and forward-looking volatility 
based on future 3 and 5 years of data, and re-estimate the main results using each of 
the possible period length combinations.16 We also create an alternative measure of 
volatility based on sales, rather than profitability (where we use total sales scaled by 
assets), and use it to estimate the impact of brand stature. The results using both 
absolute and industry-scaled forward-looking sales volatility remain similar to the 
ones presented. 
2. Credit Riskiness 
After demonstrating that brand stature is associated with more stable future 
cash flows, we ask whether market participants benefit from it. Specifically, we look 
at firm riskiness from the perspective of debt holders. The reason for focusing on debt 
holders is two-folds. First, the contract structure makes debt holders more sensitive to 
                                                 
15 About 20% of the firms in the sample experience a change in Stature of at least one standard 
deviation during the sample period. 
16 Sample period limitations do not allow calculating volatility for a longer than 5-year period without a 
significant loss of observations. 
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volatility of the firm cash flow, as they do not benefit from positive shocks, but bear 
losses during cash flow drops. Second, it is not clear what the impact of lower cash 
flow volatility on stock holders should be. All else constant, equity volatility should 
decline as well. However, if brand policy has positive implications on leverage, the 
position of stock holders will become more levered, increasing both systematic and 
idiosyncratic volatility. As will be demonstrated in Section IV, higher Stature indeed 
has a positive effect on a firm leverage, and therefore, it is not clear a-priori which of 
the effects will dominate.17 
To evaluate the impact of brand stature on a firm riskiness, we look at a firm’s 
credit ratings, as well as its probability of distress, measured by Altman’s (1968) Z-
score. Data on credit ratings is obtained from Compustat. We use S&P domestic long-
term issuer credit rating, the most populated field, as our main variable of credit rating. 
To estimate credit ratings in a linear regression setting, we convert the alphanumeric 
scale, employed by the S&P agency, into a numeric one. Thus, credit rating ‘AAA’ 
receives a score of 1, and credit rating of ‘D’ takes on a value of 23. To proxy for 
expected costs of financial distress, we use modified Z-score (see, for example, 
Mackie-Mason (1990) and Leary and Roberts (2005)). Since brand stature may affect 
capital structure, the component of market equity, scaled by book debt, is excluded 
from the score, so that the final ratio is defined as the sum of 3.3 times EBITDA plus 
sales, 1.4 times retained earnings, plus 1.2 times working capital, all scaled by total 
assets. 
The results of credit rating estimation are presented in Table 1.C.4. While 
overall brand Stature improves credit ratings, as indicated by negative coefficients in 
Panel A, its statistical significance is marginal at best. However, after splitting the 
                                                 
17 A number of marketing papers demonstrate that firms with higher customer satisfaction have lower 
stock market risk (see, for example, Fornell, Mithas and Morgenson (2006) and Tuli, Kapil and 
Bharadwaj (2009)). 
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sample into investment and non-investment grade bonds (credit ratings of ‘BBB-‘ and 
higher, and ‘BB+’ and lower, respectively), the effect of brand stature on bond rating 
differs substantially among investment and non-investment grade bonds. While the 
results for the investment grade bonds subsample remain insignificant, Stature 
significantly improves credit ratings of firms that issue non-investment grade bonds. 
The coefficients range from -0.34 to -0.37, suggesting that a one standard deviation 
increase in brand Stature helps closing about 1/3 of the distance between current and 
higher available rating. These results are important, as they challenge a number of 
alternative explanations, suggesting that brand Stature is related to the overall maturity 
and stability of the firm, and therefore, may indirectly proxy for its reputation in the 
external capital markets. At the same time, our findings are consistent with the main 
hypothesis of the paper, and indicate that brand stature captures intangible 
characteristics of a firm’s assets, which are more valuable for relatively risky and 
capital-constrained firms that cannot borrow cheaply. Similarly to the estimation of 
forward-looking volatility, adding control variables that have traditionally been used 
as a proxy for a firm’s riskiness and asset tangibility does not impact brand stature 
significance and magnitude in a material way. 
Next, we estimate Z-score as a function of brand Stature and control variables. 
Since Z-score is a linear combination of commonly used control variables, using a 
standard set of independent variables, which include size and profitability, is 
impossible. Moreover, both variables are also highly persistent over time (for 
example, autocorrelation of sales is above 0.9), so that using lagged variables is also 
impossible. To overcome this problem, we look for another set of variables that are 
highly correlated with size and profitability, but do not come from sources, directly 
related to operating performance. To capture profitability, we use average stock 
returns and change in sales over the past period. We keep the M/B ratio, which 
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indirectly captures the relative profitability of the firm as well. Finding alternatives for 
size is trickier, as the commonly used proxies such as sales, assets and market value of 
equity are highly correlated. Therefore, we use several alternative sets of variables. In 
specifications (1) and (2) we include the logarithm of the number of shareholders 
(log(Sharehoders)) holdings; in specifications (3)-(4) we use a dummy variable for 
access to external capital markets, as is proxied by availability of S&P credit rating 
(Access), and a dummy variable for belonging to the S&P500 index (S&P500). 
Finally, in the last set of specifications we proxy for size with the overall advertising 
expenses (we drop all the firms with zero and missing values). The results in Table 
1.C.5 demonstrate that brand Stature has a positive impact on the probability of 
distress, as measured by Z-score. The coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant across all the specification, with the magnitudes ranging from 0.11 to 0.23, 
or about 10% of an average Z-score value. All the indirect size proxies have positive 
and significant coefficients, consistent with larger firms being more stable. 
Surprisingly, change in sales has a negative impact on Z-score. The coefficients may 
be driven by including M/B in the regression, which also captures profitability to a 
certain degree. 
Taken together, the results in Tables 1.C.4 and 1.C.5 demonstrate that brand 
stature reduces the probability of distress and default, with the effect being especially 
pronounced for the subsample of firms with relatively poor credit rating. This suggests 
that firms the influence of strong brand is especially beneficial to improving stability 
of relatively risky firms. 
3. Performance during Economic Downturns 
The subsections above demonstrate that on average, strong brand perception is 
associated with lower forward looking stability of a firm’s cash flow. It is possible, 
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though, that the results are mainly driven by low-volatility performance of branded 
goods during periods of economic stability. While in good times consumers may 
consider their personal perception of brands in the purchase decisions, lower and less 
certain income following an economic slump may force them to switch to cheaper 
generic brands despite their actual preferences. Therefore, it is possible that during 
recession a firm with a loyal pool of consumers, who would normally secure its 
income, suffers more. 
Theoretical literature on brand capital does not provide an answer to what 
happens to brands during recession. For example, the model by Belo et al. (2011) 
shows that systematic risk is decreasing in the level of brand capital stock. However, 
the brand capital evolution over time is determined solely by past brand level and 
advertising, and does not depend on economic conditions and wage rates. Therefore, it 
is not clear what would happen to the performance of firms if a negative wage shock 
reduces the impact of brand perception on sales. Moreover, the assumption itself is 
questionable. It is also possible that truly loyal customers, who believe there is no 
suitable alternative to the brand they value, continue buying brands they strongly 
prefer during economic downturns, while shifting to cheaper substitutes of brands that 
they do not value as much. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this, indeed, may be the 
case. For example, annual reports of Coca-Cola, which has one of the strongest 
Stature scores in our sample, indicate that the company’s sales volume (as measured 
by the number of unit cases) in North America declined only by 1% in 2008 and by 
2% in 2009. At the same time, per capita GDP in US during the 2008-2009 periods 
remained almost unchanged, and unemployment rate doubled to 9.9%. Therefore, it is 
possible that consumer loyalty remains persistent despite income shocks. 
Following the discussion above, we examine the performance of strong brand 
firms during recession relative to peers in a separate analysis. To test whether these 
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firms suffer more during recession, we look at operating performance of firms with 
low versus high brand Stature during the two economic recessions that occurred 
within our sample period: the high-tech bubble crush of 2001, and the financial crisis 
of 2008-2009. We employ a matched sample methodology and in every year (t-1) 
allocate all the firms in our sample into quartiles of Stature. Firms in the lowest 
quartile are the Low Stature firms, and firms that belong to the top quartile are the 
High Stature ones. Next, for every firm in the Low Stature group we find the closest 
match from the High Stature group based on sales in period (t-1).18 In Table 1.C.6 we 
compare changes in sales and profitability (EBITDA) of the two groups during the two 
recession periods. The first recession, as measured by NBER Business Cycle data, 
occurred between March and November 2001, so we look at the performance of firms 
during the fiscal year of 2001. The second recession officially started in December of 
2007 and lasted till June 2009. Therefore, we use 2007-2009 as our second recession 
period. 
The results demonstrate that the performance of firms with high brand Stature 
does not suffer more in recession. Thus, during the recent crisis the median profits and 
sales of High Stature firms increased by 2.19% and 2.80%, respectively, while the 
growth of Low Stature firms was only about half of that magnitude. The Z-score also 
remained stronger among High Stature versus the Low Stature firms. The differences 
are even more pronounced when comparing means,19 and are similar when looking at 
the 2001 recession period. It is important to note, though, that focusing on a narrow 
                                                 
18 To verify robustness of the results, we also match firms on size and profitability, and size, 
profitability, and industry. The results are similar to the ones based on size matching, but result in a 
significant loss of observations.  
19 To mitigate the impact of outliers, we winsorize the top and bottom 1% of changes in EBITDA and 
sales before performing the match. The differences among Low and High Stature firms for a non-
winsorized sample have the same sign, and are more pronounced in terms of magnitude.  
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time period leads to a relatively small number of observations, so the results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
Overall, however, the comparison of high and low brand perception firms 
during the two periods of economic downturn demonstrates that firms with high brand 
perception do not seem to suffer more, and in fact have a better performance than their 
competitors with lower consumer loyalty. 
4. Cost of Debt 
After documenting that strong brands have lower probability of financial 
distress, lower forward looking cash flow volatility, and better performance during 
crises we ask whether brand perception is incorporated in the cost of debt capital. A 
firm with strong brand perception may take advantage of lower borrowing costs by 
issuing more debt until the marginal costs equal the costs of debt for other firms. 
However, the average price it pays for the debt should still be lower. 
To measure the cost of debt, we focus on public bond yields. The reason for 
that is twofold. First, the data on private loans does not exist in a time-series, as the 
loans are not traded over time, and the interest rate is available at origination date 
only. Second, private loans include a large number of covenants, which may affect the 
required yield, and make aggregation across contracts with different characteristics 
difficult. We obtain the yield data from two sources. Bond yields are extracted from 
FINRA’s TRACE (Transaction Reporting and Compliance Engine) database. Trace 
was established in July 2002 to increase transparency in the secondary bond market, 
and it tracks intraday trading data in OTC markets. While initially the data has been 
reported only for a limited number of securities (investment-grade bonds with an 
initial size of $1 billion and higher), the reporting requirements expanded throughout 
2003-2004 and starting from 2005 TRACE include almost all public transactions 
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(although the par value is still truncated at $1 million and $5 million for non-
investment and investment grade bonds, respectively). We identify the last available 
trade of each month and use the yields from this transaction. 
TRACE reports the information on price, spreads, and yields, but does not 
include any characteristics of the bond issue, so to obtain this data we link it to the 
Mergent database, which maintains information on bond characteristics (for example, 
whether the bond is convertible, callable, etc.), the amount issued, and changes to the 
amount outstanding over time. We exclude convertible bonds, foreign and non-USD 
issues, as well as bonds with potentially difficult to evaluate characteristics, such as 
pass-through and pay-in kind. We obtain the average yield across all the bond tranches 
by weighting the yields by the amount outstanding. To aggregate data over time, we 
first calculate the value-weighted yields at a monthly frequency, and then average the 
results over a calendar year. After merging the bond yield data with our BAV sample, 
we end up with 739 observations for the period of 2002-2009. To obtain credit 
spreads, we subtract the yields of the Treasury notes and bonds with matching 
maturity from the corporate bond yields. If the exact maturity is unavailable, we use a 
linear extrapolation of two Treasury notes [bonds] with the closest maturities, so that 
the maturity of the corporate bonds falls in the range between the maturities of the two 
Treasury bonds. 
We estimate credit spreads as a function of brand Stature and control variables 
and report our findings in Table 1.C.7. To analyze whether the results differ across 
bond characteristics, we split credit yields by bond maturities. To calculate short-term 
yields, every year we identify all the outstanding bond tranches with maturity less than 
median maturity (6 years), and value-weigh their yields. We compute long-term 
average yields in a similar way, using tranches with maturities equal to or longer than 
6 years. Panel B reports the results of estimating short-term maturities, and in Panel C 
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the dependent variable is the spread on long-term bonds. It is not surprising that Credit 
Rating is the most significant variable in all the estimations, incorporating the effects 
of size, age, and firm profitability. M/B and Leverage are the only additional controls 
that are significant. It is striking, though, that brand Stature has a negative and 
significant impact on credit ratings, reducing them by 37-47 basis points. The results 
have stronger magnitude among short-term maturity bonds, but are economically and 
statistically insignificant for long-term maturity. For robustness, we re-estimate our 
results starting from 2005, when TRACE reporting requirements included most of the 
public debt traded in the OTC market, and obtain similar results. Overall, this 
additional piece of evidence supports that hypothesis that brand perception affects 
firm’s characteristics through the channel of lower riskiness, and the market takes that 
into account while pricing a firm’s debt.20 They also support the channel of cash flow 
volatility, as younger and riskier firms with access to short-term credit only benefit 
more from having a strong brand. 
IV. Leverage and Cash Holdings 
1. Leverage 
We start with a univariate analysis of the relationships between consumer 
demand and capital structure. First, we examine the relationship pattern between 
demand characteristics and capital structure, controlling for size, which captures a 
significant part of cross-sectional differences among firms. Every year we partition the 
sample into five quintiles, based on Sales, and then form five brand Stature quintiles 
within each Sales group. Panel A of Table 1.C.8 presents average book and market 
leverage levels for each Size-Stature group. Consistent with previous studies, we find 
                                                 
20 The results are consistent with the findings of marketing studies by Rego, Billett, and Neil (2009) and 
Anderson and Mansi (2009). 
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that size affects leverage levels: large firms in all Stature quintiles (except for the High 
Stature one) hold considerably more leverage than the firms in the lowest size quintile 
and the differences are even more pronounced for firms in the lowest Stature quintile. 
At the same time, there is a significant variation in the average leverage level across 
brand value groups. Even controlling for size, the leverage level increases for firms 
with higher Stature in all but the largest Sale groups, and the differences are 
statistically and economically significant. The differences in leverage across Sale 
quintiles are most pronounced among smallest firms, and equal 23% and 12% for 
book and market leverage, respectively. 
We then turn to a multivariate analysis and estimate leverage as a function of 
customer perception of a firm’s products and a variety of control variables drawn from 
a set of variables used in the previous capital structure research. We estimate each 
specification using Tobit model, which accounts for observations with zero leverage 
(about 10% of the sample). The results are presented in Table 1.C.9. Consistent with 
the univariate analysis, we find a positive and significant effect of Stature on 
Leverage. Its magnitude in Specification (1) ranges from 0.01 in market leverage 
estimation to 0.03. Smaller magnitude of the Stature coefficient in market leverage 
regression is not surprising: positive brand perception increases the overall value of 
the firm, and the market takes that into account. Interaction term between Stature and 
Sale has negative and significant coefficient in all the specifications, consistent with 
the univariate analysis, and suggesting that the impact of brand perception is more 
pronounced among small firms. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in Stature is 
associated with 1.7% increase in market leverage for a median-sized firm, and allows 
for over 4% of additional debt capacity for a firm in 25th percentile of our sample. 
Given that an average leverage is about 18%, this translates into more than 20% 
additional debt capital. 
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The rest of the control variables are in line with the previous studies. M/B and 
profitability has a negative impact on leverage, while firm size allows for more debt 
capacity, consistent with other capital structure findings. We also find that historical 
volatility of EBITDA does not have a negative impact on capital structure, confirming 
our previous discussion about fundamental differences between past and forward-
looking cash flow volatility. 
To verify the robustness of our results, we repeat the main analysis using 
additional definitions of leverage. First, we exclude the short-term debt component 
and define leverage as long-term debt, scaled by assets. Our results remain unchanged. 
Second, we re-estimate the main specifications using liabilities-to-assets. Welch 
(2011) points to fundamental flaws in using financial debt-to-assets as a leverage 
proxy and advocates the use of the ratio of total liabilities to assets as a more precise 
measure, capturing non-financial liabilities. We do not find any material differences in 
the coefficient of brand Stature, using total liabilities-to-assets. We also re-run the 
main specifications using additional control variables: DivDummy, sales growth in 
years (t-1) and (t-2), Depreciation, Return, S&P credit rating of the firm’s long-term 
debt, and NYSE. While some of the coefficients appear to be statistically significant, 
and have the predicted sign (for example, Depreciation, and NYSE dummy have a 
positive impact on leverage), they do not affect the magnitude and statistical 
significance of brand Stature. 
Overall, the results of the capital structure estimation are consistent with the 
hypothesis that product demand characteristics have an economically and statistically 
significant impact on capital structure, even after controlling for other commonly used 
determinants of the capital structure. The positive impact of Stature on Leverage 
indicates that consumer brand perception reduces the bankruptcy risk and 
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guaranteeing higher and more stable cash flows, as a result, providing a firm with 
more debt capacity. 
2. Cash Holding 
Following the methodology of the previous sub-section, we start with a 
univariate analysis of cash holdings scaled by assets and sales, across Sales-Stature 
groups. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 1.C.8. Consistent with previous 
studies, we find that size plays an important role in cash holding policy and larger 
firms hold significantly less cash than small firms, and the pattern linearly declines 
across size groups. Keeping size constant, cash holdings decrease across Stature 
groups, and the difference is the most pronounced for the smallest size quintile: while 
firms in the bottom of Stature quintile hold over 34% of their assets as cash and liquid 
securities (scaled by assets), firms in the top Stature group hold only 13%. The 
differences are even more pronounced when analyzing cash holding scaled by Sales. 
We proceed with multivariate analysis and estimate cash holdings as a function 
of Stature and common control variables. The results are presented in Table 1.C.10. In 
Panel A cash holds are scaled by total assets, and in Panel B by Sale. Consistent with 
previous findings, we find that cash holdings decrease with size and net working 
capital, which can be considered a substitute for cash. More profitable and tangible 
firms hold less cash, as their probability and cost of financial distress are lower. At the 
same time, firms with more growth opportunities, as captured by M/B, accumulate 
more cash to be able to finance future projects. We alter the baseline specification by 
adding the interaction of Stature and Sale (Specification (2)), and also past cash flow 
volatility, as well as advertising and R&D expenses (Specification (3)). The 
coefficients of log(Advertising) and log(R&D) are positive and mostly significant, 
suggesting that both variables can be viewed as proxies for investment opportunities. 
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Similar to the leverage estimation, the Stature*log(Sale) interaction term is 
statistically significant, and indicates that the impact of Stature on cash holdings is 
more pronounced for smaller firms. In terms of magnitude, a median firm that 
experiences a one standard deviation increase in its brand perception, reduces its cash 
holdings by 2.5%, while a firm in the 25th percentile – by 4.5%. 
To verify the robustness of our results for cash holding, in unreported 
regressions we include additional control variables (log(Age), sales growth in years (t-
1) and (t-2), Depreciation, Return, NYSE) and obtain results similar to the ones 
reported here. 
The results for cash holding, together with the results on leverage, robustly 
demonstrate that firms with strong brand Stature hold significantly more net debt (debt 
minus cash holdings, all scaled by book assets). Net debt, commonly used by 
practitioners, shows how well a firm can manage its debt. Given a fixed debt level, a 
firm with more cash reserves is better able to handle financial troubles than an all 
equal firm with lower cash reserves. The higher levels of net debt among firms with 
high Stature provide evidence that firms with strong brand perception have lower 
expected costs of financial distress, which allows them to maintain a relatively high 
level of net debt. 
3. Variance Decomposition 
The results so far have established an economically and statistically significant 
relationship between consumer demand characteristics, as captured by brand Stature, 
and a firm leverage and cash holding policy. In this subsection we turn to a variance 
decomposition analysis and examine how much Stature contributes to explaining the 
overall variation in each of the dependent variables, compared to other control 
variables, commonly used in empirical research. 
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Following Lemmon et al. (2008), we perform an analysis of covariance 
(ANOVA). Specifically, we use Type III sum of squares, which is the increase in 
model sum of squares due to adding the variable of interest to a model that already 
contains all the other control variables. Type III sum of squares is more appropriate 
than Type I sum of squares for our analysis, since the former does not depend on the 
order in which the explanatory variables are entered into the model. To calculate the 
Type III sum of squares, we use the regression specifications identified in Tables 
1.C.4 and 1.C.5. We first compute partial sum of squares and then normalize the 
vector obtained by dividing the partial sum for each variable by the total Type III 
partial sum of squares. The normalization procedure eases the interpretation of the 
results by demonstrating the relative contribution of each factor. It is important to 
note, though, that Type III partial sum of squares do not add up to the regression sum 
of squares but, rather, capture a marginal increase in explanatory power as a result of 
adding another variable. 
The results of the variance decomposition are presented in Table 1.C.11. 
Panels A and B estimate book and market leverage, respectively, while Panels C and 
D present the results of cash holding as the dependent variable. Regression 
specifications (1) through (3) in each panel exclude industry fixed effect, which is 
added back in specifications (4) through (6). When Stature and industry fixed effect is 
not included, most of the variation in book and market leverage are explained by 
tangibility and Market-to-Book ratio. This is consistent with previous studies, 
suggesting that tangibility is one of the important factors determining debt capacity. 
Specifications (4) through (6) demonstrate that Stature and its interaction with size 
explain aver 50% of the variation of book leverage, significantly more than any other 
variable. In the regression of market leverage the contribution of these variables is 
lower, and is about 16%-20% of the overall sum of squares, but it is almost as 
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substantial as the contribution of Tangibility. Incorporating industry fixed effects shifts 
most of the explanatory share from the control variables to the fixed effect 
components, which is responsible for 47% to 89% of the explained variation in 
leverage (specifications (4) through (6)). As industry fixed effect reduce the 
explanatory power of Stature, it still explains more of the variation than any of the 
control variables. The only variable that has more power in capturing the overall 
variation is M/B in the market leverage regression. It is important to note, though, that 
scaling leverage by market, rather than book, assets, creates a mechanical relation 
between the two variables. Overall, the sum of squares explained by brand Stature 
roughly equals the explained sum of squares of all the major explanatory variables: 
log(Sale), EBITDA, tangibility, and most important, historical variance in a firm’s 
profitability. Taken together, the results provide evidence that Stature accounts for a 
significant portion of explained variation in leverage, equivalent to the fraction, 
explained by the standard accounting characteristics of a firm. 
A somewhat different picture emerges from Panel B, which decomposes the 
explained variance of cash holdings. Overall, M/B, tangibility, and net working capital 
are the important drivers of the explained sum of squares. Industry fixed effects, while 
still explaining a large portion of the variation, contribute 47% to 77%. Stature and its 
size interaction account for about 20% of the variation when fixed effects are 
excluded, and 10% in specifications that account for industry fixed effects. While this 
is a relatively small portion, it is still quite substantial compared to other control 
variables, such as size, profitability, historical volatility, and dividend payer indicator, 
suggesting once again that brand Stature bears information about cash flow 
characteristics, not captured by other variables. 
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V. Alternative Explanations and Robustness Tests 
While this paper focuses cash flow stability as the main mechanism through 
which characteristics of intangible assets affect financial policies of a firm, it is 
possible that there exist alternative links between brand perception and corporate 
decisions. In this subsection we discuss other plausible explanations to the results 
above. 
1. Agency Problems 
The findings of the paper are potentially consistent with an agency 
explanation, as market competition is considered one of the managerial disciplining 
devices (see, among others, Alchian (1950), Stigler (1958), and Hart (1983)). A loyal 
pool of consumers may insulate the firm from the rest of the firms in the industry and 
reduce the impact of market competition. As a result, agency problems between 
managers and shareholders intensify. However, agency conflicts generate opposite 
predictions about the relations between demand function characteristics and a firm’s 
financial decisions. Thus, firms with strong demand hoard cash and distribute less to 
the shareholders. Firms might also choose to hold less debt, as debt also restricts 
managerial discretion (Jensen (1986)). 
It is still possible, though, that a firm decides to use higher debt and lower cash 
holdings as an alternative mechanism of mitigating the agency problems. Thus, 
managers may voluntarily restrict themselves from potential overuse of a firm’s funds 
by choosing higher debt levels, lower cash reserves, and higher payouts to maintain a 
favorable reputation of operating in the best interests of the shareholders. To address 
this concern, we formally examine whether the substitution effect, associated with 
intensified agency problems, can be the actual driver of our results. To test the 
substitution model, we use the entrenchment index of the corporate governance 
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provisions, suggested by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009).21 The index is based on 
the most important components of the governance index by Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) and consists of six provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder 
bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements 
for mergers and charter amendments. If the substitution hypothesis is correct, we 
should find that firms with stronger demand have lower entrenchment index. 
We compute an average of the entrenchment index for each quintile of firms, 
constructed based on the Stature measure, and find no significant pattern between the 
entrenchment index and Stature. Moreover, the difference between the top and the 
bottom quintiles is negative, indicating that firms with stronger brand perception in 
fact have a better corporate governance. Next, we add the entrenchment index to our 
main regression specifications and find that it does not influence the main results 
(unreported). 
2. Information Asymmetry 
Higher brand perception may affect information asymmetry of the firm. For 
example, Chemmanur and Yan (2009, 2010b) demonstrate the link between 
information asymmetry and advertising. Grullon et al. (2004) show that advertising 
affects the overall visibility of a firm. While, as described in Section II, advertising 
and brand perception are quite different concepts, it is still plausible that strong brand 
perception of a firm’s products leads to investor interest in a firm’s financial 
performance, and results in more research on a firm and its operations. The empirical 
results for bond yields and cash holding are consistent with this explanation: firms 
with lower information asymmetry have lower cost of raising debt, and therefore, do 
                                                 
21 The entrenchment index data were obtained from the Web site of Lucian Bebchuk at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml. 
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not need to hold cash to finance potential investment opportunities. However, 
information asymmetry does not explain the positive link between brand perception 
and leverage. If firms with stronger brand enjoy lower information asymmetry, the 
impact should be stronger for equity, rather than debt, because of the option-like 
structure of the equity payout. Therefore, according to this explanation, the leverage 
level of firms with strong brand perception should actually be higher. 
3. Profitability 
Higher brand perception may affect financial decisions of a firm through 
profitability, rather than cash flow volatility channel. If demand for a firm’s product is 
more inelastic among loyal customers, who differentiate the product from other 
existing brands, they will not be willing to substitute the product for alternative 
brands, and the firm will exploit that by charging higher prices. As an outcome, brand 
stability will affect financial decisions through level of profitability, rather than 
through its future stability. 
While theoretically plausible, the argument does not find support in the data. 
First, a simple correlation analysis in Table 1.C.2 demonstrates that the correlation 
between Stature and EBITDA is quite modest, and equals 0.17. To verify that this 
result is robust, in unreported results we calculate correlation between Stature in 
period t and EBITDA in periods (t+1) and (t+2) and find that the correlation does not 
change significantly. These results are consistent with brands such as McDonalds and 
Wal-Mart consistently scoring high on brand stature scale, and suggest that some 
brands appeal to consumers by positioning their products as being consistently cheap. 
Finally, if the brand links to financial decisions through higher profit margins, 
which are not captured by EBITDA variable, one would expect to find negative, rather 
than positive impact on a firm’s leverage, as past literature on capital structure has 
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long documented the negative effect of profitability on leverage, consistent with the 
implications of pecking order theory (see, for example, Fama and French (2002)). 
Therefore, our results do not support this explanation. 
4. Endogeneity and Reverse Causality 
A large number of papers document the effect of financial frictions on the real 
policy of a firm, determining its behavior in the product market. Therefore, a reverse 
causality argument explaining the relationship between financial policy and consumer 
attitudes towards brand predicts that a firm with higher leverage competes more 
aggressively and, as result, may be willing to invest more resources in enhancing the 
value if its brand. While this explanation is plausible by itself, the negative relation 
between brand perception and cash holdings undermines it. Previous studies show that 
deep-pocketed firms increase their output and future market share gains at the expense 
of industry rivals (Telser (1966), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Fresard (2010)). We 
demonstrate that firms with stronger demand hold less cash, which is inconsistent with 
the reverse causality arguments that link strategic debt and cash holdings to product 
competition. 
It is also plausible that relations between brand perception and financial 
decisions are driven by omitted variables. For example, more established and mature 
firms can have easy access to external capital markets, which will provide them with 
resources to advertise heavily, invest in enhancing the quality of their products, or use 
marketing strategies to alter consumer attitude towards the firm’s products. However, 
this argument is not consistent with our findings that the impact of Stature is more 
pronounced among small firms with access to relatively short maturity debt and non-
investment grade bonds. These firms are potentially more constrained in their access 
to the external capital market, and do not have a good reputation in the external capital 
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markets. Therefore, it is unlikely that those rather than large and more mature firms, 
would spend more on enhancing their brand. 
5. Robustness Tests 
Finally, we perform additional robustness tests to verify that our main results 
hold across different subsamples and are robust to additional variable definitions. 
To make sure that our results are not driven by large multi-national 
conglomerates, operating in a number of segments, we remove market leaders from 
the sample and repeat our analysis. We use several definitions to identify market 
leaders. Our first definition is based on a firm’s age. Using the overall Compustat 
universe, we classify the oldest firm in each SIC four-digit industry as a market leader. 
Our second definition uses the market share of a firm. For each year we denote the 
firm with the largest sales in the industry as a market leader. Since the largest firm in 
the industry is most likely publicly traded, our definition is not likely to be biased by 
reliance on the sample of publicly traded firms in defining the market leader. Overall, 
only 6.8% of the firm-year observations fall into the category of market leaders using 
the definition of age and about 7.6%, using the definition of market share. We repeat 
the main estimations of leverage and cash holdings, removing market leaders, and 
obtain similar results. For additional robustness, we define both categories more 
broadly and assign the oldest/largest 1%, 5%, and 10% of firms to the category of 
market leaders. While we eliminate more firm-year observation by expanding the 
market leader criteria, the results of all estimations remain very similar to the ones 
presented here. 
We also verify that our results are not sensitive to using Stature as our main 
measure of brand perception and loyalty. Since the Knowledge pillar may capture 
additional effects, such as elements of information asymmetry, rather than personal 
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attitude as a consumer, it may introduce additional noise to the variable. We re-
estimate our analysis using only the Esteem pillar and find very similar results. Next, 
we use the measure of brand performance, as suggested by Bronnenberg, Dhar, and 
Dube (2009). The authors use a simple average of positive response rates to the 
following brand characteristics: “high quality,” “good value,” and “best brand in the 
category” as a proxy for perceived quality. While “high quality” response is one of the 
components of “Esteem,” the other two questions are not included in the brand Stature 
construct and may potentially affect our results. We re-estimate our specifications for 
leverage and cash holdings using the new index and find results similar to the ones 
obtained with the overall brand Stature measure. 
Since the BAV surveys were not performed on a constant basis before 2001, 
our sample has gaps for the years 1994 to 1996, 1998, and 2000. As a robustness 
check, we correct the sample by imputing the missing BAV data. As most of the BAV 
survey components are extremely persistent, we use the linear function to obtain data 
between two data points to fill in missing data. As a result of the imputation, our 
sample increases to between 2,800 and 3,000 observations (depending on the specified 
regression). The main results remain very similar to the ones presented here. We also 
use a step function as an alternative imputation method and assign the values of the 
most available survey until we obtain new data. Again, we obtain results similar to the 
ones presented. 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that intangible assets characteristics have an impact 
on corporate financial policy. We focus on characteristics of a firm’s brand, which 
accounts for a large portion of a firm’s overall value, and is relevant to firms across 
various industries. To examine the role of intangible asset characteristics, we employ a 
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novel data of consumer brand evaluation, Brand Asset Valuator, which summarizes 
individual attitudes towards different brands using US household surveys. Our main 
measure, brand Stature, captures the degree of familiarity and regards that consumers 
experience towards a certain brand. We use Stature measure to test whether positive 
perception of a brand affects a firm through cash flow stability channel. Previous 
evidence shows that strong brand results in a clientele of loyal consumers, who have 
high subjective value for the firm’s products and are willing to stick with it over time. 
As a result, firms with favorable brand can enjoy a higher and more stable stream of 
future profits and lower riskiness. 
To support the validity of the mechanism, we demonstrate that brand Stature 
reduces forward-looking volatility of a firm’s profits and the probability of distress, as 
measured by Altman’s (1968) modified Z-score. We also find that brand Stature 
improves credit ratings of non-investment grade corporate bonds. Next, we ask 
whether the lower cash flow riskiness, as proxied by brand Stature, is priced in the 
credit market. We estimate yields on publicly traded corporate bonds, and find that 
creditors require lower spreads on debt of firms with positive brand perception. The 
results are more pronounced among firms with short-term credit, and are small and 
insignificant for yields of bonds with maturity over six years. 
After demonstrating that consumer attitude translates into lower riskiness and 
better prices of debt, we turn to the main question of the paper and investigate whether 
characteristics of intangible assets have implications on the financial policy of the 
firm. We find that brand Stature has a positive impact on leverage and a negative 
impact on cash flow, improving the net debt position of the firm. Our results hold after 
including historical cash flow volatility, the commonly used measure of a firm 
stability, in all of our regressions. The impact of Stature remains significant, 
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suggesting that it captures certain information about the firm, not reflected in the past-
looking accounting measures. 
While it is possible that the relationship between financial policy and brand 
perception works in the opposite direction, and financially strong firms allocate more 
resources to an active management of its brand, our subsample results do not support 
these potential explanations. For the reverse causality explanation to hold, we would 
expect to find stronger results among larger, mature, and more established firms. We 
find the opposite. The impact of brand is more pronounces among small firms with 
low credit ratings and short debt maturity, or put differently, more financially 
constrained ones. These findings strengthen the validity of our main hypothesis by 
suggesting that financially constrained firms benefit from having a strong brand more, 
and receive better access to external capital market on more favorable terms. 
Overall, our findings indicate that characteristics of intangible assets are just as 
significant in explaining financial policy of a firm, as the tangible assets are. The 
paper has important product market implications for investment policy, suggesting that 
a young firm may benefit from developing and enhancing its brand early in its 
business life, as it will improve not only relationships with its customers, but also with 
potential investors. From the creditors perspective, the results suggest that a due 
diligence process, accounting for soft information such as relative positioning of the 
firm among its competitors based on customers reviews may help in identifying 
potentially creditworthy borrowers. Finally, the paper shows the importance of the 
interaction between marketing and finance fields and suggests that marketing policy, 
such as brand management, and financial policy, such as capital and cash holding 
decisions, are interdependent. 
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APPENDIX 1.B: MERGING BAV DATA WITH COMPUSTAT 
Linking brands to firms is not trivial. The reason for that is that most 
companies have a quite complex brand hierarchy, through which firms manage 
different products across different brand groups.22 There are four major types of 
branding strategies. In this appendix, we describe the merging rule that we apply for 
each type of brand portfolio. 
The simplest, and actually the rarest, case is a “monobrand”: firms in which 
one brand represents all or most of the firm’s business (for example, Starbucks, 
Walmart, and Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia). In this case the identification of 
brand and company it belongs to is one to one. 
The second case is a corporate brand, in which the corporate name is dominant 
(or is at least an element) in the product brand names (for example, General Electric, 
Logitech, and Hewlett-Packard). For this type of firm, the link to the company is also 
easy, since BAV typically asks about a brand either without mentioning the product 
type or using a separate entrance for the overall brand name (for example, Colgate, 
Colgate Total and Colgate mouthwash). 
The third type of brand hierarchy is the house-of-brands strategy, in which the 
firm does not use its corporate name for branding its products. For example, Diageo, 
the world’s largest beer, wine, and spirit company (whose brands include Guinness, 
Smirnoff, and Johnnie Walker), keeps the company name only at the background of its 
product labels. BAV typically asks about the overall brand name, as well as about 
each of the company brands, in a separate entry. The problem that arises in this case is 
that the combination of brands, composing the firm’s operations, does not have to be 
similar to the overall company valuation. The reason for that is that consumers, while 
                                                 
22 Rao, Agarwal, and Dahlhoff (2004) provide a comprehensive overview of different branding 
strategies. 
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being quite familiar with the brand, often do not know the company it belongs to, so 
when asked about the company name, they cannot relate it to the brands it owns. 
While this question can be quite interesting for further marketing research, our 
purpose in this paper is to get the best approximation at a company level. A weighted 
average of a firm’s brands, while potentially providing a more precise brand value 
proxy, creates additional problems. The first problem is data availability: not all 
companies report the distribution of their balance of statement at a brand level. 
Second, it is not clear which weights are appropriate to use: revenues, gross profits, 
net profits, etc. The advantage of our data is that for most of the house-of-brand firms, 
BAV includes the company name, as well as the names of the brands it owns, as a 
separate entry. As a result, we use the BAV data for the company name rather than an 
aggregation of the individual brands it manages. 
The final type of brand hierarchy is the mixed branding strategy, in which a 
firm uses its company name for some of its brands’ products and employs a house-of-
brand approach for the rest. The Gap Inc, which owns the Gap, Banana Republic, Old 
Navy, Piperlime, and Athleta brands, is a classic example of this strategy. The 
problem here is similar to the previous case: how to construct the best proxy for the 
company’s overall BAV score. We use the brand with the same, or most similar, name 
to the company as a proxy to the firm’s core business.23 The reasoning for this is as 
follows: the choice of brand hierarchy is clearly an endogenous decision of a firm (for 
example, Rao, Agarwal, and Dahlhoff (2004) document the association of the 
branding strategy with firm’s value), so if a firm chooses to identify itself with one of 
its brands, it must be part of the business strategy of the firm—this brand either 
                                                 
23 Some firms have double names (for example, Molson-Coors). In this case we use a simple average of 
the BAV pillars and other variables (usage, brand image) as a proxy for the firm’s overall brand value. 
 49 
constitutes the core of the business or has been historically the main brand of the 
company, so that consumers associate it with the firm. 
Since the data is a time-series, we identify all the changes in ownerships, such 
as mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs, in the BAV-Compustat bridge and change the 
brand-firm links accordingly. For example, we create the link of Gillette brand to the 
Gillette Company, but discontinue it in 2005, when the company was acquired by 
Proctor & Gamble. 
Overall, this approach of matching brands and firms is somewhat different 
from the one used in marketing. Marketing studies use the cases of monobrands only 
and do not consider more complex brand hierarchy structures (Mizik and Jacobson 
(2008, 2009)). We do not believe that our matching strategy introduces a systematic 
bias but are aware of the fact that it introduces additional noise. In the trade-off 
between precision and sample size, we prefer to sacrifice some degree of precision to 
obtain a larger sample of firms for our analysis. As a result, our final sample is almost 
twice as large as in the studies that use monobrands only. 
We still address potential biases, resulting from implementing the approach 
described above, by applying three alternative matching algorithms for house of 
brands and mixed-strategy brand portfolios. First, we use a simple average of the 
Stature of all the brands that belong to a firm. As an alternative approach, we assume 
that the larger the segment of a certain brand in the overall portfolio of a firm’s 
products, the better is consumer familiarity with it. Therefore, we weigh the Stature of 
each brand by the Knowledge of its brand, relative to the overall Knowledge of the 
firm (sum of Knowledge across all the brands of a firm). In the third approach we use 
the brand with the maximum Stature as the representative of the company strength. 
The idea behind this approach is that a firm typically starts with one brand, which 
becomes its core business, but as it grows, it starts introducing new brands. Since a 
 50 
firm can always go back to its core business in a case of unsuccessful development of 
a new brand, the Stature of the most valuable brand may be the important one. We 
repeat the main analysis using each of the alternative merging approaches and find that 
using alternative matching techniques does not change our conclusions in a material 
way. 
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Table 1.C.1. Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the distribution of main variables of interest with non-missing Stature values for the 
period 1993–2009. log(Sale) is the total sales, in millions of constant 1992 dollars, converted to 
logarithms. M/B, market to book ratio, is the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus 
preferred stock plus deferred taxes. EBITDA is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total 
assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment divided by book assets. S&P500 is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a firm belongs to the S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise. Age is 
calculated starting from the first year the firm appeared in the Compustat database. Z-score is the sum 
of 3.3 times EBITDA plus sales, 1.4 times retained earnings, plus 1.2 times working capital, all scaled 
by total assets. Book Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by book assets. Cash 
is cash and short term investments, scales bo total assets (Assets). Hist Volatility(EBITDA) is the 
standard deviation of EBITDA in the previous 5 years. Herfindahl index is the summed squared market 
shares of all the publicly traded companies in an industry defined by the SIC four-digit code. 
 
  
Variable Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Correlation 
with Stature
log(Sale) 7.90 8.15 1.45 6.91 9.06 0.30
M/B 2.15 1.72 1.37 1.23 2.58 0.08
EBITDA 14.8% 14.6% 11.4% 9.1% 20.8% 0.17
Tangibility 28.3% 23.9% 19.6% 13.1% 39.4% 0.04
S&P500 0.49 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.31
Age 26.42 17.00 23.39 8.00 38.00 0.35
Z-score 1.88 2.00 1.58 1.33 2.76 0.18
Advertising/Sales 3.9% 2.2% 6.7% 0.0% 4.8% 0.08
RD/Sales 3.0% 0.0% 6.5% 0.0% 2.5% -0.17
Hist Volatility(EBITDA) 4.4% 2.7% 7.8% 1.6% 5.0% -0.15
Book Leverage 23.9% 21.5% 24.5% 7.8% 33.5% 0.17
Cash/Assets 15.2% 10.4% 15.4% 3.6% 21.6% -0.26
Herfindahl Index 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.19
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Table 1.C.2. Industry Distribution 
This table presents the distribution of BAV and Compustat samples (firm-year observations) by 
industry for the period 1993–2009. Industries are defined according to the Fama-French 12-industry 
classification. Panel A reports the ratio of the number of observations in each industry to the overall 
number of observations in the sample. Panel B reports the ratio of the market capitalization of each 
industry to the overall market capitalization of the sample. 
 
  
Industry Name Industry Description
BAV Compustat BAV Compustat
1
Consumer 
Nondurables
Food, tobacco, textiles, 
apparel, leather, toys
0.223 0.054 0.164 0.078
2 Consumer Durables
Cars, TV's, Furniture, 
Household appliances
0.033 0.025 0.015 0.016
3 Manufacturing
Machinery, trucks, planes, off 
furn, paper, com printing
0.097 0.105 0.098 0.098
4 Energy Oil, gas and coal extraction 0.007 0.039 0.005 0.054
5 Chemicals Chemicals and allied products 0.030 0.022 0.027 0.029
6 Business Equipment
Computers, software, 
electronic equipment
0.156 0.188 0.234 0.169
7 Telecommunications
Telephone and television 
transmission
0.049 0.032 0.080 0.111
8 Utilities Utilities 0.002 0.029 0.002 0.058
9 Shops
Wholesale, retail and some 
services
0.209 0.098 0.095 0.061
10 Healthcare
Healthcare, medical equipment 
and drugs
0.038 0.091 0.174 0.129
11 Money Financial services 0.047 0.188 0.044 0.094
12 Other Other 0.110 0.130 0.063 0.105
Panel A Panel B
Industry 
Number Number of firms Market Cap
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Table 1.C.3. The Effect of Brand Stature on Forward-Looking Cash Flow 
Volatility 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression where the dependent variable is forward-looking 
absolute volatility of earnings in Panel A, and forward-looking relative volatility of earnings in Panel B. 
Forward-looking absolute cash flow volatility at time t is the standard deviation of a firm’s annual 
profitability, scaled by total assets (EBITDA) during period (t+1) through (t+5). Forward-looking 
relative cash flow volatility is forward-looking absolute volatility, scaled by the industry forward-
looking volatility, which is the volatility of the average industry profitability (based on a SIC two-digit 
code) five years forward. Log(Sale) is the logarithm of the total firm sales expressed in millions of 
constant 1992 dollars. M/B, market to book ratio, is the market value of equity plus the book value of 
assets minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes. log(R&D) and log(Advertising) are natural logarithms 
of the overall amount of R&D and advertising expenses, respectively, in millions of constant 1993 
dollars. Hist Volatility(EBITDA) is the standard deviation of EBITDA in the previous 5 years. All 
explanatory variables are lagged by one period. All estimations models include year and industry fixed 
effects (at SIC two-digit level). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are based on 
heteroskedastic consistent errors adjusted for clustering across firms. ***, **, and * indicate p-values of 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept  0.062***  0.049***  2.061***  1.572***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.435) (0.402)
Stature -0.002** -0.002** -0.081* -0.088*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.044) (0.048)
log(Sale) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.247*** -0.245***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.051) (0.057)
M/B  0.005***  0.004***  0.143***  0.105***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.039) (0.035)
EBITDA -0.048*** -0.035* -0.513  0.027 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.742) (0.708)
log(Age) -0.003* -0.06 
(0.001) (0.057)
log(advertising)  0.001***  0.045**
(0.0005) (0.019)
log(R&D)  0.0006  0.034 
(0.001) (0.025)
Hist Volatility(EBITDA)  0.007**  0.045**
(0.003) (0.022)
Obs. 2338 2304 2338 2337
Number of firms 452 446 452 452
R-squared adj. 0.26 0.27 0.16 0.17
Panel B: Relative VolPanel A: Absolute Vol
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Table 1.C.4. The Effect of Brand Stature on Credit Rating 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression where the dependent variable is S&P domestic long-
term issuer credit rating. Panel A includes all the sample firms; Panel B includes firms with rating of 
‘BBB-’ and higher; Panel C includes firms with rating of ‘BB+’ and lower. Credit ratings are converted 
into numeric scale, where credit rating ‘AAA’ receives a score of 1, and credit rating of ‘D’ receives a 
score of 23. Log(Sale) is the logarithm of the total firm sales expressed in millions of constant 1992 
dollars. M/B, market to book ratio, is the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus 
preferred stock plus deferred taxes. EBITDA is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total 
assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by book assets. Tangibility is 
defined as net property, plant, and equipment divided by book assets. Depreciation is depreciation 
expenses scaled by assets. Ret_mean is the average monthly returns on equity over calendar year. 
log(R&D) and log(Advertising) are natural logarithms of the overall amount of R&D and advertising 
expenses, respectively, in millions of constant 1993 dollars. Hist Volatility(EBITDA) is the standard 
deviation of EBITDA in the previous 5 years. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. All 
estimations models include year and industry fixed effects (at SIC two-digit level). Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and are based on heteroskedastic consistent errors adjusted for clustering across 
firms. ***, **, and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept  24.06***  23.52***  22.36***  20.26***  20.17***  18.76***  21.02***  21.3***  20.77***
(1.31) (1.29) (1.29) (1.77) (1.68) (1.69) (0.93) (1.05) (1.05)
Stature -0.11 -0.09 -0.17* -0.06 -0.08 -0.1 -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.37***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
log(Sale) -1.28*** -1.24*** -1.1*** -1.15*** -1.16*** -0.99*** -0.73*** -0.73*** -0.76***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.11) (0.1)
M/B -0.19* -0.21** -0.19* -0.05 -0.11 -0.13 -0.23** -0.24** -0.37***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.09) (0.08) (0.1) (0.1) (0.11)
EBITDA -14.9*** -15.2*** -15.04*** -7.21*** -5.65*** -5.03*** -11.64*** -12.02*** -10.39***
(1.8) (1.75) (1.72) (1.76) (1.8) (1.73) (1.56) (1.56) (1.56)
Leverage  4.77***  4.53***  4.58***  3.66***  3.82***  3.49***  3.49***  3.38***  3.36***
(0.66) (0.63) (0.6) (1.03) (1) (0.95) (0.57) (0.57) (0.55)
Tangibility -3.33*** -3.05*** -4.12*** -3.68*** -1.16 -0.85 
(0.91) (0.91) (0.93) (0.9) (0.86) (0.81)
Depreciation  18.46***  16.21***  7.36  5.61  11.39**  6.71*
(5.54) (5.34) (6.43) (6.26) (4.45) (3.96)
Ret_mean -3.95* -4.1** -7.59 -8.16* -3.16 -3.46 
(2.09) (2.03) (4.79) (4.87) (2.19) (2.13)
log(Advertising)  0.07 -0.001  0.12**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
log(R&D) -0.16** -0.116*  0.02 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Hist Volatility(EBITDA)  8.08**  7.91***  11.66***
(3.75) (2.8) (3.26)
Obs. 1793 1793 1793 882 882 882 911 911 911
Number of firms 324 324 324 208 208 208 203 203 203
R-squared adj. 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.61
Panel A: All Ratings Panel C: Non-Investment RatingsPanel B:Investment Ratings
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Table 1.C.5. The Effect of Brand Stature on Z-Score 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression where the dependent variable is Altman’s (1968) Z-
score, which is the sum of 3.3 times EBITDA plus sales, 1.4 times retained earnings, plus 1.2 times 
working capital, all scaled by total assets. Log(Shareholders) is the logarithm of the total number of 
stock shareholders. S&P is a dummy value that equals one if a firm belongs to the S&P500 index, and 
zero otherwise. Access is an indicator variable for having a credit rating. M/B, market to book ratio, is 
the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes. 
log(R&D) and log(Advertising) are natural logarithms of the overall amount of R&D and advertising 
expenses, respectively, in millions of constant 1993 dollars. Zero is assigned to missing variables. 
log(Advertising) [if>0] includes non-zero values only. Change in Sales is the percentage change in sales 
from previous year. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment divided by book assets. 
Ret_mean is the average monthly returns on equity over calendar year. Hist Volatility(EBITDA) is the 
standard deviation of EBITDA in the previous 5 years. All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
period. All estimations models include year and industry fixed effects (at SIC two-digit level). Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses and are based on heteroskedastic consistent errors adjusted for 
clustering across firms. ***, **, and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept  2.76***  2.97***  2.44***  2.82***  1.82***  2.37***
(0.13) (0.27) (0.21) (0.24) (0.25) (0.29)
Stature  0.23***  0.14**  0.19***  0.11**  0.17***  0.12**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
log(Shareholders)  0.03  0.02 
(0.04) (0.04)
S&P500  0.23**  0.21**
(0.1) (0.09)
Access  0.33*  0.22 
(0.17) (0.18)
log(Advertising) [if>0]  0.22***  0.2***
(0.06) (0.06)
Sales (change) -0.24** -0.25** -0.21* -0.23** -0.18** -0.18**
(0.11) (0.1) (0.11) (0.1) (0.08) (0.08)
Ret_mean  0.19  0.96  0.33  0.96 -0.21  0.5 
(0.93) (0.81) (0.89) (0.79) (0.99) (0.86)
M/B  0.24***  0.276***  0.22***  0.26***  0.25***  0.28 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Tangibility  1.36***  1.16**  1.36***  1.18***  1.72***  1.48***
(0.49) (0.46) (0.47) (0.43) (0.59) (0.56)
log(Advertising)  0.05**  0.05*
(0.02) (0.02)
log(R&D) -0.07* -0.08** -0.07 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Hist Volatility(EBITDA) -5.09*** -4.91*** -4.53***
(1.37) (1.31) (1.59)
Obs. 2364 2364 2532 2532 1861 1861
Number of firms 438 438 464 464 357 357
R-squared adj. 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.42 0.39 0.43
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Table 1.C.6. Operating Performance of Low versus High Brand Stature Firms 
during Recession 
This table presents sample statistics of selected variables for low and high brand Stature firms, matched 
on their sales as of (t-1). To assign firms into groups of Low and High Stature, every year all the firms 
are allocated into quartiles based on their Stature score. The bottom quartile includes Low Stature firms, 
and the top one includes High Stature firms. Change in EBITDA is the percentage change in firm 
operating performance, scaled by assets. Change in Sale in the percentage change in firm total sales, in 
millions of constant 1993 dollars. Z-score is the sum of 3.3 times EBITDA plus sales, 1.4 times retained 
earnings, plus 1.2 times working capital, all scaled by total assets. The periods of recession are based on 
NBER Business Cycle data. Tests on means and medians are t-test and Wilcoxon test, respectively. ***, 
**, and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, and are based on two-tailed tests. 
 
  
Variable
Number of 
observations mean median mean median mean median
change in EBITDA 58 3.27% 1.58% 2.30% 2.46% 0.97% -0.88%
change in Sale 58 -0.02% 0.05% 8.02% 5.25% -8.04%*** -5.2%
Z-Score 58 0.55 1.21 1.93 2.04 -1.38*** -0.83***
change in EBITDA 152 1.23% 1.20% 5.90% 2.19% -4.67%*** -0.99**
change in Sale 152 0.60% 1.30% 10.3% 2.80% -9.7%*** -1.50%*
Z-Score 152 1.22 1.59 1.82 1.86 -0.60*** -0.27
Panel A: Recession of 2001
Panel B: Recession of 2007-2009
Low Stature High Stature Low minus High Stature
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Table 1.C.7. The Effect of Brand Stature on Credit Spreads 
This table reports the results of the OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the spread on 
public bond, in percent terms. In Panel A spreads are aggregated across all bond maturities; in Panel B 
they are based on bonds with maturities of less or equal to 6 years; in Panel C spreads are based on 
bonds with maturities of longer than 6 years. Credit Rating corresponds to the appropriate maturity 
rating, and is converted into numeric scale. Log(Sale) is the logarithm of the total firm sales expressed 
in millions of constant 1992 dollars. M/B, market to book ratio, is the market value of equity plus the 
book value of assets minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes. EBITDA is the ratio of operating income 
before depreciation to total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment divided 
by book assets. log(Age) is calculated starting from the first year the firm appeared in the Compustat 
database. log(R&D) and log(Advertising) are natural logarithms of the overall amount of R&D and 
advertising expenses, respectively, in millions of constant 1993 dollars. Hist Volatility(EBITDA) is the 
standard deviation of EBITDA in the previous 5 years. All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
period. All estimations models include year and industry fixed effects (at SIC two-digit level). Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses and are based on heteroskedastic consistent errors adjusted for 
clustering across firms. ***, **, and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
    
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept -3.02 -3.13  0.56  0.31 -8.25 -7.91 
(4.87) (4.86) (5.29) (5.22) (5.83) (5.57)
Stature -0.37** -0.47*** -0.49** -0.63*** -0.03 -0.01 
(0.15) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.09) (0.1)
log(Sale)  0.32  0.29  0.04  0.02  0.56*  0.55*
(0.29) (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.33) (0.31)
M/B  0.49**  0.48***  0.46**  0.47**  0.31  0.26 
(0.19) (0.18) (0.2) (0.2) (0.22) (0.2)
EBITDA -2.04 -2.82  0.89  0.24  1.4  0.42 
(1.92) (2.04) (2.48) (2.84) (2.21) (2.65)
Tangibility  2.33*  2.388*  0.58  0.45  1.87*  1.74*
(1.33) (1.32) (2.15) (2.17) (0.99) (1.03)
log(Age)  0.54**  0.54**  0.12  0.17  0.41*  0.42*
(0.25) (0.27) (0.32) (0.33) (0.22) (0.22)
Credit Rating  0.64***  0.62***  0.57***  0.53***  0.63***  0.6***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14)
Leverage  4.28*  4.44*  5.92**  6.32*** -0.13  0.02 
(2.33) (2.33) (2.27) (2.32) (0.99) (1.04)
log(Advertising)  0.12**  0.14* -0.002 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04)
log(R&D) -0.014 -0.1 -0.04 
(0.07) (0.1) (0.07)
Hist Volatility(EBITDA)  0.22  5.02  11.26 
(5.35) (7.39) (8.89)
Obs. 739 739 600 600 482 482
Number of firms 168 168 148 148 130 130
R-squared adj. 0.54 0.54 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.55
Panel A: All Maturities Panel B: Short-Term Maturity Panel C: Long-Term Maturity
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Table 1.C.8. Brand Stature and Financial Policy: Univariate Analysis 
This table presents a comparison of equally weighted group means for measures of leverage (Panel A), 
and cash holding (Panel B) The quintiles are formed by first partitioning the BAV sample by Sales, and 
then partitioning each quintile by Stature quintiles. Quintiles of Sale-Stature are re-formed every year. 
Reported averages are cross-sectional equally-weighted averages. Leverage is the sum of short-term and 
long-term debt; Cash is cash and short-term investments. 
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Table 1.C.8 (Continued) 
 
 
Small 2 3 4 Large Small 2 3 4 Large
Stature/Sales quintile
Low 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.25 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.17
2 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.27 0.26 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.18
3 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.26 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.19
4 0.14 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.28 0.10 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.20
High 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.13
Difference (High-Low) 0.23 0.17 0.15 0.09 -0.03 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.01 -0.04
t-stat (High-Low) 6.86 5.89 6.67 4.27 -1.33 6.20 5.86 2.48 0.51 -2.08
Small 2 3 4 Large Small 2 3 4 Large
Stature/Sales quintile
Low 0.34 0.25 0.23 0.15 0.14 0.40 0.41 0.37 0.21 0.23
2 0.22 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.20
3 0.22 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.19
4 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.18
High 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.19
Difference (High-Low) -0.20 -0.16 -0.16 -0.07 -0.01 -0.29 -0.33 -0.30 -0.14 -0.04
t-stat (High-Low) -7.65 -7.91 -7.60 -5.11 -0.76 -7.03 -8.00 -8.02 -5.95 -1.29
Book Leverage Market Leverage
Panel A: Leverage 
Panel B: Cash Holdings 
Cash/Assets Cash/Sales
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Table 1.C.9. Cross-Sectional Regression of Leverage on Brand Value Estimates 
This table reports the results of the Tobit estimation of book and market leverage (Panel A and Panel B, 
respectively). Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by book [market value of] 
assets. log(Sale) is the total sales, in millions of constant 1992 dollars, converted to logarithms. M/B, 
market to book ratio, is the market value of equity plus the book value of assets minus preferred stock 
plus deferred taxes. EBITDA is the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets. 
S&P500 is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm belongs to the S&P 500 index, and zero 
otherwise. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and equipment divided by book assets. log(Age) 
is calculated starting from the first year the firm appeared in the Compustat database. log(R&D) and 
log(Advertising) are natural logarithms of the overall amount of R&D and advertising expenses, 
respectively, in millions of constant 1993 dollars. Hist Volatility(EBITDA) is the standard deviation of 
EBITDA in the previous 5 years. All estimation models include year and industry fixed effects (at SIC 
two-digit level). Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are based on heteroskedastic consistent 
errors adjusted for clustering across firms. ***, **, and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 1.C.9 (Continued) 
    
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept -0.02  0.05  0.02 -0.04  0.01  0.002 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Stature  0.03***  0.305***  0.31***  0.01*  0.18***  0.18***
(0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
log(Sale)  0.01*  0.002  0.01  0.01***  0.01  0.01**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.01) (0.01)
Stature*log(Sale) -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
M/B -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
EBITDA  0  0  0.002 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
S&P500 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(Age)  0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.002 -0.06 -0.09 
(0.1) (0.1) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Tangibility -0.01  0.004  0.002 -0.007  0.001 -0.0004 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
log(Advertising)  0.003  0.001 
(0) (0.002)
log(R&D) -0.01* -0.01***
(0) (0.003)
Hist Volatility(EBITDA)  0.1 -0.013 
(0.07) (0.05)
Number of obs. 2572 2572 2572 2569 2569 2569
Number of clusters 468 468 468 468 468 468
Chi-squared 843.17 947.14 967.56 1132.6 1211.8 1249.4
Panel A: Book Leverage Panel B: Market Leverage
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Table 1.C.10. Cross-Sectional Regression of Cash Holding on Brand Value 
Estimates 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression where the dependent variable is the ratio of cash to 
assets in Panel A, and the ratio of cash to sales in Panel B. log(Sale) is total sales, in millions of 
constant 1992 dollars, converted to logarithms. S&P500 is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm 
belongs to the S&P500 index, and zero otherwise. M/B, market to book ratio, is the market value of 
equity plus the book value of assets minus preferred stock plus deferred taxes. EBITDA is the ratio of 
operating income before depreciation to total assets. Tangibility is defined as net property, plant, and 
equipment divided by book assets. Wcap is working capital net of cash, scaled by assets. Capex is the 
ratio of capital expenditures to total assets. DivDummy is a dummy variables that equals one if a firm 
pays out dividends, and zero otherwise. log(R&D) and log(Advertising) are natural logarithms of the 
overall amount of R&D and advertising expenses, respectively, in millions of constant 1993 dollars. 
Hist Volatility(EBITDA) is the standard deviation of EBITDA in the previous 5 years. All estimation 
models include year and industry fixed effects (at SIC two-digit level). Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and are based on heteroskedastic consistent errors adjusted for clustering across firms. ***, 
**, and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 1.C.10 (Continued) 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept  0.45***  0.411***  0.373***  0.389***  0.335***  0.361***
(0.047) (0.045) (0.046) (0.09) (0.084) (0.088)
Stature -0.017*** -0.1564*** -0.139*** -0.022*** -0.21*** -0.208***
(0.005) (0.031) (0.031) (0.008) (0.058) (0.059)
log(Sale) -0.019*** -0.014*** -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.018** -0.038***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Stature*log(Sale)  0.016***  0.014***  0.022***  0.022***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
S&P500 -0.016 -0.018* -0.018*  0.008  0.004  0.004 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.018)
M/B  0.03***  0.028***  0.023***  0.028***  0.025***  0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
EBITDA -0.117** -0.076 -0.007 -0.287*** -0.231*** -0.169**
(0.05) (0.051) (0.047) (0.071) (0.07) (0.071)
Tangibility -0.147*** -0.145*** -0.129*** -0.119** -0.117** -0.101*
(0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
Wcap -0.287*** -0.279*** -0.255*** -0.236*** -0.226*** -0.171***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.059) (0.059) (0.057)
Capex  0.062  0.009 -0.041  0.037 -0.033 -0.08 
(0.092) (0.093) (0.087) (0.128) (0.131) (0.127)
DivDummy -0.013 -0.012 -0.01  0.002  0.003  0.009 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
log(advertising)  0.006***  0.003 
(0.002) (0.003)
log(R&D)  0.011***  0.03***
(0.003) (0.005)
Hist Volatility(EBITDA)  0.199*** -0.092 
(0.059) (0.15)
Number of obs. 2568 2568 2568 2568 2568 2568
Number of clusters 465 465 465 465 465 465
R-squared adj. 0.52 0.53 0.56 0.420 0.43 0.46
Panel BPanel A
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Table 1.C.11. Variance Decomposition 
This table presents the results of Type III variance decomposition analysis where the dependent 
variables are book leverage (Panel A) and cash holdings (Panel B). We first compute partial sum of 
squares, and then normalize the vector obtained by dividing the partial sum for each variable by the 
total Type III partial sum of squares. See Tables 1.C.5 and 1.C.6 for the description of the variables. 
 
  
66
Table 1.C.11 (Continued) 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stature 0.31 0.34 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.05
log(Sale) 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Stature*log(Sale) 0.23 0.26 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.04
M/B 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.62 0.46 0.40 0.32 0.26 0.21
EBITDA 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01
S&P500 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
log(Age) 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Tangibility 0.62 0.30 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.10 0.00 0.00
log(Advertising) 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
log(R&D) 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02
Hist Volatility(EBITDA) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Year FE 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.08
Industry FE 0.89 0.75 0.74 0.47 0.55 0.56
R-squared adj. 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.26 0.26 0.2 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.33 0.34
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stature 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.04
log(Sale) 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.06
Stature*log(Sale) 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04
S&P500 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
M/B 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.02
EBITDA 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01
Tangibility 0.35 0.32 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.27 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.01
Wcap 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.33 0.30 0.22 0.04 0.04 0.02
Capex 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
DivDummy 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
log(advertising) 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
log(R&D) 0.08 0.04 0.25 0.12
Hist Volatility(EBITDA) 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
Year FE 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
Industry FE 0.52 0.47 0.46 0.77 0.74 0.63
R-squared adj. 0.37 0.41 0.44 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.42 0.43 0.46
Panel C: Cash/Assets Panel D: Cash/Sale
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CHAPTER 2: 
STRIKE WHILE THE IRON IS HOT: TIMING THE MARKET ON THE 
WAY TO THE OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Abstract 
The existing literature provides mixed evidence on the relative importance of market 
timing versus trade-off incentives in capital structure decisions. This paper shows how 
exactly these forces coexist and determines when one is more important than the other 
in affecting equity issuance decisions and long-run stock performance. The idea is that 
market timing benefits dominate trade-off costs when firms are close to their target 
leverage, but become offset by the rebalancing considerations when firms are farther 
away. Two sets of empirical results support the validity of the framework. First, the 
sensitivity of equity issuances to past stock performance is the highest among firms 
close to the target leverage. Second, the long-run performance of equity issuers is also 
a function of their deviation from target leverage. The lower the leverage of issuing 
firms is relative to the target, the worse their after-issuance returns are, consistent with 
higher market timing incentives compared to other issuers. 
Introduction 
Whether market timing or trade-off considerations are the main drivers of 
financial decisions has been an important debate in the capital structure literature (see, 
among others, Baker and Wurgler (2002), Welch (2004), and Leary and Roberts 
(2005)). Starting from early empirical evidence by Marsh (1982) and Jalilvand and 
Harris (1984), finance research has accumulated a body of evidence, indicating that 
firms may consider both market timing and trade-off incentives. Yet, it is unclear 
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which of the two incentives is more important, and why studies find mixed results 
assessing the relative contribution of each force to capital structure decisions. 
In this paper I develop a unified framework that demonstrates that firms 
proactively time the market, but at the same time consider target leverage when 
making their capital structure decisions. In addressing the mixed results about the 
relative importance of trade-off versus market timing forces, the framework 
demonstrates that incentives to time the market are determined not only by recent 
stock performance, but also by the relative distance of current leverage compared to 
the target one. Specifically, in every period firms weigh the benefits of market timing 
and the costs of deviation from the target, and make their capital structure decisions 
accordingly. All else equal, market timing impact on issuance decisions is most 
pronounced when firms are close to the target, and have low costs of deviation from 
the target. At the same time, the gap between current and optimal leverage becomes 
costlier than the benefits of raising cheap capital as firms’ leverage moves farther 
away from the target. Overleveraged firms, facing an increased probability of getting 
into financial distress, higher borrowing rates and potential constraints on investments 
and future growth, place a higher priority on reducing their leverage rather than on 
waiting for market timing opportunities, and should issue equity regardless of the 
current market value of their equity. Similarly, the advantages of the tax shield and the 
role of debt as a manager disciplining device (Jensen (1986), Harris and Raviv (1990)) 
become more important for underleveraged firms, who will choose to forgo market 
timing opportunities and issue debt rather than equity to get back to the optimal 
leverage level. To summarize, market timing incentives are the dominant ones for 
firms that are close to the target leverage, while the trade-off considerations primarily 
determine capital structure decisions of underleveraged and overleveraged firms. 
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To test the validity of this unified framework, I empirically examine how the 
market timing impact on financial decisions of firms differs with the distance of their 
current leverage from the target. I study market timing behavior in two ways. In the 
first part of the empirical analysis I look at the sensitivity of issuances to the relative 
stock performance of firms and examine whether its magnitude differs with the 
distance of the firms’ leverage from the target. In the second part I test whether the 
long-run performance of firms that issued equity differs depending on their relative 
leverage at the moment of issuance. 
To measure the rebalancing motives, all firms in the sample are divided into 
three groups of relative leverage. I define relative leverage as deviation from the 
benchmark group leverage, which I use to proxy for the target leverage of a firm. It is 
calculated as the mean of industry-size peer group. Market timing incentives are 
measured by excess returns of a firm over the mean of the benchmark group (industry-
size). To validate the robustness of the results, I consider additional specifications of 
the target leverage (including a parametric estimation of the target leverage), as well 
as different proxies of the market timing incentives. 
The results of the empirical tests support the main idea of the paper. The first 
part of the analysis shows that firms’ returns, as well as their relative leverage, have a 
significant impact on determining the amount of equity issued in the following period. 
The trade-off between the benefits of market timing and the costs of deviation from 
the optimal leverage level is non-linear, and depends on the firms’ current level of 
leverage relative to their benchmark peers. The impact of stock returns on issuances is 
the highest in magnitude for those firms that are close to the target leverage, and small 
and insignificant for firms with high or low leverage relative to the peer group. I also 
find that the non-linear sensitivity of equity changes to market timing opportunities is 
more pronounced for equity issuances than for equity repurchases, and for stocks with 
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extremely high returns. The results are robust to different specifications of relative 
leverage and market timing proxies. 
The second part of the paper examines the long-run performance of issuing 
versus non-issuing firms as a function of their relative leverage. As previously 
documented, equity issues are characterized not only by stock price run-up before the 
equity issuance, but also by subsequent long-run deterioration of stock prices. 
Therefore, firms that had the most incentives to time the market should underperform 
their peers in the long-run, as the market corrects the price of the stock. 
Underleveraged firms that decide to issue equity are potentially the worst 
underperformers. Since these firms do not issue equity for rebalancing motives, their 
market timing opportunities at the time of issue should be the highest compared to 
their peers in other leverage groups. In general, long-run underperformance of issuers 
is expected to decrease across groups of relative leverage, as rebalancing 
considerations intensify. 
I test this hypothesis using Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) and 
Fama-French calendar-time approach, and find that the portfolio of underleveraged 
firms that issued equity has the most negative abnormal performance. As the relative 
leverage increases, long-run excess returns of firms improve, indicating that firms 
issue more equity for rebalancing reasons. Taken together, the results of the tests 
suggest that relative leverage position of firms at the time of issue can reveal true 
motives behind the issue. 
Overall, this paper has several contributions to the existing capital structure 
literature. First, it demonstrates that firms actively manage their capital structure to 
minimize the losses due to high deviation from the target by covering leverage gaps, 
but at the same time monitor their relative stock performance to rationally take 
advantages of temporary market inefficiencies. Second, it outlines a simple, but broad 
76 
framework that determines how exactly the two forces interact under what conditions 
one incentive dominates the other. Third, the paper constructs two sets of econometric 
analyses, and provides an empirical support for the validity of the proposed 
framework. Finally, this framework helps identifying the purpose of the issue, and 
evaluating its long-run impact on investors’ portfolio. More broadly, the paper adds to 
a large group of capital structure studies indicating that while equity issuances appear 
to be driven by stock price considerations, firms also have target leverage in mind 
(Graham and Harvey (2001), Hovakimian (2004, 2006), Leary and Roberts (2005), 
Kayhan and Titman (2007), Alti (2006), Elsas, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2006), Huang 
and Ritter (2009), Cook and Tang (2010)). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I start with hypotheses 
development in Section I. Section II describes the data and methodology. Section III 
presents the results of estimating the issuance decisions. Section IV tests hypothesis 
about the long-run performance of the issuing firms, and Section V concludes. 
I. Hypothesis Development 
This section introduces the framework in which market timing and trade-off 
forces can be viewed as two elements of a broader set of capital structure 
considerations. The main idea of the framework is that in every period firms compare 
the benefits of timing the market with the costs of deviation from the target leverage. 
The strongest among the two forces will determine the capital structure decision. 
Before outlining the framework in more details, it is important to note that two 
types of managerial actions can fall under the category of market timing behavior. The 
first one is issuing equity without an actual need for additional capital when the stock 
prices are high. The second is deferring a potential issuance until more favorable 
market conditions prevail. Both actions provide an opportunity for current 
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shareholders to raise external capital with a discount, which is determined by the 
difference between the stock price at the time of equity issue and the price that 
prevails in the long run.1 
Next, let’s define the trade-off costs. These costs can be split into direct ones 
(proceeds that firms pay to intermediaries if they decide to issue or repurchase equity) 
and indirect, which are the costs of deviation from the optimal leverage level. How are 
the indirect costs established? The indirect costs of deviation from the target level are 
determined by several factors, which differ depending on whether firms are over- or 
underleveraged relative to the target. That is, firms with low leverage forego the 
benefits of the tax shield. In addition, debt plays a signaling role (Leland and Pyle 
(1977)), and mitigates agency costs by disciplining managers (Jensen (1986), Harris 
and Raviv (1990)). Overleveraged firms face an increased probability of getting into 
financial distress, higher borrowing rates and potential constraints on investment, 
which might impair future growth. In addition, agency problems between debt- and 
shareholders can intensify (Myers (1977), Jensen and Meckling (1976)). 
Overleveraged firms will thus prefer to issue equity regardless of the stock returns to 
close the gap between the actual and desired debt level. 
To summarize, the costs of deviation from the optimal leverage will become 
higher than the benefits of market timing (which are determined by the temporary 
deviation of stock prices from the fundamental one) as firms move farther away from 
the target leverage. Therefore, market timing will be the driver of issuance decisions 
only for those firms that are close enough to the optimal leverage: their costs of 
deviation from the optimal target leverage are relatively low and are more than offset 
by the benefits of market timing. 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, I ignore the time value of the money.  
78 
The intuition of this argument is illustrated in Figure 2.B.1. The marginal 
trade-off costs of deviating from the target leverage are presented by the line F(Lev-
Lev*), which is a function of the difference between firms’ current and target leverage 
(Lev and Lev*, respectively). I assume that the function is continuous, monotonically 
decreasing in the deviation from leverage (Lev-Lev*), and convex.2 The function 
achieves its maximum when (Lev-Lev*=0), as firms at their target leverage do not 
incur any trade-off costs. Korteweg (2010) and van Bisbergen, Graham and Yang 
(2010) show that the costs of deviating from optimal leverage are asymmetric, and are 
higher for overleveraged, compared to underleveraged, firms. To incorporate their 
findings in the analysis of this paper, I allow for a steeper slope of the cost function 
F(Lev-Lev*) in the positive range of (Lev-Lev*) values. Without loss of generality, the 
analysis holds for symmetrical functional forms. The marginal profits from timing the 
market are represented by the function M=(Ret-Ret*), which is parallel to the axis X.3 
Ret are the recent returns during the period t, and Ret* is the cost of capital in the long 
run. The marginal profit from market timing, net of the trade-off costs, is determined 
by the difference (F-M), and represented by the function G(Lev-Lev*). Firms will 
choose to time the market as long as G(Lev-Lev*) is positive. As a result, the decision 
to time the market becomes a function of firms’ deviation from the target leverage. 
Firms in the range LowLev will choose to forgo market timing opportunities to issue 
debt or repurchase equity; firms in the HighLev range will issue equity independently 
of their actual stock performance; and firms in the MidLev group will time the market. 
                                                 
2 The assumption of convexity is consistent with the model by Korteweg (2010). It is not critical to the 
main results of the framework, and can be substituted with a convex function of equity issuance costs, 
which is consistent with empirical evidence by Altinkilic and Hansen (2000). 
3 Without loss of generality it is possible to incorporate the direct costs of issuance by subtracting a 
constant. 
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After the general description of the framework, I now turn to developing the 
first hypothesis of the paper, which examines the sensitivity of the firm’s issuances to 
the relative stock performance across leverage groups. First, we need to classify 
changes in firms’ equity as market timing driven or not, since the mere decision to 
issue/repurchase does not necessarily indicate market timing motives. For example, 
according to the framework, a firm that is close to the target leverage will issue equity 
to time the market, while another firm in the HighLev range will issue equity for trade-
off reasons. To empirically distinguish between the two cases, it is necessary to 
condition issues/repurchases on relative performance of the stock. In general, market 
timing behavior can be defined as: 
ሺ∆ܧ ൐ 0|ሺܴ݁ݐ௧ െ ܴ݁ݐכሻ ൐ 0ሻ 
ሺ∆ܧ ൏ 0|ሺܴ݁ݐ௧ െ ܴ݁ݐכሻ ൏ 0ሻ 
where ΔE indicates changes in firm’s equity between periods t and (t+1). In words, an 
equity issue is motivated by market timing when it is preceded by positive relative 
performance of a firm. Similarly, a firm’s decision to repurchase equity after a period 
of relatively low stock performance is also classified market timing. 
Next, let’s look at issuance and repurchase decisions of each of the three 
relative leverage groups as a function of their relative stock performance, and 
determine which of those are driven by market timing. The schematic analysis, 
illustrating the intuition behind each case, is presented in Figure 2.B.2. Each chart 
shows the amount of equity issued/repurchased in each relative leverage group as a 
function of the relative stock performance, while taking into account both market 
timing and trade-off motives. It also depicts an empirical linear approximation of 
measuring the sensitivity of stock issuances/repurchases to relative stock performance, 
while keeping the deviation from the target leverage constant. 
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Panel A shows the simplest case of firms that are close to the target leverage 
(MedLev). These firms do not need to issue or repurchase equity for rebalancing 
reasons, so if the market estimates the value of their equity correctly, firms will not 
take any action to rebalance their capital structure (the line passes through the origin). 
However, firms will decide to issue as the difference between the recent and long-run 
returns goes up. Similarly, those firms may choose to repurchase stocks if the market 
temporarily undervalues them. A linear approximation in this case (dotted line) will 
coincide with the theoretical prediction. Empirically, a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of relative returns in predicting changes in equity will indicate 
market timing behavior. 
A more complex theoretical relation between issuances and relative returns 
arises in the case of firms with high relative leverage (HighLev). Since these firms 
incur costs of deviation from the target leverage, their priority is to issue equity 
independently of the actual stock performance and close the leverage gap. Therefore, 
for a certain range of negative (Ret-Ret*) (and possibly a range of positive, but low 
relative returns) the amount of issuances will be positive. Graphically, it is reflected by 
the parallel line AB, which crosses the Y axis at a positive level of ∆ܧ and indicates 
zero sensitivity of issuances to relative stock performance in this range. As the relative 
returns increase, firms may still benefit from market timing by issuing a higher 
amount of equity than required by trade-off consideration, so that the slope can 
become positive within some range of positive (Ret-Ret*). Similarly, when relative 
returns become considerably negative, firms may start taking market timing into 
account and decide to issue a lower amount of equity, or even switch to repurchasing, 
if the net benefits from doing so dominate the losses of deviation from target leverage. 
Empirically, measuring the sensitivity of issuances and repurchases to relative returns 
using a straight line will result in a flatter slope than in the case of MedLev firms (even 
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if the actual sensitivity to relative returns the issuances above point A and below point 
B is the same as in Panel A). 
Finally, the last possible case, depicted in Panel C, describes the relationship 
between issuances and returns for the LowLev group. The trade-off motives of 
underleveraged firms force them to repurchase equity to be able to return to the 
optimal leverage. Therefore, for the range of (Ret-Ret*) up to the point A the amount 
of equity repurchases ΔE is negative, and independent of the actual returns. At a 
certain point, however, the market timing considerations start prevailing, and the firm 
eventually decides to issue equity to exploit the market timing opportunities. 
Therefore, beyond point A´ the sensitivity of issuances to relative returns becomes 
positive. Likewise, when relative returns are substantially negative, a firm may decide 
to take advantage of the market timing opportunities and repurchase a higher amount 
of equity, so that the sensitivity of issuances to relative performance becomes positive 
again. Similarly to the case of overlevered firms, a linear empirical approximation of 
the relationships between issuances and returns will result in a lower slope. 
The schematic analysis, described above, is informal. Still, it is pretty general 
and incorporates a range of possible cases. First, it includes both issuances and 
repurchases. Second, it allows incorporating other types of costs. For example, adding 
fixed issuance costs will shift the issuance line down, closer to the X axis, while 
preserving the main intuition (in the case of MedLev firms the straight line will 
transform into a step function with a period of issuance/repurchase inactivity around 
zero). Similarly, it is possible to incorporate varying issuing costs by changing the 
slopes of the issuance/repurchases line. Third, one can account for varying costs of 
deviation from target leverage. The higher the costs of deviation from target leverage 
are, the wider the AB range will be. Finally, the empirical test of the framework 
validity does not require that the functional form of the G(Lev-Lev*), which 
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determines points A and B, be specified. To demonstrate the interaction between the 
trade-off and market timing forces, it is sufficient to show that the sensitivity of the 
issuance decisions has different magnitudes across the three groups of relative 
leverage. 
The discussion above leads me to outlining the first hypothesis of the paper. 
Hypothesis 1: The sensitivity of issuances to market timing opportunities 
is a non-linear function of the distance between current and target 
leverage of firms. Specifically: 
H1a: The sensitivity of issuances/repurchases to the past stock 
performance for firms that are close to the target leverage (MedLev) is 
positive and significant. 
H1b: The sensitivity of issuances/repurchases to the past stock 
performance for firms that are under- and overleveraged (LowLev and 
HighLev, respectively) is lower than the sensitivity of the MedLev firms. 
Hypothesis 1 studies one aspect of market timing, which is the stock price run-
up before the issuance. However, equity issues, as first documented by Stigler (1964) 
and Loughran and Ritter (1995), are also characterized by long-run price deterioration. 
Firms issue for a number of reasons, including a need to finance upcoming projects, 
change in capital structure, and opportunities to raise cheap capital (see, among others, 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2010), Leary and Roberts (2005), Baker and 
Wurgler (2002), and Welch (2004)). The true reason is usually unknown to 
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shareholders, or can be masked by the firms’ management.4 The framework of this 
paper allows applying the idea of differences in market timing motives across relative 
leverage groups to the post-issuance period. 
To examine the long-term stock performance of firms as a function of their 
relative leverage at the time of issue, let’s go back to Figure 2.B.2 and look at firms 
that decided to issue equity (firms with positive ∆ܧ). I start with Panel B first. The 
majority of overleveraged firms that issue equity do so for trade-off considerations (as 
characterized by the line AB). Therefore, there should be little price correction by the 
market in the long run, and little or no underperformance. As the deviation from target 
leverage decreases, though, more firms start issuing equity for market timing reasons. 
Thus, a group of MedLev firms (Panel A), which are close to the target leverage, can 
issue equity each time there is a positive deviation of their current stock price from the 
fundamental value. Those firms are also expected to perform worse than their peers in 
the HighLev group in the long-run, as the market learns about the true value of the 
firm. Finally, firms in the LowLev group should be the worst underperformers. Since 
their issuance decisions move them further away from the target, market timing 
considerations must be really strong to dominate potential trade-off costs. Panel C 
illustrates this intuition. The line of issuances obtains positive values beyond point A, 
when the relative returns are high. For comparison, MedLev firms start issuing equity 
in the positive range of (Ret-Ret*), and HighLev firms can issue equity almost 
independently of the actual stock performance. The lower is the relative leverage of 
firms, the more likely it is that the issues are motivated by market timing 
opportunities. Therefore, the long run underperformance should be the worst among 
                                                 
4 Behavioral theories have also shown that individuals systematically bias available information. A 
number of studies, including Loughran and Ritter (1997) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 
(1998), demonstrate that investors exhibit biases by being overly optimistic and putting too much 
weight on past performance of a firm. These biases may explain long-run post-issue correction of the 
issuing firm’s prices and the overall underperformance of the firm. 
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underleveraged firms and improve as the relative leverage of a firm at the time of issue 
increases. To summarize this hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Long-run performance of issuing firms improves in the 
relative leverage at the time of issuance. 
II. Data and Methodology 
1. Defining Issuances and Control Variables 
I use annual data available on Compustat for the period 1970-2006 to obtain 
accounting variables. I exclude firms with assets under $1 million and firms that 
belong to utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) and financial sectors (SIC codes 6000-6999). 
Following the methodology, suggested by Fama and French (2005), changes in equity 
are identified from the balance sheet of firms. Net equity issuance (EA) is the change 
in book equity minus the change in retained earnings, as a percent of total assets. A 
positive value indicate that issuances were higher than repurchases during the fiscal 
year, while negative EA implies that in aggregate the firm repurchased shares during 
the period. Net debt issuance (DA) is the residual change in assets as a percent of total 
assets. Finally, net of net issuance (Net_Iss) is the difference between net equity and 
net debt issuance. Following Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), I use a cutoff of 
5% of the asset value for issuances, and 1% for repurchases. Specifically, I assign a 
value of zero to issuances that are smaller than 5% of the total assets. In addition, I 
trim the top and bottom 1% of observations for net debt and equity issuances.5 
The independent variables, used in the multivariate analysis, are the commonly 
used ones in studies of issuance and leverage decisions of a firm (for the summary of 
                                                 
5 As a robustness test, I repeat the analysis using symmetric cutoffs of 5% and 1% for both equity and 
debt issuances. The results remain unchanged. 
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the factors, determining capital structure decisions see, for example, Frank and Goyal 
(2009) and Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008)). Leverage is defined as the sum of 
long-term debt (data9) and debt in current liabilities (data34), scaled by total assets. I 
drop firm-year observations with leverage values above one. The size of the firm, 
Log(Sales), is the total revenues of a firm, expressed in natural logarithms. Market-to-
Book ratio (M/B) is defined as the ratio of assets and market equity minus book 
equity6 to total assets, and reflects growth opportunities. Profitability is the ratio of the 
EBITDA (data12) to total assets. The tangibility of a firm’s assets is captured by PPE, 
the ratio of total net property, plant and equipment (data8), to total assets. R&D is the 
ratio of a firm’s research and development expenses (data46) to total sales (data12). 
The value of zero is assigned to missing variables. I use the first date on which the 
stock price is available in CRSP database to determine the IPO date. I merge CRSP 
and Compustat data and remove missing observations and observations recorded at 
dates earlier than the IPO. Age is the number of years since the first year of a firm’s 
stock price appearance in CRSP database. I remove observations before the IPO year. 
To control for future investment opportunities, I use capital expenditures of the firm 
(data128), scaled by total assets, as of period (t+1) (Capex(t+1)). 
Leary and Roberts (2005) emphasize the importance of accounting for 
adjustment costs in the estimation of the leverage and equity issuance decisions to 
avoid the mistake of falsely identifying adjustment costs as market timing 
opportunities. For example, a firm that does not close the gap between the current and 
target leverage by issuing equity might be waiting for a good opportunity to time the 
market, or trying to minimize the adjustment costs. Following Faulkender et al. 
(2010), I create a proxy for adjustment costs, by computing the free cash flow of the 
                                                 
6 The book value of equity is the book value of total assets minus book liabilities minus preferred stock 
plus deferred taxes. Preferred stock equals to the liquidation value if not missing; otherwise I use 
redemption value if not missing; otherwise the carrying value. 
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firm (FCF) (operating income before depreciation (data13) minus taxes (data16) and 
capital expenditures7 (data128), divided by book assets). I sort all the firm-years in the 
sample by FCF and use the cut-off of 15% to create a dummy variable FCF_low that 
gets a value of 1 if the firm’s cash flow is in the bottom 15% of the sample, and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, FCF_high gets a value of 1 if a firm’s cash flow is in the top 
15% of the sample, and zero otherwise. Since firms with significantly negative free 
cash flow have to raise capital anyway, their marginal adjustment costs should be 
lower than for other firms, and they will have more incentive to issue debt or equity. 
For the final sample I require that a firm has non-missing values for the 
following variables: log(Sales), Profitability, PPE, M/B, Age and Leverage. These 
variables are trimmed at the top and bottom 1% to mitigate the effect of outliers. The 
final sample consists of 13,809 firms and 114,058 firm-year observations. 
In addition, I create a variable for the external finance weighted average 
market-to-book ratio (EFWA), as suggested by Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
Hovakimian (2006) finds that this measure proxies for growth opportunities of a firm 
rather than for market timing. Therefore, I include it in an alternative specification. I 
start by obtaining a continuous time-series of a firm’s assets history and remove firms 
with at least one missing value of total assets variable (data 6) during the history of the 
firm’s record on Compustat. The EFWA measure is a sum of all the past Market-to-
Book ratios, weighted by the proportion of external finance in a given year out of the 
overall external finance raised in the firm’s history of public trading. For a given firm-
year it is defined as: 
                                                 
7 We use capital expenditures at a firm, rather than industry, level to capture the idiosyncratic capital 
needs of a firm. 
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where es and ds are the dollar amounts of equity and debt issuances, respectively8. 
Since the construction of EFWA measure requires a more strict data filtering, the 
sample of firms with non-missing EFWA values includes only about 67,000 firm-year 
observations. 
2. Defining Market Timing and Target Leverage 
This paper defines target leverage ratio as the mean leverage ratio of the 
benchmark group it belongs to. I define a group of firms in the same industry and 
same size quartile as the benchmark group. In choosing this definition as our main 
proxy for target leverage, I rely on previous studies (see, for example, Bradley, Jarrell 
and Kim (1984) and MacKay and Phillips (2005)) that show that most of the variation 
in the financial structure among firms is captured by industry effects. In addition, 
Hovakimian (2006) uses industry-based proxy as his main definition of target 
leverage. To refine the industry proxy, I impose additional matching requirements of 
size groups, as size typically explains a large portion of cross-sectional variation in 
firm financial variables (Frank and Goyal (2009), Korteweg (2010)). Obviously, this is 
only one way to define target leverage. I elaborate on alternative measures of relative 
target leverage ratios that I use to verify the robustness of my results, in Section 
III.C.2. 
To compute the benchmark leverage, in each year I sort all firms in the sample 
into industry groups based on Compustat 2-digit SIC code, and size quartiles based on 
                                                 
8 Following Baker and Wurgler (2002) I set the minimum weight equal to zero by removing 
observations with negative sum of equity and debt issuances in a given year. I also drop firm-year 
observations where the resulting EFWA ratio is greater than 10.  
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Sales. Re-forming the benchmark groups every year serves two purposes. First, it 
allow for a time-series trends in target leverage. Second, it overcomes the problems of 
cold/hot markets (Alti (2006)), as well as incorporating changes in target leverage due 
to macroeconomic factors (Bhamra, Kuehn and Strebulaev (2010)). I then calculate an 
average book leverage of every industry-size benchmark group, requiring at least 10 
observations in a given year. Dev_Lev is defined as the deviation of a firm’s leverage 
from the mean leverage of the benchmark group in a given year. To classify firms into 
overleveraged, underleveraged and the ones close to the target, each year I sort all the 
firms into quartiles based on Dev_Lev variable. The bottom quartile consists of the 
most underleveraged firms, relative to their industry peers, the top quartile includes 
the most overleveraged firms, and quartiles 2 and 3 consist of firms that are close to 
the target leverage. 
Following the market timing literature, I derive market timing proxy from a 
firm’s stock returns. Stock returns are annual returns of a firm on a given fiscal year, 
as reported by Compustat. I use firm’s excess returns over the benchmark group 
average (Dev_Ret) as the main proxy for firm’s market timing incentives. Although 
this measure is somewhat simplistic, it is also the most direct one in measuring the 
firm’s opportunities to raise capital with the lowest costs. In the survey of managers, 
Graham and Harvey (2001) find that CEOs issue equity in response to high raw stock 
performance of their firm. In addition, raw and excess past stock returns prior to the 
issuance are used as a proxy for market timing opportunities in previous studies (see, 
for example, Marsh (1982), Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Korajczyk, Lucas and 
McDonald (1991), Welch (2004), Elsas, Flannery and Garfinkel (2006), Alti and 
Sulaeman (2009), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2010), Hovakimian and Hutton 
(2010)). I perform robustness tests and describe alternative measures of market timing 
in Section III.C.1. 
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3. Summary Statistics 
Table 2.A.1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables used in the 
sample. An average firm has leverage ratio of 0.23, similar to the median one. The 
average annual returns are 6%, somewhat smaller than the average of indices, but the 
results can be driven by the fact that the sample includes small firms with volatile 
returns and firms in distress. The profit of an average firm is about 10% a year, and 
M/B is 1.65. An average firm issues around 3.8% of equity a year (as a percentage of 
assets). This is a very small number, since it averages across years with no issuances 
as well as years with positive or negative net issuances. Consistently with previous 
studies, I find that only about 20% of the sample has positive equity issuances in a 
given year (75th Pctl. Of EA is zero). Debt issues are more frequent, but the average 
issuance magnitude is smaller (the mean is 3%). 
III. Results 
1. Non-Parametric Analysis 
1.1. Univariate Analysis 
I first perform a univariate analysis of the issuances of debt, equity and the 
main control variables. The results are reported in Table 2.A.2. I sort the overall 
sample into quartiles by relative leverage (Dev_Lev) in Panel A and by relative stock 
performance (Dev_Ret) in Panel B (both as of (t-1) period). 
Panel A shows that net debt issuances (DA) exhibit a declining pattern across 
leverage groups from 4.4% for the most underleveraged quartile to 0.8% for the 
highest leverage quartile. These results are consistent with a trade-off hypothesis: 
firms with low level of leverage are the ones that are the most likely to issue debt. 
There is no clear pattern, however, for the net equity issuances (EA), suggesting that 
there are other factors, besides leverage, that determine the decision of the firm to 
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issue equity. The pattern of the net of net equity issuance (Net_Iss) monotonically 
increases across leverage quartiles from -0.7% for underleveraged firms to 3.1% for 
the overleveraged ones, also consistent with the trade-off hypothesis. Taken together, 
the results suggest that equity and debt serve different purposes: debt is issued/retired 
for rebalancing motives, while there seem to be additional reasons behind equity 
issuance. Some of the control variables also have a clear pattern. Profitability and 
Market-to-Book ratio (M/B) decrease with leverage, similar to the findings of other 
studies (for example, Hovakimian et al. (2001)). Overall, the results of the table 
suggest that these variables will be crucial to control for in the multivariate setting. 
There is no clear pattern, however, for age (Age), size (log(Sales)) and excess returns 
across relative leverage groups. 
Panel B sorts the overall sample into quartiles based on relative performance 
(Dev_Ret). Not surprisingly, Profitability and M/B increase across return quartiles. Net 
issuances of equity (EA) have a U-shaped pattern, and net issuances of debt (DA) 
increase linearly, which can be interpreted as a sign of market timing, or of a need to 
raise capital in response to increasing growth opportunities, since M/B and 
Profitability also increase across return groups. 
1.2. Double Sorting Analysis 
In Table 2.A.3 I sort all the observations by deviation of the firm’s leverage 
from the peer book leverage (Dev_Lev) and independently by deviation of the firm’s 
returns from the benchmark group average returns (Dev_Ret). Fixing return group and 
following the issuances across leverage groups should approximately capture the 
rebalancing impact, when highly leveraged firms issue less debt and more equity than 
low–leveraged firms that should prefer debt. Holding leverage constant and following 
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issuances across return quartiles captures the potential market timing effect: firms with 
higher returns should be more willing to issue equity. 
The pattern of net equity issuances (EA) across leverage groups is 
inconclusive, consistent with the univariate results, and implying that other factors, 
besides rebalancing motives, affect firms’ issuing decisions. Net debt issuances (DA), 
however, clearly decline with leverage. For example, net debt issuances decrease from 
3.5% to -1.9% for the firms in the low returns quartile, and from 5% to 3.7% for those 
in the best performing quartile. All the differences are statistically significant. The 
overall net of net issuance pattern (Net_Iss) is significantly higher for more leveraged 
firms across all return quartiles. The different issuance patterns between debt and 
equity suggest that these instruments serve different purposes: firms use debt to 
rebalance their capital structure, and equity to time the market or finance potential 
projects. 
The net issuance pattern across return groups (EA) is more complicated and 
forms a U-shape. High issuances in the high return groups compared to the median 
quartiles are consistent with market timing behavior. High equity issuances in the 
lowest return quartile are somewhat surprising. For example, the worst performing 
firms (the ones that belong to the low return quartile) issue 4.1% equity as percent of 
their total assets in the second leverage quartile, and only 2.6% and 2.4%, when their 
performance falls in the second or third return quartile, respectively. However, it is 
possible that the lowest return quartile contains firms in distress (column of low 
returns for Profitability, Age and FCF0 variables supports this idea – the variables 
have lower magnitude than for other return quartiles), with no internal capital, so the 
only channel to raise external capital available for them is through equity issuance. 
One way to deal with the problem is to identify the distressed firms and eliminate 
them from the overall sample. However, that can create a potential selection bias. 
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Performing a multivariate analysis, while controlling for the other factors, should 
minimize this problem. Besides, I use additional proxies for market timing, which I 
describe below, that eliminate the impact of distressed firms’ issuances. 
2. Parametric Analysis 
2.1 Main Specification 
To examine the differences in the impact of market timing across different 
groups of relative leverage, I interact the market timing proxy (Dev_Ret) with three 
dummies, derived from Dev_Lev variable. LowLev takes value of 1 if a firm belongs to 
the bottom Dev_Lev quartile, and zero otherwise. HighLev takes value of 1 if a firm 
belongs to the top Dev_Lev quartile, and zero otherwise. Finally, MedLev takes value 
of 1 if a firm belongs to one of the medium Dev_Lev quartiles, and zero otherwise. 
The final estimation takes the following form: 
(2) ܫݏݏݑܽ݊ܿ݁௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ · ܦ݁ݒ_ܴ݁ݐ௜,௧ିଵ · ܮ݋ݓܮ݁ݒ ൅ ߚଶ · ܦ݁ݒ_ܴ݁ݐ௜,௧ିଵ · ܯ݁݀݅ݑ݉ܮ݁ݒ ൅
ߚଷ · ܦ݁ݒ_ܴ݁ݐ௜,௧ିଵ · ܪ݄݅݃ܮ݁ݒ ൅ ௜ܺ,௧ିଵᇱ ߜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
where X is a vector of control variables, and δ is a vector of their coefficients. 
To obtain empirical support for Hypothesis 1, two conditions have to hold. 
First, β2 has to be positive and significant to demonstrate the effect of market timing 
on equity issuance decisions. Second, β2 has to be significantly higher than the 
coefficients of Dev_Ret, interacted with other groups of relative leverage. To test 
whether the second condition has statistical support, I conduct the following F test for 
OLS estimations (Chi-squared test for the Logit estimations): 
(3) ߚଶ ൌ ఉభାఉయଶ  
If market timing effect is homogeneous across relative leverage groups, then 
all the coefficients of Dev_Ret will have similar magnitudes, and each β should not be 
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different from the average of the other two (H0). On the other side, if β2 is 
significantly higher than the other coefficients, the F-test will reject the null hypothesis 
(H1). 
Table 2.A.4 presents the results of estimating equity issuances in period t as a 
function of excess returns over the benchmark group (Dev_Ret), relative book 
leverage and a set of control variables as of (t-1). Panel A uses EA, the percentage of 
issuance as a fraction of a firm’s assets, as the independent variable. Panel B is a logit 
regression where the dependent variable receives a value of 1 if EA>0, and zero 
otherwise. Logit specification helps addressing issues of non-linear impact of size and 
growth opportunities, when larger firms with higher investment opportunities may 
issue higher proportion of equity. Following Petersen (2009), the method of 
heteroskedasticity consistent clustered standard errors is used to control for possible 
autocorrelations of residuals in time-series data of each firm. 
Table 2.A.4 includes several specifications. Specifications (1) and (5) are the 
baseline ones and include the vector of commonly used firm characteristics. 
Specifications (2) and (6) control for adjustment costs by adding FCF_low and 
FCF_high dummies, and future growth opportunities by including future capital 
expenditures (Capex (t+1)). Specifications (3) and (7) allow for non-linear interaction 
of leverage with relative leverage groups. Finally, Specifications (4) and (8) are 
estimated using the subsample of firms for which the EFWA measure is available. 
Table 2.A.4 demonstrates that the main variable of interest, Dev_Ret*MedLev, 
has a positive and significant coefficient in all specifications. A 10% increase in 
excess returns leads to additional 0.5% of equity issuances. Given that an average firm 
issues about 3.8% of its assets as equity, this is a substantial number. At the same 
time, the coefficients of Dev_Ret*HighLev and Dev_Ret*LowLev are small in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant. The F-test that compares the magnitude of 
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Dev_Ret*MedLev coefficient to the average of the other two interactions of excess 
returns with relative leverage, is highly significant, further supporting the hypothesis 
that market timing is pronounced mainly for the group of firms close to their target 
leverage. The coefficients of Leverage are also statistically significant, implying the 
existence of rebalancing motives: firms issue more equity when leverage is high, and 
vice versa. Interestingly, the coefficient of Leverage*HighLev is smaller than the 
coefficient of Leverage *MedLev, contrary to what a trade-off theory would predict. 
Although this finding may seem counterintuitive, it follows from the tendency of 
highly leveraged firms to retire debt rather than issue equity in order to return to the 
optimal leverage level. 
Most of the control variables are statistically significant and have the expected 
signs, consistent with previous studies. Profitability and Log(Sales) have a negative 
effect on equity issuance, as more profitable and large firms use internal resources and 
have better access to debt capital. The impact of Age is negative, since mature firms 
gradually increase their leverage. Tangibility (PPE) reduces the costs of bankruptcy 
and allows for higher levels of debt, resulting in mostly negative impact on equity 
issuances. Proxies of adjustment costs (FCF_high and FCF_low) are also significant, 
suggesting that raising external capital is costly and firms have to take that into 
account when deciding whether to issue equity. Finally, M/B has a positive impact on 
issuances, consistent with the idea that firms with growth opportunities need more 
access to external capital market. Interestingly, EFWA has statistically significant 
coefficient only in Panel B. EFWA has positive and significant coefficient in the 
specification that omits the capital expenditure variables (not reported). These results 
are in line with Hovakimian (2006), who finds that EFWA captures future investment 
opportunities rather than past market timing attempts of the firm. 
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One problem of the analysis in Table 2.A.4 is that excess returns can proxy for 
growth opportunities as well. An issuance, preceded by a stock run-up can be 
interpreted both as driven by market timing incentives, and by information about 
future investment opportunities, which rational agents immediately incorporate into 
the stock prices. To overcome this concern, I use net of net issuances as the dependent 
variable. Using Net_Iss instead of EA is more precise for a number of reasons. First, if 
a firm raises capital to finance future growth opportunities, it may decide to finance it 
with debt. Therefore, using the net of net issuances should mitigate this effect. Second, 
Net_Iss captures the overall net change in leverage of the firm, and therefore, reflects 
the trade-off forces more precisely. I re-estimate the analysis of Table 2.A.4 using net 
of net issues (Net_Iss) as a dependent variable. The results are presented in Panel A of 
Table 2.A.5. Panel B estimates a set of logit regressions of equity versus debt choice 
for a subsample of firms that raised external capital in a given year. The dependent 
variable, Net_dummy, takes a value of 1 if a firm issues equity, and 0 if it issues debt. 
The convex pattern of the interaction between excess returns and relative 
leverage is still present, though the magnitude of the coefficients for Dev_Ret*MedLev 
is somewhat smaller: 0.19 in Table 2.A.5 compared to 0.542 in Table 2.A.4. The 
coefficient of Dev_Ret*LowLev is much smaller and insignificant, while the 
coefficient of Dev_Ret*HighLev is even negative, although the magnitude is very 
small. F-test is significant at 10% confidence level. Similar pattern emerges from 
Panel B, which shows that high returns increase the probability that a firm with 
leverage close to the target one will choose to issue equity rather than debt. 
Specifications (3) and (4) indicate that trade-off concerns become more 
important as the firm deviates further away from target leverage: the coefficient of 
Leverage *MedLev is 0.04, the coefficient of Leverage *HighLev is 0.076, and the 
coefficient of Leverage *LowLev is negative, although insignificant. Taken together, 
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these results suggest that firms will try to reduce the leverage when their leverage 
level is too high, and will issue less net equity when it is low. Combined with findings 
from Table 2.A.4, the results provide indirect support to previous studies that find that 
debt reductions are initiated to offset the deviation from the target leverage. 
To summarize, the results of Tables 2.A.4 and 2.A.5 support the main 
hypothesis of the paper. Both coefficients of trade-off and market timing are positive 
and significant, suggesting that firms rebalance towards the target leverage, but also 
have market timing incentives. The interaction of the market timing proxy with the 
leverage group dummies confirms the idea that firms are more willing to time the 
market when they are closer to the target leverage, while for firms in the extreme 
leverage quartiles market timing considerations matter less. 
2.2. Equity Issuances versus Repurchases 
In the next step of the analysis I re-estimate the main specification separately 
for equity issuing (EA>0) and equity repurchasing firms (EA<0). Since repurchases are 
defined as negative issuances, the coefficients should have opposite signs if one 
anticipates the same impact of a variable on both issuances and repurchases. The 
results, presented in Table 2.A.6, indicate that equity repurchases are not simply a 
mirror image of issuances, and most of the factors that lead a firm to issue more 
equity, also cause it to repurchase more. Thus, larger, more profitable and tangible 
firms issue and repurchase less, as indicated by negative coefficients of log(Sales), 
Profitability and PPE in Panel A, and positive coefficients in Panel B. 
Equity issues are consistent with both market timing and rebalancing 
incentives. The coefficients of Leverage are in the range of 0.022-0.025 and 
statistically significant, indicating that firms issue higher amounts of equity as their 
leverage increase. The magnitude of the leverage coefficients in Specification (3) 
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increases across relative leverage groups, also supporting the trade-off considerations. 
The interaction of Dev_Ret with relative leverage groups produces similar pattern to 
the one described in the previous subsection: firms are more sensitive to market timing 
when their leverage is close to the target one. 
At the same time, both market timing and trade-off considerations have a 
somewhat mixed impact on a firm’s decisions to repurchase. While the coefficient of 
Leverage is 0.007 and significant, indicating that firms repurchase less when their 
leverage is high, the interaction of leverage with relative leverage dummies produces 
conflicting results. The magnitude of the coefficients decreases across the groups, 
opposite from the predictions of the trade-off theory: firms repurchase smaller 
amounts of equity when they are underleveraged. The results of Dev_Ret coefficients 
are also inconclusive. The positive sign is consistent with market timing motives: 
firms repurchase equity when the relative performance of their stock is poor. At the 
same time the magnitude of Dev_Ret across leverage groups is inconsistent with trade-
off considerations, and I do not find that firms time the market by repurchasing shares 
in the medium group of relative leverage. The overall inconsistency of results for 
equity repurchases can be explained by the fact that aside from being a channel to 
modify a firm’s capital structure, share repurchases are a way to distribute cash to 
shareholders, and serve as a substitute to dividend payouts (Grullon and Michaely 
(2002)). As a result, repurchases may be determined by additional factors, such as 
cash holdings, investor composition etc. that do not make it a main tool to rebalance. 
Similar findings were also documented by Hovakimian (2006), who concludes that 
target leverage does not play a major role in equity repurchases. 
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3. Robustness Tests 
3.1. Alternative Definitions of Market Timing 
This sub-section refines the definition of market timing by concentrating on 
highly positive returns. Univariate results, as well as previous studies, indicate that a 
poorly performing firm may issue equity in an attempt to exit from distress and 
survive, rather than for rebalancing reasons (see, for example, Park (2010)). Therefore, 
excess returns can be an imprecise proxy for market timing, since very low 
performance captures additional factors, unrelated to market timing. In addition, the 
analysis above reveals that repurchases follow a somewhat different pattern from 
equity issuances, so eliminating low returns from the analysis will not eliminate the 
market timing effect from the share repurchasing perspective. 
To capture the market timing effect more precisely, I construct a new market 
timing proxy, Ex_Ret, which equals excess returns over the benchmark group if it falls 
in the top quartile of excess return distribution, and zero otherwise. I use the new 
proxy to re-estimate the original specifications, and summarize the results in Table 
2.A.7. Clearly, the pattern of market timing is similar to the one obtained in Table 
2.A.4: the interaction of Ex_Ret with leverage is of the highest magnitude in the 
specifications of net and net of net equity issuances, and the coefficients decline in 
magnitude across leverage groups in the logit specification of equity versus debt. 
However, the coefficients are significantly larger than the ones in Table 2.A.4 and 
provide additional evidence that firms time the market mainly by issuing equity when 
stocks are overvalued. The results are consistent across different specifications, and 
estimation methods (OLS versus logit). 
Second, I use raw past stock returns, rather than excess returns over the 
benchmark group, as an alternative measure of market timing. I interact raw returns 
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with the groups of relative leverage and repeat the main estimations. The results 
remain very similar to the ones, reported above, and are not presented. 
3.2. Alternative Definitions of Target Leverage 
I also test the robustness of results to alternative definitions of target leverage. 
First, to refine the definition of peer group, I use a larger number of size groups (5 and 
6) and find similar results. Second, I further split the sample into M/B groups, and use 
industry-size-M/B peer group to determine target leverage. The results remain 
unchanged. 
As an alternative method to calculate target leverage, I use a parametric 
approach to estimate target leverage (see, among others, Hovakimian et al. (2001), 
Hovakimian (2006) and Flannery and Rangan (2006)). Specifically, using a Fama-
MacBeth (1973) methodology, every year I estimate leverage as a function of leverage 
in the previous year and a set of control variables (size, profitability, M/B, tangibility, 
NOLC and R&D dummy). The estimated specification takes the following form: 
(4) ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ାଵ ൌ ሺߣߚሻ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
where X is a vector of control variables and λ is a speed of adjustment coefficient. 
Using the obtained coefficients, I compute the speed of adjustment for each 
firm in a given year: 
(5) ܶܽݎ݃݁ݐ௜,௧ ൌ ߚ ௜ܺ,௧ 
I use the obtained target leverage to calculate the deviation of a firm from its 
target leverage in a given year, and then sort all firms in the sample into four quartiles 
based on their relative leverage. Finally, I re-estimate the main specification using the 
new proxy for relative leverage, and obtain similar results (not reported). 
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3.3. Book versus Market Leverage 
The literature does not have a clear agreement on whether book or market 
leverage is a better one to use in research. In one of the first empirical studies of 
capital structure Marsh (1982) argues that although theoretically market leverage is 
correct, in practice managers look at book leverage. Following him, book leverage is 
used by Jalilvand and Harris (1984), Frank and Goyal (2003), Fama and French 
(2005), Leary and Roberts (2005), Alti (2006), Hovakimian (2006). On the other side, 
Welch (2004) argues that market leverage better reflects problems between debt and 
equity holders and therefore, views market leverage as a better measure of leverage. 
Additional studies that base their analysis on market leverage include Strebulaev 
(2007), Hertzel and Li (2010), and Fama and French (2002). Finally, the majority of 
the papers use both market and book leverage in their analysis, and usually conclude 
that the results are robust to either specification. 
While book and market leverage indeed behave in a similar way in many 
studies, it does not have to be true for any research question, especially the one 
focusing on interaction of equity value and leverage. The reason for that is the 
mechanical effect of Market-to-Book and past returns on the level of market leverage 
and changes in it over time. For example, a firm that experienced a run-up in stock 
prices during the last year will automatically end up with lower market leverage at the 
end of the year, even if it has not had actual issuances or repurchases during the same 
period. Similarly, the definition of market leverage incorporates the implicit effect of 
Market-to-Book as well. As a result, assigning firms into leverage groups based on 
market leverage will be systematically biased. The group of underleveraged firms will 
actually include firms with higher market timing opportunities. Similarly, the high 
leverage group will consist of poorly performing firms, who can time the market by 
repurchasing shares. Adding M/B as a control variable in the estimation will not solve 
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the problem, since I hypothesize non-linear relationship between the variables of 
interest. As a result, the coefficients of market timing will be biased in the low and 
high leveraged group, compared to the results based on book leverage. 
IV. Long-Term Stock Performance 
The results so far indicate that a firm exploits market timing opportunities 
when costs of doing so are low, and issues equity when its actual leverage is close to 
the target one. This section examines the post-issuance performance of firms and tests 
whether it is consistent with the general framework. Specifically, I test whether the 
long-run underperformance of equity issuing firms is correlated with their relative 
leverage during the issue. 
1. Data Description 
To perform the analysis of this section, I use SDC database of public issuances. 
The reason for using SDC, as opposed to Compustat, is the ability to precisely identify 
the issuance date, which is important for computing long-run returns of a firm. 
Compustat-based measures are more appropriate for the first part of the analysis, as 
they capture both equity and debt issuances, as well as issues of private instruments, 
while SDC is more suitable for the long-term analysis, as it provides the exact 
issuance date. A potential disadvantage of using different datasets is the discrepancies 
between the Compustat-based and SDC-based measures of issuance. However, studies 
by Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Korajczyk and Levy (2003) document that 
calculating issuances from Compustat, using a 5% cut-off, produce results similar to 
those obtained using SDC. 
I start by obtaining all the US public issues for the period of 1970-2006. The 
sample includes all public equity issues by US firms with non-missing issuance date 
102 
and CUSIP number. I merge the data with the Compustat sample, described in the 
previous section, by using CUSIP, if available, and ticker, if not. I also merge the data 
with CRSP monthly file to obtain raw returns of each firm. To verify the validity of 
the merges, I re-estimate the summary statistics of the number of issues and the long-
run performance after the issuances from Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Ritter 
(2003) and get similar results. The final sample consists of 12,863 issuances. 
To test Hypothesis II, I apply two commonly used methodologies: the Buy-
and-Hold approach and Fama-French factor regression analysis. For robustness, I use 
both equally and value weighted portfolios, and different event window periods. 
Below I describe the results for each method separately. 
2. BHAR Approach 
The first approach I use is Buy-and-Hold (BHAR). The idea of BHAR is to 
compare the cumulative post-issuance performance of issuing firms to the 
performance of similar firms that did not issue. Several ways have been suggested to 
compute the performance of matching firms. While some papers use matching-
methodology approach, other studies argue that matching SEOs to individual firms 
may create a bias towards finding underperformance (Brav, Geczy, and Gompers 
(2000)). Following Brav et al. (2000), I compare the long-run performance portfolios 
of issuing firms with portfolio of non-issuing firms with similar characteristics. 
To create a subsample of non-issuing, or benchmark firms, at any given month 
I require that a firm that did not issue equity (whether in a form of SEO or IPO) in the 
previous five years. This filtering step eliminates benchmark bias, discussed by 
Loughran and Ritter (2000). I form size, B/M and Dev_Lev portfolios as follows. First, 
I use Fama-French (1993) size and B/M breakpoints to assign all issuing and matching 
firms into 5 size and 5 B/M groups. The size quintile breakpoints are based on NYSE 
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traded firms. The size measure is a firm’s market capitalization as of December (t-1), 
and is obtained from CRSP monthly files. The B/M breakpoints are computed based 
on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms9. Following Fama and French (1993), B/M is 
defined as the book equity of a firm for the fiscal year ending in calendar year (t -1), 
divided by market equity at the end of December of (t -1). To mitigate the effect of 
outliers, I trim top and bottom 1% of size and B/M observations to mitigate the effect 
of outliers. Independently, I create the Dev_Lev quartiles, as described in Section II.B. 
The bottom quartile represents underleveraged firms, the top quartile – overleveraged 
firms, and the medium two quartiles include firms close to their target leverage. The 
firms are then aggregated into 5 x 5 x 4 portfolios of issuers and non-issuers, and their 
long-run 3 and 5 year performance is computed, using equally-weighted and value-
weighted returns. To construct long-run returns, I cumulate the monthly returns of 
issuing and non-issuing firms starting one month after the issue date and for the 
following 36 (60) months, or the delisting or new equity issuing month, whichever 
comes first. Finally, I average the returns across size-B/M groups and present the 
results for each Dev_Lev group in Table 2.A.8. 
The pattern of prior returns is the first indication of different market timing 
incentives across Dev_Lev groups. The portfolio of underleveraged firm has a 65% 
stock price increase in the pre-issuance year, compared to 44% and 50% for firms in 
third and fourth quartile, respectively. This suggests that ex-post, firms that issued 
while being underleveraged, had higher incentives to do so. The three and five-year 
long-term returns also indicate that firms, issuing at the bottom Dev_Lev quartile, did 
so to time the market. The performance of those firms is significantly different from 
the performance of firms in other quartiles. Interestingly, the long-run returns of the 
                                                 
9 The breakpoints for size and B/M are obtained from Kenneth French data library at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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highest Dev_Lev group are somewhat lower than those in the medium quartile, 
although their market timing incentives are low. The difference can be explained by 
differences in growth opportunities among different leverage groups. The main 
hypothesis focuses on the interaction of market timing and trade-off forces, keeping all 
else equal. However, it is possible that there are additional factors that change across 
leverage group, and weaken the main findings. As a result, it is important to compare 
the performance of issuers net of the performance of the benchmark group with the 
same relative leverage. The return pattern across control groups is not homogeneous, 
and firms in the high leverage group are also characterized by relative low long-run 
performance. Those results are consistent with the findings by Gomes and Schmid 
(2010), which show that leverage and investments are correlated, and firms with high 
leverage typically have lower investment opportunities. 
The abnormal performance of issuing firms, net of benchmark returns, is 
increasing across Dev_Lev quartiles, consistent with Hypothesis 2. Underleveraged 
firms underperform their overleveraged peers by about 24-27% during the three years 
after the SEO, and by about 30%-40% during the five year period, following the 
issuance. The results suggest that underleveraged firms issuing equity are the ones 
with high market timing incentives to do so, and hence, they also suffer from the worst 
underperformance in the long-run. The results are robust to using different time-
windows (three versus five years) and different weighting methodologies (equally 
versus value-weighted). 
3. Calendar-Time Approach 
While the results above are consistent with the general predictions, a number 
of critics challenge the BHAR-based analysis. First, it is possible that there are some 
risk factors, determining the risk premium of issuing versus non-issuing firms and 
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driving the main results. Second, cross-sectional dependence in returns could result in 
understated standard errors and inflated t-statistics. To overcome these problems and 
verify the robustness of the results to different methodologies, I next use a factor-
based calendar-time approach. 
The calendar-time approach is performed as follows. First, I identify all firms 
that had at least one SEO in the previous three/five years, and create a subsample of 
equity issuers. The subsample of control firms includes firms that did not have an IPO 
or SEO event during three/five years, preceding the date of portfolio formation. I trim 
the top and bottom 1% of returns, B/M and size to mitigate the effect of outliers, 
which can be especially acute in the regression setting. I then assign all the firms in 
each subgroup into size-B/M-Dev_Lev groups, following the methodology, described 
in the previous subsection. The portfolios are re-formed every calendar month. I 
calculate time-series returns (equally and value weighted) of each of the 100 portfolios 
for issuers and non-issuers. I then estimate the returns of each portfolio, net of risk-
free return, as function of Fama and French (1993) three factors10, and average the 
coefficients across size-B/M group to obtain a coefficient pattern across each Dev_Lev 
quartile. I do not use the momentum factor in the specification, since I want to capture 
the overall trend of stock underperformance after the equity issuance, rather than 
separating it into excess returns and momentum factors. 
The results are presented in Table 2.A.9. Panel A defines as issuers all the 
firms that issued equity in the past three years, while Panel B extends the event long-
run period to five years. Each panel presents results for equally and value-weighted 
portfolios. The main coefficient of interest is the intercept. If firms in the bottom 
relative leverage group time the market more, their excess return, as measured by the 
                                                 
10 The factors used in the analysis are obtained from Kenneth French website at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html. See Fama and French (1993) for a 
description of factor construction. 
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intercept of the regression, should be smaller in magnitude than the intercept of the 
other leverage groups. Table 2.A.9 shows that issuing firms indeed have low excess 
returns compared to the medium groups. However, the excess returns of the highly 
leveraged group are also significantly negative. This, again, might result from 
leverage-investment correlation, discussed in the previous sub-section. The pattern of 
excess returns across relative leverage groups for non-issuing firms confirms the 
pattern11. The excess returns of non-issuers decrease along the Dev_Lev quartiles, 
suggesting that other factors determine the pattern as well. As a result, the correct 
comparison is of the differences between the issuers and non-issuers across the 
quartiles. The differences of excess returns between issuers and non-issuers exhibit an 
increasing pattern. It ranges from -57% to 35% for firms in the bottom quartile, and is 
statistically significant. The difference in the top Dev_Lev quartile is positive, 
although insignificant. Finally, the difference in differences between the top and 
bottom quartiles is positive and also significant, indicating that the relative excess 
returns of underleveraged issuers is negative, even after controlling for risk factors. 
The results support Hypothesis II and indicate that firms with more market timing 
incentives underperform their peers in the long run. 
V. Conclusion 
Although market timing may not have a permanent impact on a firm’s capital 
structure, firm still have incentive to time the market, while keeping the target 
leverage in mind. This paper shows under what conditions firms are more likely to be 
motivated by market timing versus trade-off considerations in their issuance decisions. 
Thus, market timing can be viewed as one of the trade-off forces, which has its 
                                                 
11 The results for non-issuing firms are identical for non-issuing firms across both panels, as I require a 
5-year non-issuance window to assign a firm into a group of non-issuers.  
107 
benefits (the opportunity to raise cheap capital) and costs (the costs of deviating from 
the target leverage/not closing the gap). 
The framework of the paper, verified by an empirical analysis, shows that there 
is a non-linear relationship between the two incentives: market timing effect is more 
pronounced for firms that are close to their target leverage, and less pronounced for 
over- and underleveraged firms. The results are robust to different definitions of 
issuances. The empirical analysis also suggests that firms time the market mainly 
through equity issuances, while trade-off forces do not determine equity repurchases. I 
also find that market timing is more pronounced for firms with extremely high past 
stock performance. 
The second part of the paper addresses the long-run stock underperformance, 
which usually follows equity issues, and constitutes another aspect of market-timing 
phenomenon. Firms that issue capital while being underleveraged, have more market 
timing incentives, compared to other firms. As a result, they are expected to 
underperform their peers in the long-run. Using BHAR and calendar-time approach, I 
find empirical support to this idea. Firms at the bottom Dev_Lev quartile have the 
lowest long-run performance, compared to their peers that did not issue equity. The 
relative performance of equity issuers improves as the deviation from the target 
leverage becomes more positive. 
This study can be extended in several ways. First, it is possible to examine 
debt, and not just equity, timing. The problem, though, is identifying a proxy for debt 
market timing that will still create cross-sectional variation (for this reason, looking at 
the average spreads in the market may not be a good idea). Another way to extend the 
results of this paper is by conditioning the speed of adjustment on the size of the 
remaining gap between the current and optimal debt level. As this study suggests, the 
speed of adjustment may slow down as a firm gradually covers the leverage gap and 
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other considerations, such as market timing, start playing a role. I leave these 
questions for future research. 
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Table 2.A.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.A.1 presents the summary statistics of the sample. Leverage is the ratio of book debt to total assets. Return is the annual return of a firm during a 
fiscal year. Log(Sales) is total revenues of a firm, in logarithms. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets; Market-to-Book ratio (M/B) is defined as 
the ratio of assets and market equity minus book equity to total assets. Age is the number of years since the first year of a firm’s stock price appearance in 
CRSP database. PPE is the ratio of total net property, plant and equipment to total assets. R&D is the ratio of a firm’s research and development expenses 
(data46) to total assets. The value of zero is assigned to missing variables. Capex is the capital expenditures of the firm, scaled by total assets. EFWA is the 
external finance weighted average, as suggested by Baker and Wurgler (2002). Equity issuance (EA) is defined as the change in book equity minus the change 
in retained earnings as a percent of total assets. Debt Issuance (DA) is the residual change in assets as a percent of total assets. Net_iss is the difference 
between EA and DA. I use a cutoff of 5% of the asset value to determine an issuance, and 1% to determine a repurchase. 
 
  
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 25th Pctl 75th Pctl
Leverage 114,058 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.08 0.35 
Return 114,058 0.06 -0.02 0.72 -0.36 0.33
log(Sales) 114,058 4.86 4.78 2.17 3.44 6.26 
Profitability 114,058 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.06 0.18 
M/B 114,058 1.65 1.22 1.30 0.93 1.82 
Age 114,058 13.64 9.00 14.10 4.00 18.00 
PPE 114,058 31.22 26.71 21.24 14.58 43.73 
R&D 114,058 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 
Capex 114,058 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.08 
EFWA 66,834 1.59 1.24 1.15 0.97 1.81 
EA 114,058 0.038 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 
DA 114,058 0.030 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.09 
Net_Iss 114,058 0.007 0.00 0.19 (0.08) 0.06 
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Table 2.A.2. Issuances and Control Variables by Quartiles of Dev_lev and Dev_ret 
Table 2.A.2 presents the summary statistics of the sample, sorted by Dev_Lev (Panel A) and Dev_Ret (Panel B) quartiles. Leverage is the ratio of book debt to 
total assets, and Dev_Lev is the deviation of leverage from the benchmark group. Dev_Ret is the annual excess return of a firm over its benchmark group. 
Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets; Age is the number of years since the first year of a firm’s stock price appearance in CRSP database. 
Log(Sales) is total revenues of a firm, in logarithms. Market-to-Book ratio (M/B) is defined as the ratio of assets and market equity minus book equity to total 
assets. Equity issuance (EA) is defined as the change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings as a percent of total assets. Debt Issuance (DA) is 
the residual change in assets as a percent of total assets. Net_iss is the difference between EA and DA. I use a cutoff of 5% of the asset value to determine an 
issuance, and 1% to determine a repurchase. 
 
Low 0.05 4.94% 0.13  12.24  4.58  2.02  0.037  0.044  ‐0.007
1 0.14 1.75% 0.09  14.20  4.81  1.77  0.043  0.040  0.003 
2 0.27 ‐1.55% 0.10  15.59  5.28  1.45  0.032  0.030  0.002 
High 0.46 1.00% 0.08  12.42  4.76  1.38  0.039  0.008  0.031 
Low 0.23 ‐67.02% 0.04  10.80  4.23  1.41  0.042  0.012  0.030
1 0.24 ‐21.54% 0.10  15.36  5.16  1.47  0.026  0.028  ‐0.002
2 0.24 4.38% 0.13  16.16  5.36  1.61  0.026  0.035  ‐0.010
High 0.23 89.49% 0.13  12.19  4.69  2.11  0.057  0.046  0.011
DA
Net_Isslog(Sales) M/B EA DA
Rank for 
Dev_Lev
Rank for 
Dev_Ret
Panel A: by Dev_Lev  Quartiles
Panel B:  by Dev_Ret  Quartiles
Leverage Dev_Ret Profitability Age log(Sales) Net_Iss
Leverage Dev_Ret Profitability Age
M/B EA
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Table 2.A.3. Issuances and Control Variables by Quartiles of Dev_lev and 
Dev_ret 
Table 2.A.3 presents the summary statistics of the sample by Dev_Lev - Dev_Ret quartiles. Dev_Lev is 
the deviation of book leverage from the benchmark leverage group. Dev_ret is the annual excess return 
of a firm over its benchmark group. Profitability is the ratio of EBITDA to total assets; Log(Sales) is 
total revenues of a firm, in logarithms. Age is the number of years since the first year of a firm’s stock 
price appearance in CRSP database. Market-to-Book ratio (M/B) is defined as the ratio of assets and 
market equity minus book equity to total assets. FCF is operating income before depreciation minus 
taxes and capital expenditures, divided by book assets. Equity issuance (EA) is defined as the change in 
book equity minus the change in retained earnings as a percent of total assets. Debt Issuance (DA) is the 
residual change in assets as a percent of total assets. Net_iss is the difference between EA and DA. I use 
a cutoff of 5% of the asset value to determine an issuance, and 1% to determine a repurchase. 
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Dev_Ret‐
Low 2 3
Dev_Ret‐
High
Diff.       
(High ‐ Low)
t‐stat 
(High‐Low)
Dev_Ret‐
Low 2 3
Dev_Ret‐
High
Diff.       
(High ‐ Low)
t‐stat 
(High‐Low)
Dev_Lev‐Low 5.9% 12.4% 15.2% 16.2% 10.3% 11.8 3.99 4.76 5.03 4.46 0.46 6.2
2 0.7% 10.0% 12.6% 12.9% 12.2% 14.5 3.93 5.15 5.49 4.60 0.67 10.5
3 4.8% 10.7% 12.4% 13.1% 8.4% 10.4 4.52 5.63 5.76 5.05 0.53 7.2
Dev_Lev‐High 3.8% 8.5% 10.5% 11.1% 7.3% 10.4 4.30 5.09 5.20 4.63 0.34 5.2
Diff. (High‐Low) ‐2.0% ‐3.9% ‐4.7% ‐5.1% 0.30 0.32 0.16 0.18
t‐stat (High‐Low) ‐2.2 ‐3.7 ‐5.4 ‐8.2 4.1 3.5 1.8 2.7
Dev_Ret‐
Low 2 3
Dev_Ret‐
High
Diff.       
(High ‐ Low)
t‐stat 
(High‐Low)
Dev_Ret‐
Low 2 3
Dev_Ret‐
High
Diff.       
(High ‐ Low)
t‐stat 
(High‐Low)
Dev_Lev‐Low 9.6 13.4 14.6 11.2 1.60 6.6 ‐4.5% 1.1% 3.0% 3.4% 7.9% 8.8
2 10.2 16.2 17.7 12.4 2.25 8.9 ‐7.8% ‐0.1% 1.7% 1.9% 9.7% 11.4
3 12.1 17.5 18.3 13.6 1.48 4.5 ‐3.8% 1.1% 2.0% 2.5% 6.2% 7.4
Dev_Lev‐High 10.6 14.0 14.3 11.6 1.00 3.8 ‐3.5% 0.0% 1.1% 1.2% 4.8% 6.4
Diff. (High‐Low) 1.01 0.57 (0.23) 0.41 0.9% ‐1.0% ‐1.8% ‐2.2%
t‐stat (High‐Low) 4.7 1.4 ‐0.5 1.4 0.9 ‐1.0 ‐2.1 ‐3.7
Dev_Ret‐
Low 2 3
Dev_Ret‐
High
Diff.       
(High ‐ Low)
t‐stat 
(High‐Low)
Dev_Ret‐
Low 2 3
Dev_Ret‐
High
Diff.       
(High ‐ Low)
t‐stat 
(High‐Low)
Dev_Lev‐Low 1.64 1.76 1.94 2.63 0.98 13.5 4.1% 2.6% 2.4% 5.5% 1.35% 2.0
2 1.55 1.51 1.65 2.31 0.77 10.9 5.5% 2.7% 2.7% 6.3% 0.82% 1.2
3 1.27 1.30 1.44 1.79 0.51 8.7 3.8% 2.0% 2.3% 5.0% 1.27% 1.9
Dev_Lev‐High 1.21 1.28 1.39 1.72 0.51 10.0 3.7% 2.8% 3.2% 6.2% 2.42% 3.8
Diff. (High‐Low) ‐0.43 ‐0.48 ‐0.55 ‐0.91 ‐0.4% 0.2% 0.8% 0.7%
t‐stat (High‐Low) ‐6.9 ‐7.9 ‐8.0 ‐14.3 ‐0.5 0.3 1.2 1.2
Dev_Ret‐
Low 2 3
Dev_Ret‐
High
Diff.       
(High ‐ Low)
t‐stat 
(High‐Low)
Dev_Ret‐
Low 2 3
Dev_Ret‐
High
Diff.       
(High ‐ Low)
t‐stat 
(High‐Low)
Dev_Lev‐Low 3.5% 4.2% 4.6% 5.0% 1.5% 3.1 0.6% ‐1.7% ‐2.2% 0.4% ‐0.2% ‐0.2
2 2.4% 3.9% 4.2% 5.1% 2.6% 5.5 3.0% ‐1.2% ‐1.6% 1.2% ‐1.8% ‐2.1
3 1.0% 2.6% 3.5% 4.9% 3.9% 6.4 2.8% ‐0.6% ‐1.2% 0.2% ‐2.6% ‐2.8
Dev_Lev‐High ‐1.9% 0.7% 2.0% 3.7% 5.7% 8.2 5.7% 2.1% 1.2% 2.4% ‐3.2% ‐3.2
Diff. (High‐Low) ‐5.5% ‐3.6% ‐2.6% ‐1.3% 5.1% 3.8% 3.4% 2.0%
t‐stat (High‐Low) ‐8.3 ‐4.8 ‐3.7 ‐2.5 5.0 3.4 3.3 2.4
Panel D: FCFPanel C: Age
Panel E: M/B Panel F: EA
Panel H: Net_IssPanel G:DA
Panel A: Profitability Panel B: Log(Sales)
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Table 2.A.4. Multivariate Regressions of Net Equity Issuance as a Function of 
Market Timing and Relative Leverage 
The table reports the results of estimating net equity issuances as a function of leverage, market timing 
and control variables for the period 1970-2006. The dependent variable is EA in Panel A, and 
EA_dummy in Panel B (takes a value of 1 if EA>0 and 0 otherwise). LowLev is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to the bottom Dev_Lev quartile, and 0 otherwise. MedLev is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to the 2-nd and 3-rd Dev_Lev quartile, and 0 
otherwise. HighLev is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to the top Dev_Lev 
quartile; and 0 otherwise. See Table 2.A.1 for description of the rest of the variables. All the 
explanatory variables are lagged by one period. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are 
clustered at a firm level (Petersen (2009)). ***, ** and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.A.4 (Continued) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept  0.025***  0.018***  0.018***  0.027*** -1.721*** -1.891*** -1.738*** -1.86***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.04) (0.041) (0.041) (0.062)
log(Sales) -0.005*** -0.0043*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.074*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.05***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011)
Profitability -0.229*** -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.2*** -2.289*** -191.92*** -1.842*** -2.125***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.075) (9.17) (0.09) (0.153)
PPE  0.021*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.001  0.239*** -0.003*** -0.254*** -0.251***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.059) (0.001) (0.063) (0.088)
M/B  0.032***  0.03***  0.03***  0.026***  0.484***  0.455***  0.46***  0.421***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.02)
Age -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.014***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
R&D/Assets  0.175***  0.175***  0.174***  0.315***  0.042  0.082  0.098  1***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) (0.172) (0.168) (0.167) (0.382)
Leverage  0.017***  0.02***  0.489***  0.571***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.059) (0.059)
Leverage*LowLev  0.022*** -0.0002  1.516***  1.217***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.139) (0.188)
Leverage*MedLev  0.029***  0.016***  1.161***  1.211***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.195) (0.265)
Leverage*HighLev  0.019***  0.009***  0.552***  0.441***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.089) (0.127)
FCF_low  0.015***  0.015***  0.019***  0.421***  0.423***  0.422***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.032) (0.032) (0.046)
FCF_high  0.006***  0.007*** -0.001  0.065**  0.065** -0.046 
(0.008) (0.001) (0.03) (0.03) (0.042)
Capex (t+1)  0.127***  0.127***  0.11***  2.287***  2.351***  2.788***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.151) (0.151) (0.222)
EFWA  0.001  0.084***
(0.001) (0.016)
Dev_Ret*LowLev  0.039  0.038  0.038  0.03  0.008  0.007  0.008  0.006 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.03) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005)
Dev_Ret*MedLev  0.542***  0.543***  0.54***  0.965***  0.143***  0.145***  0.14***  0.268***
(0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.196) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.045)
Dev_Ret*HighLev  0.003  0.003  0.003 -0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 0 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 114,058 114,058 114,058 66,834 114,058     114,058     114,058     66,834
R-squared adj. 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
F test 35.87 36.62 36.44 23.51
Prob. (F test) <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Likelihood Ratio 14,457 15,092 15,343 6,738
Chi-squared 22.01 23.52 20.84 14.53
Prob. (Chi-squared) <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Panel B: LogitPanel A: OLS
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Table 2.A.5. Multivariate Regressions of Net of Net Equity Issuance as a 
Function of Market Timing and Relative Leverage 
The table reports the results of estimating net of net issuances (Panel A) and equity versus debt choice 
(Panel B) as a function of leverage, market timing and control variables for the period 1970-2006. The 
dependent variable is Net_Iss in Panel A (EA-DA), and Net_dummy in Panel B (takes a value of 1 if 
Net_Iss>0 and 0 if Net_Iss<0). LowLev is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to 
the bottom Dev_Lev quartile, and 0 otherwise. MedLev is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
firm belongs to the 2-nd and 3-rd Dev_Lev quartile, and 0 otherwise. HighLev is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to the top Dev_Lev quartile; and 0 otherwise. See Table 2.A.1 for 
description of the rest of the variables. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one period. The 
standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at a firm level (Petersen (2009)). ***, ** 
and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.A.5 (Continued) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept  0.01***  0.008***  0.011***  0.018 -0.094***  0.173***  0.144** -1.86***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.03) (0.037) (0.057) (0.062)
log(Sales) -0.0065*** -0.0062*** -0.006*** -0.007 -0.111*** -0.099*** -0.112*** -0.05***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011)
Profitability -0.277*** -0.295*** -0.294*** -0.294 -2.019*** -2.129*** -2.79*** -2.125***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.07) (0.094) (0.169) (0.153)
PPE -0.018*** -0.008** -0.004  0.002 -0.541*** -0.192*** -0.197*** -0.251***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.045) (0.05) (0.071) (0.088)
M/B  0.024***  0.023***  0.022***  0.017  0.173***  0.148***  0.103***  0.421***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.02)
Age  0.0002***  0.0002***  0.0002***  0.0002 -0.001 -0.002** -0.001 -0.014***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
R&D/Assets  0.134***  0.126***  0.129***  0.243 -0.493*** -0.548*** -0.126  1***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.034) (0.167) (0.165) (0.407) (0.382)
Leverage  0.08***  0.078***  1.405***  0***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.051) (0)
Leverage*LowLev -0.02 -0.0249*  1.503***  1.217***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.202) (0.188)
Leverage*MedLev  0.04***  0.028  1.939***  1.211***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.294) (0.265)
Leverage*HighLev  0.076***  0.063  1.564***  0.441***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.191) (0.127)
FCF_low  0.003  0.003 -0.006*  0.05* -0.018  0.422***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.03) (0.044) (0.046)
FCF_high  0.025***  0.025***  0.018  0.332***  0.319*** -0.046 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.025) (0.036) (0.042)
Capex (t+1) -0.026** -0.025** -0.043*** -0.95*** -1.067***  2.788***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.138) (0.218) (0.222)
EFWA  0.005  0.084***
(0.001) (0.016)
Dev_Ret*LowLev  0.044  0.043  0.045  0.041  0.003  0.005  0.002  0.006 
(0.036) (0.038) (0.04) (0.035) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
Dev_Ret*MedLev  0.19*  0.199*  0.21*  0.473***  0.021**  0.026**  0.071***  0.268***
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.155) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.045)
Dev_Ret*HighLev -0.021*** -0.02*** -0.021*** -0.018 -0.043** -0.037** -0.014 0 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.021) (0.019) (0.027) (0.001)
Obs. 114,058 114,058 114,058 66,834 80,626 80,626 80,626 45,620
R-squared adj. 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.10
F test 2.66 2.96 3.32 8.86
Prob. (F test) 0.10 0.08 0.07 <0.01
Likelihood Ratio 6,459 6,768 7,054 3,569
Chi-squared test 5.38 5.45 4.69 10.18
Prob. (Chi-squared) 0.02 0.02 0.03 <0.01
Panel B: LogitPanel A: OLS
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Table 2.A.6. Multivariate Regressions of Equity Issuances and Repurchases as a 
Function of Market Timing and Relative Leverage 
The table reports the results of estimating equity issuances (EA>0) and repurchases (EA<0) as a 
function of leverage, market timing and control variables for the period 1970-2006. LowLev is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to the bottom Dev_Lev quartile, and 0 otherwise. 
MedLev is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to the 2-nd and 3-rd Dev_Lev 
quartile, and 0 otherwise. HighLev is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to the 
top Dev_Lev quartile; and 0 otherwise. See Table 2.A.1 for description of the rest of the variables. All 
the explanatory variables are lagged by one period. The standard errors are reported in parentheses and 
are clustered at a firm level (Petersen (2009)). ***, ** and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.A.6 (Continued) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept  0.221***  0.211***  0.212***  0.216*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.042***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
log(Sales) -0.012*** -0.0111*** -0.011*** -0.013***  0.0005**  0.0003*  0.0002  0.0003 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Profitability -0.263*** -0.273*** -0.273*** -0.268***  0.008**  0.012***  0.012*** -0.003 
(0.008) (0.01) (0.01) (0.017) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
PPE -0.008 -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.007  0.006***  0.004**  0.003*  0.006**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
M/B  0.024***  0.023***  0.023***  0.025*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0) (0) (0) (0.001)
Age -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0004***  0  0  0  0 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
R&D/Assets  0.05***  0.05***  0.05***  0.102***  0.013  0.017  0.016  0.011 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.043)
Leverage  0.022***  0.025***  0.007***  0.007***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002)
Leverage*LowLev  0.01  0.0337  0.018**  0.012 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.008) (0.01)
Leverage*MedLev  0.018*  0.017  0.015***  0.007*
(0.011) (0.013) (0.003) (0.004)
Leverage*HighLev  0.025***  0.025***  0.007***  0.006**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003)
FCF_low  0.009**  0.008**  0.011** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
FCF_high  0.022***  0.022***  0.016*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.1) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Capex (t+1)  0.108***  0.109***  0.057***  0.012**  0.012**  0.02**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.02) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
EFWA -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.001)
Dev_Ret*LowLev -0.022 -0.045 -0.044  0.154  0.006***  0.007***  0.007***  0.006***
(0.188) (0.187) (0.187) (0.382) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Dev_Ret*MedLev  0.36**  0.356**  0.362**  0.73***  0.076  0.07  0.077  0.03 
(0.149) (0.148) (0.149) (0.211) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.124)
Dev_Ret*HighLev  0.024  0.016  0.015  0.716*  0.172**  0.157**  0.13  0.2433*
(0.106) (0.101) (0.1) (0.37) (0.081) (0.08) (0.08) (0.126)
Obs. 22,496 22,496 22,496 11,186 17,008 17,008 17,008 17,008
R-squared 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04
F test 3.93 4.24 4.35 0.79 0.030 0.03 0.01 0.47
Prob. (F test) 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.37 0.860 0.86 0.91 0.49
Panel B: RepurchasesPanel A: Issues
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Table 2.A.7. Multivariate Regressions of Net Equity Issuance as a Function of 
Market Timing (Extreme Returns Only) and Relative Leverage 
The table reports the results of estimating net equity issuances as a function of leverage, market timing 
and control variables for the period 1970-2006. The dependent variable is EA in Panel A, and 
EA_dummy in Panel B (takes a value of 1 if EA>0 and 0 otherwise). LowLev is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to the bottom Dev_Lev quartile, and 0 otherwise. MedLev is a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to the 2-nd and 3-rd Dev_Lev quartile, and 0 
otherwise. HighLev is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to the top Dev_Lev 
quartile; and 0 otherwise. Ex_Ret equals Dev_Ret if in the top quartile, and zero otherwise. See Table 
2.A.1 for description of the rest of the variables. All the explanatory variables are lagged by one period. 
The standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at a firm level (Petersen (2009)). ***, 
** and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 2.A.7 (Continued) 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept  0.024***  0.017***  0.017***  0.025*** -1.721*** -1.938*** -1.786*** -1.792***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.04) (-0.042) (0.042) (0.062)
log(Sales) -0.005*** -0.0042*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.073*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.052***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.007) (-0.006) (0.006) (0.01)
Profitability -0.228*** -0.225*** -0.225*** -0.197*** -2.289*** -1.885*** -1.803*** -2.054***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.075) (-0.082) (0.081) (0.136)
PPE  0.021*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001  0.239*** -0.268*** -0.253*** -0.302***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.059) (-0.06) (0.059) (0.082)
M/B  0.032***  0.03***  0.03***  0.026***  0.484***  0.439***  0.444***  0.459***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (-0.009) (0.009) (0.014)
Age -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0.001) (-0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
R&D/Assets  0.177***  0.176***  0.176***  0.318***  0.043 -0.046 -0.024  0.824**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.031) (0.172) (-0.138) (0.137) (0.322)
Leverage  0.018***  0.021***  0.489***  0.568***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.059) (-0.056)
Leverage*LowLev  0.027***  0.0054  1.515***  1.22***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.129) (0.175)
Leverage*MedLev  0.026***  0.013***  0.953***  1.094***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.184) (0.25)
Leverage*HighLev  0.021***  0.011***  0.578***  0.412***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.084) (0.119)
FCF_low  0.015***  0.015***  0.018***  0.377***  0.381***  0.39***
(0.002) (0.002) (-0.029) (0.029) (0.042)
FCF_high  0.006***  0.006*** -0.001  0.071**  0.071** -0.04 
(0.007) (0.001) (-0.028) (0.028) (0.039)
Capex (t+1)  0.127***  0.126***  0.111***  2.125***  2.2***  2.705***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (-0.136) (0.136) (0.197)
EFWA  0.001  0.034***
(0.001) (0.011)
Ex_ret*Low  0.04  0.037  0.038  0.02  0.008  0.004  0.003  0.001 
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.021) (0.008) (-0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Ex_ret*Medium  0.916***  0.915***  0.897***  1.164***  0.143***  0.052**  0.051**  0.038 
(0.156) (0.154) (0.156) (0.311) (0.021) (-0.021) (0.021) (0.026)
Ex_ret*High  0.002  0.002  0.002 -0.002  0.001 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (-0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs. 114,058 114,058 114,058 66,834 114,058     114,058     114,058     66,834
R-squared adj. 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.23
F test 32.78 33.39 31.42 13.78
Prob. (F test) <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Likelihood Ratio 16,464.0 17,119.0 17,408.0 8,051.0
Chi-squared 27.2 29 16.94 11.4
Prob. (Chi-squared) <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Panel B: LogitPanel A: OLS
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Table 2.A.8. The Long-Run Performance of SEOs – BHAR 
The table reports three and five year buy-and-hold returns of SEO issuers, compared to benchmark 
portfolios. Benchmark portfolios are based on a subsample of firms that did not issue equity (as SEO or 
IPO) in the preceding 5 years. To mitigate the effect of outliers in eh benchmark group, I trim top and 
bottom 1% of size and B/M observations. The portfolios of size-B/M-Dev_Lev are formed by splitting 
the sample into quintiles of size and B/M (using Fama and French (1993) breakpoints), and 
independently sorting the sample into quartiles of Dev_Lev. The portfolio formation is repeated 
monthly. I calculate equally and value weighted returns of the resulting 100 portfolios of issuers and 
non-issuers. I use 36 obs starting from the month after the issuance for three-year BHAR, and 60 obs 
for the five-year BHAR. If an issuing firm delists before the 36-th (60-th) month, I use the available 
return data until the delisting month. The final results are averaged across size-B/M portfolios. Prior 
returns are the 12-month returns of the issuing firms before the SEO date. The abnormal return is an 
arithmetic difference between SEO and Control groups for each given Dev_Lev quartile. 
 
  
Dev_Lev Group Prior return 3 Years 5 Years 3 Years 5 Years 3 Years 5 Years
Low 0.65 0.22 0.53 0.47 0.90 ‐0.26 ‐0.37
2 0.55 0.37 0.73 0.55 1.00 ‐0.18 ‐0.27
3 0.44 0.39 0.71 0.52 0.97 ‐0.13 ‐0.26
High 0.50 0.35 0.60 0.34 0.57 0.01 0.03
Diff. (High‐Low) ‐0.15 0.13 0.07 ‐0.13 ‐0.33 0.27 0.40
t‐stat (High ‐ Low) 3.42 2.15
Dev_Lev Group Prior return 3 Years 5 Years 3 Years 5 Years 3 Years 5 Years
Low 0.60 0.17 0.43 0.37 0.65 ‐0.20 ‐0.22
2 0.52 0.31 0.51 0.47 0.76 ‐0.15 ‐0.25
3 0.46 0.36 0.57 0.43 0.70 ‐0.07 ‐0.13
High 0.45 0.31 0.47 0.28 0.39 0.04 0.08
Diff. (High‐Low) ‐0.14 0.15 0.04 ‐0.10 ‐0.26 0.24 0.30
t‐stat (High ‐ Low) 3.21 1.87
Panel B: Value ‐ Weighted
SEO Control Difference (SEO ‐ Conrol)
SEO Control Difference (SEO ‐ Conrol)
Panel A: Equally ‐ Weighted
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Table 2.A.9. The Long-Run Performance of SEOs – Calendar Approach 
The table reports the results of Fama and French (1993) three-factor analysis of portfolios of issuers and 
non-issuers. Every month issuers are defined as firms that had SEO at least once in the previous three 
years (Panel A), or five years (Panel B). Non-issuers are defined as firms that did not have an equity 
issuance (in terms of IPO or SEO) in the previous five years. Both issuers and non-issuers are assigned 
into portfolios of size-B/M-Dev_Lev, which are re-formed monthly. I compute equally and value 
weighted (based on market capitalization) portfolios and create a time-series of returns. I regress excess 
returns of each portfolio over the 3-month T-bill rate as function of market returns, SMB and HML 
factors, as constructed using Fama and French (1993) methodology. The estimation takes the following 
form: 
ܴ௣,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧  ൌ  ܽ ൅ ܾൣܴ௠,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧ ൧ ൅ ܿܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ݀ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߝ௧ 
Each regression has 444 monthly observations. The table presents the intercepts of the regression (a), 
averaged across size_B/M groups for issuers and non-issuers for each Dev_Lev group, and the 
differences between them. 
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Table 2.A.9 (Continued) 
 
 
Low 
Dev_Lev 2 3
High 
Dev_Lev
Diff.       
(High ‐ 
Low)
Low 
Dev_Lev 2 3
High 
Dev_Lev
Diff.       
(High ‐ 
Low)
Issuers ‐0.41 ‐0.15 ‐0.30 ‐0.37 0.04 ‐0.25 ‐0.09 ‐0.24 ‐0.37 ‐0.12
Non‐issuers 0.16 0.10 ‐0.03 ‐0.43 ‐0.59 0.12 0.07 ‐0.07 ‐0.44 ‐0.56
Diff. (Issuers ‐ Non‐issuers) ‐0.57 ‐0.25 ‐0.27 0.06 0.63 ‐0.37 ‐0.16 ‐0.17 0.07 0.44
t‐stat ‐3.79 ‐2.75 ‐3.43 0.47 3.13 ‐2.33 ‐2.17 ‐2.45 0.62 2.19
Low 
Dev_Lev 2 3
High 
Dev_Lev
Diff.       
(High ‐ 
Low)
Low 
Dev_Lev 2 3
High 
Dev_Lev
Diff.       
(High ‐ 
Low)
Issuers ‐0.30 ‐0.12 ‐0.27 ‐0.40 ‐0.10 ‐0.23 ‐0.07 ‐0.28 ‐0.35 ‐0.12
Non‐issuers 0.16 0.10 ‐0.03 ‐0.43 ‐0.59 0.12 0.07 ‐0.07 ‐0.44 ‐0.56
Diff. (Issuers ‐ Non‐issuers) ‐0.47 ‐0.22 ‐0.24 0.03 0.49 ‐0.35 ‐0.14 ‐0.21 0.08 0.44
t‐stat ‐2.95 ‐2.77 ‐3.83 0.25 2.40 ‐2.21 ‐1.82 ‐2.41 0.76 2.36
Panel A: 3‐year window
Panel B: 5‐year window
Equally‐Weghted Portfolios Value‐Weghted Portfolios
a a
Equally‐Weghted Portfolios Value‐Weghted Portfolios
a a
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Figure 2.B.1. The interaction of market timing benefits with trade-off costs. 
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Figure 2.B.2. Sensitivity of issuances to relative returns. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
DO INVESTORS VALUE DIVIDEND SMOOTHING STOCKS 
DIFFERENTLY?* 
Abstract 
It is almost an article of faith that managers have a preference for smooth dividends. 
Yet, it is not clear whether managers’ preferences reflect investors’ preferences. In this 
paper, we study whether investors indeed value dividend smoothing stocks differently 
by exploring the implications of dividend smoothing for firms’ expected returns and 
their investor clientele. We first document that dividend smoothing is associated with 
lower average stock returns both in a univariate setting and after controlling for firm 
characteristics and commonly used risk factors. We also find that some of this return 
differential can be attributed to lower risk, captured by return comovement among 
high (low) smoothing firms. Second, we find that retail investors are less likely to hold 
dividend smoothing stocks, while institutional investors are more likely. Among 
institutional investors, though, mutual funds are the only type that robustly favors 
dividend smoothing stocks. Last, we document that firms that smooth their dividends 
issue equity more frequently. Together, these results offer little support for behavioral 
explanations for why stable dividends are valued at a premium, but are consistent with 
the role of dividend smoothing in mitigating the impact of agency conflicts on the cost 
of capital. 
                                                 
* Yelena Larkin, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA; Mark T. Leary, Washington 
University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO; and Roni Michaely, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, and the 
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya, Israel. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the pivotal study by Lintner (1956), the phenomenon of dividend 
smoothing has been documented in a number of empirical studies (e.g., Fama and 
Babiak (1968), Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005)). Dividend changes 
respond only slowly to earnings changes and managers are willing to bear significant 
costs to avoid dividend cuts. Survey evidence suggests that managers bear these costs 
because they believe investors value a smooth dividend stream. Lintner (1956, p. 104) 
found that one of the most important factors driving dividend policy is “management’s 
views of its stockholders’ preference between reasonably stable or fluctuating 
dividend rates, and its judgment of the size and importance of any premium the market 
might put on stability or stable growth in the dividend rate.” Brav et al. (2005) find 
that even today “managers perceive a substantial asymmetry between dividend 
increases and decreases: there is not much reward in increasing dividends but there is 
perceived to be a large penalty for reducing dividends.” Yet, as noted by Berk and 
DeMarzo (2007), more than fifty years after Lintner’s study, “there is no clear reason 
why firms should smooth their dividends, nor convincing evidence that investors 
prefer this practice.” 
We address this gap by studying whether investors value dividend smoothing 
stocks differently. If an investor has a preference for smooth dividends, she would be 
willing to pay more for the equity of a firm that smoothes its dividends than for an 
equivalent firm that does not. The associated pricing impact should lead to lower 
(abnormal) expected returns for dividend smoothing firms. 
Consistent with this prediction, our main finding is that portfolios of firms with 
smoother dividend streams earn lower abnormal returns than firms that smooth less. 
This result is robust to the empirical specification and asset pricing models used. The 
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findings suggest that investors place a higher value on stocks that distribute smooth 
dividends, and are willing to sacrifice a portion of the stock’s expected returns for 
holding those stocks. While these findings immediately raise additional questions as to 
why investors are willing to pay more for dividend smoothing firms, they are 
important in their own right, as they serve as a starting point to understanding why 
managers care about dividend smoothing. 
We also attempt to address the question of why investors might value dividend 
smoothing stocks differently. The first explanation is that these stocks are associated 
with lower risk, and hence their returns are different. In this case, the returns 
differential may not be driven by the smoothing behavior itself. Rather, smoothing 
may proxy for some omitted risk factor not captured by commonly used firm 
characteristics or risk factors. 
However, there are also several non-risk based explanations for why firms that 
smooth dividends enjoy a lower cost of capital. First, investors may have a behavioral 
preference for smooth dividends, based either on prospect theory type of utility (Baker 
and Wurgler (2010)) or a desire to smooth consumption (Shefrin and Statman (1984), 
Baker, Nagel and Wurgler (2007)). Second, dividend smoothing may itself lower the 
costs of external finance created by agency conflicts and asymmetric information. For 
example, several models demonstrate that with incomplete contracting, external equity 
financing is only sustainable if dividends above a given threshold are consistently 
maintained (e.g. Myers (2000), Fluck (1999)). Related, other authors (e.g., Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997), Gomes (2000), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007)) argue that firms 
avoid dividend cuts in order to establish a reputation in the equity markets for fair 
treatment of dispersed shareholders, facilitating future access to equity capital. 
Additionally, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) suggest that a high and stable 
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dividend stream serves to attract and retain institutional investors, which provide 
valuable monitoring and information production. 
Our results show that differences in risk can account for at least part of the 
return premium associated with low dividend smoothing stocks. We construct a 
dividend smoothing factor, generated similarly to Fama and French (1993) Size and 
Book-to-Market factors, and show that sensitivity to this smoothing factor helps 
explain the cross-section of returns. Low-smoothing firms exhibit greater sensitivity to 
this factor, indicating that they are systematically riskier, and command higher returns. 
However, abnormal returns for dividend smoothing firms are still present even after 
controlling for the smoothing factor, suggesting that risk alone is not sufficient to 
explain our findings. 
We next examine non-risk based explanations for the value differential 
between high and low dividend smoothing stocks. First, we explore which investor 
types, if any, exhibit a preference for dividend smoothing. We document that 
institutional investors favor dividend smoothing firms, while retail investors choose 
stocks with a low degree of smoothing. This is particularly surprising in light of the 
fact that institutions shy away from high dividend stocks (Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005)), and dividend smoothing is associated with high dividend yields. Moreover, 
managerial surveys, summarized in Brav et al. (2005), show that “executives believed 
that if there was any class of investors that preferred dividends as the form of payout, 
it was retail investors.” 
This evidence is difficult to reconcile with the behavioral preference 
explanations, which suggest that individual investors would be the ones attracted to 
stocks paying smoothed dividends. However, it is consistent with reduced agency 
costs, given the monitoring provided by institutional investors. This explanation is 
further supported by the finding that the preference for dividend smoothing is not 
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shared among all types of institutions. Only mutual funds exhibit a significant 
tendency to hold shares of firms that smooth. Indeed, previous studies document the 
monitoring ability of large mutual funds. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) show that 
mutual funds and independent investment advisors are more likely to vote their 
proxies against management. Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005) present empirical 
evidence that more active institutional investors (such as independent advisors and 
investment company managers) provide more intense monitoring of corporate 
management; and Chen, Harford and Li (2007) find that independent institutional 
investors (that maintained stake in a company for at least a year) will specialize in 
monitoring activities. Hence the preference for dividend smoothing stocks is primarily 
present with institutions that tend to monitor more heavily, consistent with the role of 
dividend smoothing in reducing agency costs (Leary and Michaely (2011)). 
Finally, if firms maintain a consistent dividend stream (and avoid cuts) in order 
to facilitate low-cost access to equity capital (as in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) or 
Myers (2000)), we would expect the firms implementing a dividend smoothing policy 
to take advantage of this access by subsequently issuing equity. Consistent with this 
prediction, we find that dividend smoothing firms indeed have more frequent seasoned 
equity offerings, providing empirical support to the agency and reputation based 
explanations. 
To summarize, we show that dividend smoothing is priced, and firms that 
smooth their dividends more enjoy a lower cost of capital. We then provide evidence 
supporting two classes of explanations for this phenomenon. First, the returns 
differentials are partly attributable to differences in risk between firms that smooth 
dividends heavily and those that do not. This systematic co-variation between the 
smoothing factor and equity returns is not captured by other factors such as 
momentum, HML, SMB or dividend yield factor. Second, the institutional investor 
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clientele and more frequent equity issuance of dividend smoothing firms suggest that 
dividend smoothing helps minimize external finance costs associated with agency 
conflicts, leading to a lower cost of capital. Taken together, our results offer possible 
explanations for why managers may be willing to bear the cost of dividend smoothing. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the 
methodology of measuring dividend smoothing, and describes the sample and its 
properties. Section III examines whether dividend smoothing is priced in stock returns. 
Section IV explores the risk explanation and tests whether smoothing is priced as a 
factor. Section V investigates the non-risk based explanations and presents evidence 
on the preferences for smooth dividends by different classes of investors as well as the 
equity issuance activity of dividend smoothing firms. Section VI concludes. 
II. Data and Summary Statistics 
1. Measures of Dividend Smoothing 
For the estimation of smoothing, we use Compustat data for the period 1976-
2008, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). We construct our measures of 
smoothing, as suggested by Leary and Michaely (2011). 
The first measure of dividend smoothing, the speed of adjustment (SOA), is 
derived from a modified partial adjustment model of Lintner (1956). We use a two-
step procedure to compute it. First, we estimate a firm’s target payout ratio (TPRi) as 
the median payout over a 10-year period. Next, we obtain the deviation from the target 
payout (devi) using the following formula: 
ሺ1ሻ ݀݁ݒ௜,௧ ൌ ܴܶ ௜ܲ כ ܧ௜,௧ െ ܦ௜,௧ିଵ 
where Ei,t is the earning per share, and Di is the level of dividends per share (DPS). 
Finally, to estimate the speed of adjustment, we regress the changes in 
dividends on the deviation from the target payout (devi): 
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(2) ∆ܦ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ௜ כ ݀݁ݒ௜,௧ ൅ ߳௜,௧ 
SOA is the coefficient of the deviation variable (β). The higher its magnitude, the more 
the firm changes its dividend level to adjust for changes in earnings, and the less it 
smoothes. 
Our second measure of dividend smoothing is relative volatility (RelVol), and 
it captures the ratio of dividend volatility to earnings volatility. To obtain it, for every 
stock during a 10-year period we fit a quadratic trend to both the split-adjusted 
dividend and the scaled, split-adjusted earnings series: 
ሺ3ሻ ܣ݆݀ܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ߚଵ כ ݐ ൅ ߚଶ כ ݐଶ ൅ ߳௜,௧ 
ሺ4ሻ ܴܶܲ௜ כ ܣ݆݀ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ ߛଵ כ ݐ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݐଶ ൅ ߟ௜,௧ 
The final measure RelVol is computed by dividing the root mean square errors from 
the regression of adjusted dividends per share by the root mean square errors from the 
regression of the split-adjusted earnings series. High RelVol implies that the volatility 
of dividends is high relative to the volatility of earnings, and the firm’s dividend 
smoothing is low. 
Both measures are estimated by firm for each 10-year rolling window period. 
As a result, we obtain a time-series of speed of adjustment (SOA) and relative 
volatility (RelVol) for each firm for the period of 1985-2008. For each rolling time 
period we require at least 8 non-missing observations and one positive dividend 
observation for the SOA estimation, and 6 consecutive observations for the estimate of 
RelVol. We also remove observations before each firm’s first positive value for DPS 
and after each firm’s last positive DPS. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we trim the 
top and bottom 2.5% of the resulting distribution of SOA and RelVol, as well as 
observations with negative values of SOA. 
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2. Control Variables 
For our control variables we use Compustat, CRSP, and 13F databases at the 
annual frequency. Variable definitions are described in Appendix 3.A. We lag all the 
Compustat variables by one year to avoid the problem of reports being released during 
the following year. To be included in the sample, we require that a firm have non-
missing values for the following variables: SOA or RelVol, Assets, Age, Tangibility, 
M/B, share price, leverage and annual standard deviation of monthly return (from 
CRSP). The final sample consists of about 29,000 firm-year observations for the SOA 
measure and about 26,000 for RelVol. The number of firms each year ranges between 
923 and 1,941. 
Since the methodology of computing the speed of adjustment is applicable 
only to dividend paying firms, our final sample is a subgroup of Compustat universe.2 
However, in terms of market capitalization the final sample captures a substantial 
proportion of the overall Compustat firms, and represents almost 47% of the overall 
equity traded. 
3. Summary Statistics 
Table 3.B.1 shows the distribution of the main control variables across 
smoothing quintiles. Panel A presents the results based on the speed of adjustment as a 
proxy for smoothing, and Panel B is based on relative volatility. The distribution of 
control variables across smoothing quintiles is very similar for both measures. High 
dividend smoothing firms are larger, older, more tangible and less risky in terms of 
                                                 
2 A potential concern arises as a result of limiting our sample to dividend paying firms only. However, 
while in a study of dividend levels it is important to examine firms that pay zero dividends, this is not 
the case in the research of dividend smoothing behavior. Firms that do not pay dividends have a 
constant dividend stream of zero, which mechanically assigns them to the top smoothing group. The 
behavior of those firms is fundamentally different from the behavior of firms that pay constant and 
positive dividends. We therefore, exclude firms that do not pay dividends from our analysis. 
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return volatility and beta than the low-smoothing firms. Firms that smooth more also 
tend to pay higher dividends: the dividend yield is 3.3% for the lowest SOA quintile, 
and only 2.0% for the highest quintile. Finally, institutional ownership is significantly 
higher for the high-smoothing firms (35.9%) than for the low-smoothing ones 
(29.7%). The trends in the control variables across smoothing quintiles are similar 
when using RelVol smoothing measure (Panel B). 
Panel A of Table 3.B.2 reports descriptive statistics for the smoothing 
measures across all year-firm observations. The mean (median) SOA is 0.18 (0.13), 
suggesting that the median firm takes roughly 6 years to close half the gap between 
actual and target dividends. Overall, the averages and distributions of both measures 
are similar to those reported in other studies of dividend smoothing (e.g., Leary and 
Michaely (2011)). 
Panels B and C show the stability of our smoothing measures over time. In 
every year t we allocate all the firms in the sample into deciles based on their 
smoothing measure (SOA in Panel A, and RelVol in Panel B). The bottom SOA 
[RelVol] decile consists of firms with the highest degree of dividend smoothing, while 
the top SOA [RelVol] decile includes firms with the lowest dividend smoothing policy. 
We then calculate the percentage of firms that remained in the same decile in year 
(t+1) [(t+2), (t+5)], as well as the percentage of firms that changed their ranking. The 
results of Panel A show that 57.62% of the firms remain in the same SOA decile in the 
following year, while roughly 85% of the firms remain within +/-1 decile. After 5 
years, about 50% of the firms still remain in the range of +/-1 deciles of the smoothing 
ranking. Similar results hold when using RelVol (Panel C). Taken together, the time-
series distribution of our measures of dividend smoothing are relatively stable from 
year to year, consistent with the evidence that some firms put significant effort into 
maintaining their payout policy at a certain level over time. 
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III. Is Smoothing Priced? 
1. Univariate Analysis 
In this section, we ask to what degree variation in dividend smoothing policies 
is associated with differences in expected stock returns. We start by a simple 
univariate analysis of firm equity returns as a function of smoothing. We divide all the 
firms in the sample into smoothing deciles and calculate the average/median monthly 
returns of all firms within the smoothing decile portfolio. The results are presented in 
Table 3.B.3. 
Both the average and median returns increase across smoothing deciles. The 
differences between the top and the bottom deciles are statistically and economically 
significant. For example, firms that smooth their dividends the most (bottom SOA 
decile), have average monthly returns of 0.95%, compared to 1.35% for firms in the 
high SOA decile. This difference, which is statistically significant, is equivalent to an 
annualized return differential of 4.91%. The increase in returns over smoothing deciles 
is robust when we use medians instead of means, and also when we use RelVol as an 
alternative measure of dividend smoothing (Panel B). To verify that the pattern is 
consistent over time, we split the sample into two subperiods of equal length (1985-
1996 and 1997-2008) and repeat the analysis. The difference in returns of low versus 
high dividend smoothing firms remains economically and statistically significant (not 
tabulated). 
2. Factor Regressions 
While the results presented in Table 3.B.3 tentatively suggest that smoothing is 
priced, the returns differential might be caused by differences in exposure of firms to 
risk factors. To this end, we use multivariate analysis to determine whether the returns 
differential documented above can be attributed to one of the commonly used risk 
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factors. Specifically, we examine whether the excess return on firms with low-
smoothing can be explained by different loadings on the market return, Size, Book-to-
Market, and momentum factors. 
Every year, we sort all the firms in our sample into smoothing deciles. The 
smoothing measure in year t is obtained from the estimation of SOA/RelVol from the 
stream of dividends and earnings during the period (t-9) through t. We use the three 
bottom deciles of the speed of adjustment variable to construct the portfolio of high-
smoothing firms, and the top three to construct the portfolio of the low-smoothing 
firms. We then create equal- and value-weighted portfolios of firms in the top 
smoothing, bottom smoothing and medium smoothing groups. We also use the 
difference between the top and the bottom smoothing groups to create a strategy that is 
long low-smoothing firms and short high-smoothing firms. We regress the time-series 
of monthly returns of each portfolio on the Fama-French three factors plus the 
momentum factor (Carhart (1997)): 
ሺ5ሻ ܴ௣,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚெ௞௧ሺܴ௠,௧െ ௙ܴ,௧)+ ߚௌெ஻ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚுெ௅ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚெைெܯܱܯ௧+ߝ௧ 
Table 3.B.4 presents the intercept estimates of regressing each one of the 
portfolios on four factors. Panel A summarizes the results based on SOA as a proxy for 
smoothing, and Panel B reports the estimation using RelVol. The results indicate that 
after controlling for these four factors, the portfolio of low-smoothing firms generates 
higher abnormal returns than the portfolio of high-smoothing firms. The estimated 
alphas decline monotonically with SOA and RelVol, with the largest differences 
between the high and medium groups. The abnormal alpha of the high SOA minus low 
SOA portfolio is positive and significant for both equally and value weighted 
estimations, and robust for both proxies of dividend smoothing. Buying low-
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smoothing firms and selling high-smoothing firms generates monthly returns of at 
least 20 basis points, which is equivalent to 2.4% annually.3 
To verify that the results above are robust to alternative model specifications, 
we first exclude the momentum factor and re-estimate our regressions using Fama-
French three factors only. The results are quite similar to the ones presented here. 
Second, following a strand of literature that demonstrates that liquidity factor is 
another source of risk, incorporated into stock returns (see, among others, Chordia, 
Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Amihud (2002)), we add the Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor to Specification (5). We find that the pattern in 
excess alpha across smoothing portfolios is insensitive to the addition of the liquidity 
factor. 
3. Characteristic Regressions 
The results in the previous section demonstrate that the returns differentials 
between low and high-smoothing portfolios are not explained by different sensitivities 
to standard risk factors. However, Daniel and Titman (2007) argue that returns 
differentials based on size and book-to-market are better explained by firm 
characteristics themselves than by their associated risk factors. Therefore, in this 
section we examine the relation between smoothing and returns in a specification that 
controls for firm characteristics associated with returns differentials. 
We first estimate Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of returns 
as a function of standard firm characteristics, such as size, Book-to-Market, and beta, 
and ask whether dividend smoothing explains returns beyond those variables. 
                                                 
3 Since our objective is to show economic differences is return and valuations, (and not in arbitrage 
profits), we do not account for the transaction costs associated with these trades.  
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To construct the explanatory variables, we closely follow the methodology of 
Fama and French (1992) in matching the timing of variable measurement. Thus, we 
measure the size of the firm with the log of market value of the firm (ln(ME)), as of 
June, t. We also use log of Book-to-Market equity (ln(BE/ME)), rather than Book-to-
Market assets (M/B), as common in corporate research, and compute it as of 
December, t-1. 
Post-ranking beta is computed in two steps. First, we estimate “pre-ranking 
beta” for each stock based on contemporaneous and one-month lagged market returns 
for CRSP value-weighted index. The sampling window is 60 months, when we require 
at least 24 months of non-missing return observations. The estimates are updated 
every June of year t, so that in June of every year we estimate beta over the past 5 
years. 
To estimate post-ranking beta, we first sort stocks into size deciles each month 
using NYSE breakpoints, as in Fama and French (1993).4 We further divide each size 
decile into 10 deciles based on pre-ranking beta. For each of the resulting 100 size-
beta portfolios we calculate equally-weighted monthly returns over the sample period. 
Finally, we regress the obtained monthly returns of each portfolio on the 
contemporaneous and lagged returns of the CRSP value-weighted index. The sum of 
the coefficients is the post-ranking beta, which is assigned to each stock in the specific 
size- beta group for use in the analysis. 
In addition to post-ranking beta, size and Book-to-Market ratio, in an 
alternative specification we also include dividend yield (common dividend scaled by 
market value, as of (t-1)) as an additional characteristic variable, since it is important 
for us to separate the impact of smoothing on returns from the impact of dividend level 
                                                 
4 Obtained from Kenneth French’s website at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ 
data_library.html 
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on returns. Using these variables, every month we estimate the following 
specification: 
ሺ6ሻ ݎ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߛଵߚ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଶ݈݊ሺܯܧሻ௜,௧ ൅ ߛଷ݈݊ሺܤܧ/ܯܧሻ௜,௧ ൅ ߛସܦ݅ݒܻ݈݅݁݀௜,௧൅ߛହܵ݉݋݋ݐ݄௜,௧
൅ ߝ௧ 
Table 3.B.5 presents the results of the monthly cross-sectional estimation of 
stock returns as a function of the risk-proxying variables and smoothing (Columns (1) 
and (3) for SOA and RelVol, respectively). The estimates of the alternative 
specification that includes dividend yield are reported in columns (2) and (5). In 
columns (3) and (6), we replace dividend yield with total payout yield (sum of 
dividends and share repurchases), which Boudoukh, Michaely, Richardson and 
Roberts (2007) find better predicts stock returns. 5 
The results of the multivariate regression are consistent with the univariate 
findings. Both proxies for smoothing have positive and statistically significant 
coefficients. The coefficient of SOA ranges from 0.48 to 0.53, and the coefficients of 
RelVol are between 0.13 and 0.17, depending on the regression specification. The 
results suggest that firms that smooth their dividends (and therefore, have low speed of 
adjustment), require a lower risk premium, leading to lower expected returns. From an 
economic perspective, a one-standard deviation increase in SOA, which is about 0.16 
(see Panel C of Table 3.B.2), adds on average 8 basis points to the monthly stock 
returns. Compounding the difference over 12 months translates into 1.0% additional 
risk premium at an annual basis. 
The sign of the coefficients on control variables are in line with previous 
studies. Market beta does not have a material effect on stock returns when risk 
                                                 
5 Following Grullon and Michaely (2002) we define total payout as common dividends plus total 
expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks, plus any reduction in the value of the net 
number of preferred stocks outstanding. 
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characteristics are added to the model. The impact of size is negative (although 
statistically insignificant), consistent with larger firms being more stable and less 
risky. It is possible that some of the impact of the size variable disappears because our 
sample of smoothing firms is already based on relatively large firms. The effect of 
Book-to-Market ratio is positive and significant in most specifications. The only 
control variables that have unexpected coefficients are the dividend and total payout 
yields. While Boudoukh, et al. (2007) report a positive and insignificant coefficient of 
dividend yield in return regressions and a positive and significant coefficient of total 
yield, their coefficients in our estimation are negative and mostly insignificant. As 
higher dividend yield is associated with more smoothing, regressing returns on just the 
dividend yield includes the direct effect of dividend level and the indirect effect of 
dividend smoothing. 
For robustness, we verify that the results of Table 3.B.5 are not influenced by 
the methodology we use to estimate our smoothing measures. We use a constant, 
rather than rolling, measure of dividend smoothing and obtain similar results (not 
tabulated). 
IV. Dividend Smoothing and Risk 
The results of the previous section show that smoothing is an important 
characteristic in determining the cross-section of returns and that dividend smoothing 
firms have lower cost of capital. The pattern cannot be explained by the standard risk 
factor models or by firm characteristics commonly associated with returns. These 
findings are consistent with managers’ views, expressed in Lintner (1956) that 
investors exhibit a preference for stable dividends and are willing to pay for this 
stability. However, a question that still remains is why high dividend smoothing firms 
147 
are traded at a premium compared to low dividend smoothing firms. There are at least 
two potential (and not mutually exclusive) reasons. 
First, the difference in returns between low- and high-smoothing firms can 
reflect differences in risk not captured by the standard risk factors. For example, 
Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) suggest that dividend smoothing may attract 
informed institutional investors, which in turn reduces a firm’s opacity, asymmetric 
information and agency problems. Therefore, smoothing may result in lower risk and 
lower cost of capital. It is also possible that dividend smoothing does not lower the 
risk of the firm directly, but is correlated with other underlying firm characteristics 
associated with lower risk. As long as dividend smoothing explains some portion of 
the firm’s risk premium, not captured by other established risk factors, this may 
provide a risk-based explanation for the differences in returns. 
Second, as will be discussed in Section V, smoothing may be a priced 
characteristic for reasons unrelated to risk (see, for example, Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994)). For example, the returns differential may be an outcome of some 
investors’ preferences (e.g. Baker and Wurgler (2010)) that result in higher valuation 
(that is, in lower alpha). This section explores the risk explanation in further detail. 
To investigate whether dividend smoothing is a possible risk factor, we use the 
Fama and French (1993) framework, and examine whether a low- minus high-
smoothing portfolio can be a factor-mimicking portfolio as well, explaining return 
variation across stock portfolios that is not captured by the commonly used asset 
pricing factors. 
To construct the smoothing risk factor, in the beginning of every year t we 
assign our sample firms into deciles of smoothing. We also (independently) create 
deciles of total payout yield. For each variable, we aggregate the results into three 
groups: high, which consists of the top three deciles, low, which includes the bottom 
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three deciles, and middle, which includes deciles 4 through 7. The intersection of the 
two variables results in nine TotYield-smoothing portfolios, and for each portfolio we 
compute monthly returns, weighted by the market capitalization of each stock. We 
obtain the time-series of returns of the SOA risk factor by subtracting the average of 
the three low SOA portfolios from the average of the high SOA portfolios. We then 
repeat the procedure for RelVol instead of SOA as a measure of smoothing. The 
approach mirrors Fama and French (1993) construction of factor-mimicking portfolios 
and should help in examining whether smoothing captures some common variation of 
returns within high- and low-smoothing portfolios, which is unexplained by market, 
SMB and HML factors. 
Boudoukh et al. (2007) create a factor-mimicking portfolio based on dividend 
and total payout yields, and show that this portfolio successfully captures some cross-
sectional variation of time-series portfolio returns. Since dividend smoothing is 
correlated with dividend yield, we need to orthogonalize the impact of dividend 
smoothing from the impact of the dividend yield factor. Therefore, we construct the 
dividend-yield risk factor and include it in our regression as well. Following the 
methodology of Boudoukh et al., we sort all dividend paying firms into deciles of 
dividend yield, and (independently) into deciles of total payout yield. The dividend 
risk factor is the average of three high dividend yield portfolios minus the average of 
low dividend yield portfolios. We weight returns in each portfolio by market 
capitalization to mirror the construction of SMB and HML factors by Fama and 
French (1993). 
The dependent variables are 15 DivYield-smoothing portfolios of stock returns. 
To construct these portfolios, we start by sorting the sample into deciles of dividend 
yield and allocating firms into three groups of Low (deciles 1-3), Medium (deciles 4-
7), and High (deciles 8-10) dividend yields. We then assign firms in each dividend 
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yield group to five equal-sized portfolios of dividend smoothing. The dividend yield-
smoothing groups are re-formed every year. We compute the weighted average returns 
of each of the resulting 15 portfolios, as well as returns on the High SOA minus Low 
SOA portfolio within each dividend yield group. Finally, we regress each series, net of 
risk-free rate, on an intercept, market risk premium, SMB, HML, momentum, 
dividend yield, and dividend smoothing factors. Table 3.B.6 presents the results of the 
estimated intercepts, and the coefficients on the dividend yield and dividend 
smoothing factors, as well as their t-statistics. Panel A shows the results using SOA, 
and Panel B using RelVol, as the measure of dividend smoothing. 
The results in Table 3.B.6 provide evidence that dividend smoothing may be a 
priced factor. The coefficient on the LMH dividend smoothing factor is significant at 
least at a 5% level for 11 out of 18 portfolios in Panel A, and 10 portfolios in Panel B. 
The pattern of dividend smoothing factor coefficients across groups of smoothing is 
consistent with the idea that it captures some common variation in portfolios of high- 
versus low-smoothing stocks. Specifically, the smoothing factor loading is -0.30 for 
low SOA stocks in the smallest dividend yield quintile, but it increases to 1.03 for the 
high SOA portfolio, and both coefficients are statistically significant. In fact, five out 
of six coefficients in the top two SOA quintiles are positive and significant. These 
results suggest that some of the excess returns of the high SOA portfolio can be 
attributed to the higher volatility of this portfolio due to its exposure to a risk source, 
captured by SOA. The differences remain significant as we move across dividend yield 
quintiles. The SOA coefficient is -0.08 for stocks with high dividend yield that smooth 
dividends (low SOA quintile), but is 0.55 for stocks in the top SOA quintile, suggesting 
that the smoothing factor plays a more important role for firms that pay out less to the 
shareholders. 
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The coefficient on the dividend yield factor is consistent with previous 
findings, and suggests that it bears some useful information for estimating stock 
returns, beyond commonly used asset pricing factors. Almost all of the coefficients are 
significant, implying that dividend smoothing and dividend yield factors capture 
different sources of risk and are not mutually exclusive. 
Results are similar when we use RelVol as a measure of smoothing. Statistical 
significance of the coefficients is high, and the difference in factor loadings between 
high- and low-smoothing portfolios remains quite substantial, supporting the 
conclusions above. For example, the smoothing factor loading is -0.68 for stocks with 
low dividend yield that smooth dividends, as measured by the lowest RelVol quintile, 
but is 0.59 for stocks in the highest RelVol quintile in the same DivYield group. 
Alpha, the intercept of the regression, is positive for all and significant for at 
least half of the portfolios. These results are consistent with Table 3.B.4 (that 
summarizes the results of regressing three SOA portfolios as a function of Fama and 
French factors plus the momentum factor), in which we find that all portfolios in our 
sample have positive and significant alpha across smoothing groups. Given our sample 
selection, our findings are in line with previous studies that demonstrate that relatively 
stable and successful firms have better performance in terms of excess returns. Thus, 
to analyze the impact of the dividend smoothing policy on stock returns within the 
sample, we focus on the relative magnitude of alphas across different groups, rather 
than their absolute values. The pattern in alphas of High minus Low smoothing 
portfolios across the dividend yield quintiles is somewhat mixed. While incorporating 
the dividend smoothing factor seems to capture at least some of the excess returns 
differential, among the Medium dividend yield portfolios (which comprise 40% of our 
sample firms) alphas increase across smoothing quintiles in both panels. The alpha of 
the High-Low portfolio in this dividend yield group is 0.31 in Panel A, which uses 
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SOA as a smoothing measure, and 0.38 in Panel B, which measures the degree of 
dividend smoothing with RelVol variable. Both differences are statistically significant 
at a 5% confidence level. The differences between high and low dividend smoothing 
portfolios in other dividend yield groups are small in magnitude, and statistically 
insignificant. Overall, the results indicate that while the new dividend smoothing 
factor absorbs some of the differences in alphas, there is still a component of the 
return premium that cannot be fully attributed to risk. 
To ensure the robustness of our results, we repeat our asset pricing analysis of 
whether a smoothing factor captures an additional source of risk for portfolios of 
smoothing-dividend yield, portfolios of smoothing-size, and portfolios of smoothing-
Book-to-Market. We obtain results consistent with the ones presented here. We also 
re-estimate the main specification using a dividend yield factor, rather than total yield 
factor. The results remain very similar to the ones presented. Finally, we verify that 
the results above hold when we estimate the standard three-factor model plus the 
dividend smoothing factor (i.e. excluding the dividend yield and momentum factors 
from the regression). We find that using alternative specifications does not change the 
main conclusions in a material way. 
V. Non-Risk Based Explanations 
The results of the previous section demonstrate that differences in risk provide 
a partial, but incomplete, explanation for the returns differential between the low and 
high dividend smoothing firms. In this section, we consider why, apart from risk, 
investors may be willing to pay a premium for stocks with smooth dividends. Recent 
literature has suggested two classes of reasons. 
First, investors may have a behavioral bias toward smooth dividends. Baker 
and Wurgler (2010) discuss how prospect theory preferences can lead to such a bias. If 
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investors display both reference dependence (measuring losses and gains relative to a 
reference point) and loss aversion, they lose more utility from a dividend cut than they 
gain from an equivalent increase. A smooth dividend stream then maximizes utility 
over time. Alternatively, Shefrin and Statman (1984) and Baker, Nagel and Wurgler 
(2008) argue that investors consume out of dividends rather than capital gains. To the 
extent that they prefer a smooth consumption stream, they will also value smooth 
dividends. 
Second, dividend smoothing may lower the cost of capital by reducing agency 
and adverse selection costs. Several theoretical models show that consistent dividends 
above a given threshold enable firms to access equity capital on favorable terms by 
establishing favorable reputation in rational markets. For example, Myers (2000) 
demonstrates that in incomplete contracts setting, outside equity financing is only 
feasible if the manager makes sufficient regular dividend payments, which generate 
investors’ expectations of obtaining a similar stream of dividends in the future. 
Dividend cuts are therefore avoided in order to maintain access to equity capital.6 
Building on the model of Gomes (2000), LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2007) argue that firms anticipating 
future external capital needs maintain consistent dividends (and avoid cuts) in order to 
establish a reputation in the equity markets for fair treatment of dispersed 
shareholders. High and stable dividends can also reduce agency (or information) costs 
by attracting strong monitors. Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) suggest that a high 
and smooth dividend stream is a means of attracting and maintaining institutional 
investors, who minimize financing costs through their monitoring and information 
gathering roles. Somewhat similarly, Easterbrook (1984) and John and Knyazeva 
(2008) argue that a high and stable dividend provides a substitute governance 
                                                 
6 See Fluck (1999), Zwiebel (1996) and Warther (1994) for models with similar implications. 
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mechanism by reducing free cash flow and forcing firms to access external capital 
markets, which discipline managers through external monitoring. 
We provide evidence on the potential relevance of these explanations by 
examining two issues. First, we ask which investors are attracted to stocks that pay a 
smooth dividend. The behavioral explanations based on prospect theory or 
consumption smoothing imply that individual investors should be the primary clientele 
for dividend smoothing stocks. On the other hand, if smooth dividends lower agency 
costs by attracting strong monitors, we would expect these shares to be held 
predominantly by institutional investors. The models in which consistent dividends 
enable access to outside equity (e.g. Myers (2000)), as well as the model of Allen, 
Bernardo and Welch (2000), postulate that investors have the power to discipline 
managers if dividends are reduced. This is more likely in the case of large institutional 
investors rather than in the case of dispersed individual investors. 
Briefly, we find that shares of dividend smoothing stocks are held more by 
institutional investors, primarily mutual funds, consistent with the second set of 
predictions, in which dividend smoothing reduces external finance costs. We then 
examine the predictions of the second class of models further. If firms pay a consistent 
dividend in order to raise equity in the future at attractive prices, we anticipate these 
firms to be more likely to subsequently issue equity. Again we find supporting 
evidence. 
1. Which Investors Prefer Smooth Dividends? 
While prior studies (e.g. Grinstein and Michaely (2005), Graham and Kumar 
(2006)) have shown that individual investors exhibit a preference for dividend paying 
stocks, less is known about which investors are attracted to stocks that smooth their 
dividends. Theoretical models generate mixed predictions about who the target 
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clientele for dividend smoothing behavior would be. Baker and Wurgler (2010) show 
that by evaluating dividend increases and cuts relatively to a reference point, loss 
averse individuals will prefer to receive a smooth stream of dividends over time. 
Survey evidence by Brav et al. (2005) also suggests that individual investors exhibit 
preference for dividend smoothing – perhaps for income smoothing considerations. At 
the same time, the models by Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) and Myers (2000) 
show that managers use dividend smoothing as an instrument to retain institutional 
investors, who prefer dividend payouts for tax purposes. 
To determine whether there is a dividend smoothing clientele, we start by 
examining whether the propensity to hold dividend smoothing stocks varies across 
investor types. We first perform a simple non-parametric analysis to distinguish 
between two broad groups of investors: institutional versus retail. For each firm in the 
sample we calculate the overall number of common shareholders (#Invest), in 
thousands. The size of the investor base proxies for the number of retail investors 
holding the stock.7 We also obtain the overall number of institutions (InstNum), and 
the percentage of institutional holdings (InstHold) out of the overall investor holding, 
from Thomson Financial’s 13F filings. We use both the number and the percentage of 
institutional holding to account for potential differences in stock holdings of large 
versus small institutions. Every year we independently sort all the stocks in the sample 
into quintiles of smoothing and quintiles of dividend yield. We then average the 
investor and institutional holdings across each of the resulting 25 dividend yield-
smoothing portfolios and report our results in Table 3.B.7. 
                                                 
7 While the overall number of investors includes both the retail and the institutional investors, the 
number of institutions constitutes a very small portion of the overall shareholder base. The ratio of the 
number of institutions to the number of overall investors for a given stock has a median of 1.3% and 
does not exceed 6.3% for 90% of our sample firms. 
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Two clear trends emerge from the table. First, both the number and the weight 
of institutional ownership decrease with dividend yield, consistent with Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005). While institutional investors tend to hold firms that pay dividends as 
opposed to those that do not, within the dividend paying sample institutions seem to 
avoid high levels of dividends. For example, institutions hold 50% of the overall 
market value of firms that have low dividend yield and low speed of adjustment, but 
only 26% of outstanding shares of firms that are in the top dividend yield quintile. As 
a complement to institutional behavior, retail investors do like firms that pay high 
dividends. Their holdings (proxied by the number of shareholders) increase 
dramatically across the yield groups. Firms in the bottom SOA quintile that pay the 
lowest dividend yield have about 13,300 investors, while firms with a similar 
smoothing behavior but high dividend yield have three times as many investors 
(around 41,700 in the top dividend yield quintile). 
Second, within each dividend yield group, institutions exhibit a clear 
preference for dividend smoothing firms. Among the firms in the low yield quintile 
institutions hold only 34% of the shares of low dividend smoothing firms (as 
measured by SOA), but they own half of the equity of high-smoothing firms (Panel C). 
The pattern remains robust when we look at the overall number of institutions, rather 
than their relative weight, and suggests that the preference for dividend smoothing 
firms is not driven by institutions of a particular size. At the same time, we do not 
observe a clear preference of retail investors toward dividend smoothing firms. While 
the number of shareholders is higher for high- smoothing versus low-smoothing firms 
within the top dividend yield quintile, there is no pattern for the rest of the sample. As 
also reported in the table, using relative volatility instead of SOA yields very similar 
results. 
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Overall, the findings that institutions prefer smoothed dividends are consistent 
with the univariate analysis of the relations between smoothing and institutions, as 
documented by Leary and Michaely (2011). However, this relationship may still be an 
artifact of correlation between dividend smoothing and other variables, such as age, 
and turnover that are also correlated with institutional holding. Therefore, in Table 
3.B.8 we turn to multivariate analysis and estimate the number of the overall investors, 
the number of institutions and the percentage of institutional holding for each firm as a 
function of dividend smoothing and control variables. 
We employ a set of commonly used firm characteristics that were found to be 
correlated with institutional holding (Gompers and Metrick (2001), Grullon, Kanatas, 
Weston (2004)) as our control variables. We use a firm’s size, age, and price 
reciprocal to control for the size and maturity of the firm. Since some institutions, such 
as pension and mutual funds, have a number of restrictions on the type of firms they 
can invest in, they usually prefer bigger and more stable firms. We use stock returns 
and returns on assets (ROA) as the performance measures of the firm. Asset 
tangibility, the ratio of Market-to-Book assets (M/B), and leverage control for 
additional factors that are correlated with smoothing and may affect investor 
composition as well. We also include advertising and R&D expenses to account for 
investment of a firm in intangible assets, such as technology and brand. Finally, we 
use turnover to capture the liquidity of a firm’s stock and the standard deviation of 
stock returns to proxy for its risk. To distinguish the effect of dividend smoothing 
from the impact of dividend level, we include dividend yield. All the clientele 
variables are converted into natural logarithms (the dependent variables become 
ln(#Invest), ln(InstNum), and ln(InstHold)) to mitigate the impact of positive skewness 
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in the distribution of individual and institutional holding on the estimation 
parameters.8 
The results in Table 3.B.8 summarize the estimations with the overall number 
of shareholders, number of institutions and institutional holdings as the dependent 
variables. Similar to the previous findings, institutions prefer holding profitable and 
liquid (in terms of turnover) firms with large market capitalization and low proportion 
of tangible assets. Consistent with the non-parametric analysis above, institutions do 
not like high dividend payouts. However, they do like dividend smoothing firms. The 
coefficient on SOA is negative and significant for both the number of institutions and 
the proportion of institutional holding. Similar results are obtained for RelVol (Panel 
B), confirming that the findings are robust to using different measures of smoothing. 
The implications remain similar whether we use the number or the proportion of 
institutional holding, suggesting that the results are not driven by a few large 
institutions, but rather hold for the overall universe of institutional investors. The 
relation between the number of shareholders (ln(#Invest)) and firms’ characteristics 
are quite different from the institutional picks. Overall, retail investors prefer firms 
with tangible assets that pay high dividends. Another striking difference is their 
negative attitude towards dividend smoothing: as opposed to institutions, retail 
investors not only do not like dividend smoothing, but also exhibit a certain preference 
towards a volatile stream of dividends, as suggested by positive coefficients on SOA 
and RelVol. 
To confirm the robustness of our results, we consider alternative specifications, 
which include log(ME), log(Sales), Payout and TotYield as control variables. The 
main conclusions are unchanged. The significance of the results also holds when we 
                                                 
8 To incorporate values of zero into our analysis, we add 1 to the number and percentage of institutional 
holdings, before converting it to logarithms. 
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re-estimate the results for the subsample of firms with positive institutional holding 
only. 
We next investigate the link between institutions and smoothing further by 
breaking the overall institutional holding into groups by investment types, as defined 
in Thomson Financial’s 13F database. There are five major types of institutions. Type 
1 is bank trusts, Type 2 is insurance companies, Type 3 consists of investment 
companies (primarily mutual funds), Type 4 is investment advisors (mostly large 
brokerage firms), and all the other institutions are classified as Type 5, which is 
mainly pension funds and endowments. The classification of institutions has changed 
at the end of 1998 as a result of Thomson database integration. While the aggregate 
institutional holding remains the same, the decomposition of holdings by type has a 
structural break, impossible to correct. As a result of this mapping error, starting from 
1999 some portion of institutions classified as Types 1 through 4 are wrongly labeled 
as Type 5. To rely on the accurate classification, for the next part of our analysis we 
use the period of 1985-1998 as our main time period, but we still address the full time 
period in the robustness test. 
We start by re-running the estimation of the overall number of shareholders, 
the number of institutions and their relative weight in the overall stock holding for the 
sub-sample of 1985-1998. The results are very similar to the ones reported in Table 
3.B.8 and are not presented here. We then estimate the specification of Table 3.B.8 
separately for each institution type and report the results in Table 3.B.9. 
There is a substantial variation in firm characteristics that different types of 
institutions are attracted to. Panel A shows that Types 1 (bank trusts) and 5 (others) 
prefer to invest in large and mature firms (coefficients of log(Age) are 0.006 for both 
types), while Type 4 institutions (large brokerage firms) prefer smaller firms 
(coefficient of Size is -0.002). All institutional groups avoid high dividends, and prefer 
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stocks with higher turnover and low return volatility. Similar patterns emerge when 
relative volatility is used as the smoothing measure (Panel B). 
Interestingly, only mutual funds robustly hold a greater concentration in 
dividend smoothing firms. The coefficient on SOA is -0.014, the only one that is 
statistically significant in both panels. It also has the highest (absolute) value among 
all the types, with the exception of Type 4 in Panel A. The heterogeneity of 
institutional preferences for dividend smoothing stocks is especially noteworthy given 
that all types of institutions are similar in their avoidance of high dividend levels. It 
suggests that dividend level and the degree of dividend smoothing are dissimilar 
characteristics in their impacts on the investor decision whether or not to hold the 
stock. 
For robustness, we re-estimate the equations using sales and market value as 
alternative measures of size, and obtain similar results. We also replace DivYield with 
TotYield and Payout as alternative measures of a firm’s distribution of cash, and find 
that the results are close to the ones reported in Table 3.B.9. Finally, we rerun all the 
regressions above using the overall sample of 1985-2008, keeping in mind that the 
results should be interpreted with caution due to the mapping error in institutional 
types.9 Including year dummy variables accounts for the time-series break in the 
proportion of institutions at the end of 1998 as a result of misclassification. Despite 
type coding inaccuracy, we still find that the dividend smoothing impact on 
institutional holding is pronounced mainly for Type 3 (mutual funds) investors. The 
results for Type 5 (others) are also significant, which is consistent with inclusion some 
of the mutual funds in the Type 5 category starting from 1999. For the sake of brevity, 
                                                 
9 Brian Bushee (http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html) overcomes the problem of 
institutional misclassification by carrying the reliable type codes forward in time after 1998 and 
manually assigning types to new institutions, emerged after 1998. Unfortunately, his classification is 
not applicable in our study as it does not distinguish between types 3 and 4. 
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the results of the robustness tests are not presented here and are available upon 
request. 
The finding that share holdings of stocks with smooth dividends are 
concentrated among mutual funds is particularly supportive of an agency cost 
explanation. Several authors document the monitoring ability of mutual funds. For 
example, Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005) present empirical evidence that 
independent advisors and investment company managers, who have skilled employees 
and low costs of information gathering, have advantages in monitoring of corporate 
management. Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) show that mutual funds and 
independent investment advisors are more likely to vote their proxies against 
management. Kisin (2010) and Cella (2010) demonstrate that mutual funds influence 
corporate investments of a firm, including capital expenditures, R&D, and 
acquisitions. Further, this evidence is consistent with Leary and Michaely (2011) who 
find that dividend smoothing is most pronounced among firms most exposed to 
potential agency conflicts. On the other hand, the fact that individual investors do not 
display a preference for smooth dividends is less supportive of the behavioral 
explanations. 
2. Dividend Smoothing and Equity Issuance 
Another implication of the agency-based explanations for a dividend 
smoothing premium is that firms maintain a consistent dividend and avoid dividend 
cuts in order to ensure future low-cost access to external equity. To the extent that 
maintaining a smooth dividend is costly – either to the manager in terms of limiting 
private benefits or to the firm in terms of limiting investment – we would expect this 
behavior to be most prevalent among firms anticipating future equity issuance. In this 
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section, we provide evidence for this motivation by examining the relationship 
between dividend smoothing and equity issuance decisions. 
We obtain data on seasoned equity issues from the SDC Platinum database for 
the period 1985-2008. The sample includes all public equity issues by US firms with 
non-missing issuance date and CUSIP number. We merge the data with our main 
sample by using CUSIP, if available, and ticker, if not. To verify the validity of the 
merge, we calculate the summary statistics of the number of issues and obtain results 
similar to the previous studies (see, among others, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and 
Ritter (2003)). 
We estimate issuance decisions using a logit regression where the dependent 
dummy variable takes a value of 1 if a firm issues in a given year, and zero otherwise. 
Our control variables include the main firm characteristics, such as size, M/B and 
profitability (ROA). We also use firm leverage to capture the trade-off forces that 
determine a firm’s issuance decisions, and past stock returns (Ret_mean) to control for 
potential growth and market timing opportunities, which can provide firms with 
additional incentives to issue equity. Similarly to our previous estimations, we want to 
distinguish between the impact of dividend smoothing and dividend level, and 
therefore, include dividend yield in an alternative specification. All the specifications 
are estimated using SOA and RelVol to verify that the coefficients are robust to using 
different measures of dividend smoothing. The results are presented in Table 3.B.10. 
The results in Panels A and B indicate that both smoothing measures have a 
negative and statistically significant impact on the issuance decisions of the firm, 
implying that firms that smooth their dividends, access external equity markets more 
often. Including additional variables, such as firm leverage, past returns and dividend 
yield does not change the magnitude of dividend smoothing coefficients in a material 
way. Overall, the results provide evidence that dividend smoothing is indeed 
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associated with lower costs of access to external equity, and firms take advantage of it 
through more frequent issuances. 
In a robustness test, we address a possible alternative explanation for our 
results, namely that firms committed to a smooth dividend policy are forced to access 
external equity markets if they do not have enough internal capital to maintain their 
dividend. In this case, the firm may issue equity and pay out the proceeds. However, if 
the alternative explanation is correct, our results are driven either by firms with 
relatively poor pre-issuance performance or by financially constrained firms. To 
address the first concern, we drop all the observations with negative ROA in period (t-
1) and re-estimate our regression. Our results remain very close to the ones reported. 
To make sure that the results are not driven by financially constrained firms that do 
not have enough internal capital, we remove all firms that fall into the bottom quartile 
of Cash distribution (cash and short-term investments, scaled by total assets), and 
repeat the estimation. We find that re-estimating the results for firms that do not have 
problems with cash reserves also does not change our conclusions in a material way. 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper explores why managers care about dividend smoothing. First of all, 
it documents that investors place a higher value on stocks that distribute smooth 
dividends, and are willing to sacrifice a portion of the expected returns for holding 
those stocks. We show that portfolios of low dividend smoothing firms generate 
higher abnormal returns compared to high dividend smoothing firms in both a 
univariate setting and a four-factor Fama-French model. The level of dividend 
smoothing is also significant in explaining the cross-section of returns after controlling 
for risk-related characteristics, such as size, Book-to-Market, and momentum. 
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We then identify two potential channels (which are not mutually exclusive) 
through which dividend smoothing firms enjoy lower cost of capital. First, we ask 
whether dividend smoothing captures additional risk factors, which are not 
incorporated in the standard Fama-French three factor model. To test this hypothesis, 
we construct a dividend smoothing factor, using the methodology of Fama and French 
(1993), and find that the additional premium on firms that do not smooth their 
dividends can be at least partially attributed to risk differences. These results suggest 
that to the extent that firm characteristics proxy for firm risk, firms that do not smooth 
dividends are riskier, and require additional premium. We find evidence that the new 
smoothing risk factor, constructed as the difference between low and high smoothing 
firms, is significant in pricing the time-series of stock portfolios. Taken together, the 
results provide strong evidence that firms that do not smooth dividends bear additional 
risk, which is priced in the returns of their stocks. A by-product of our analysis is to 
show that a dividend smoothing factor helps explain the cross-section of stock returns. 
While beyond the scope of our current study, understanding the sources of these risk 
differentials is a question for future research. 
Still, some of the return differential between smoothing and non-smoothing 
firms remains significant, so we turn to the non-risk based reasons that dividend 
smoothing firms may enjoy a lower cost of capital. We first document that 
institutional investors favor dividend smoothing firms, while retail investors do not 
have a pronounced preference for dividend smoothing policy. This runs counter to the 
predictions of the behavioral explanations, which suggest that retail investors will 
prefer smooth dividends. 
We then present two pieces of evidence consistent with the role of dividend 
smoothing in mitigating the impact of agency conflicts on the cost of capital. First, we 
find that the preference for dividend smoothing is not shared among all types of 
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institutions. In particular, only mutual funds exhibit a significant tendency to hold 
shares of firms that smooth. Previous literature has documented a wide range of 
advantages that a firm can gain by attracting mutual funds, including monitoring of 
corporate management and impact on a firm’s investment policy. Second, we find that 
firms that smooth their dividends issue equity more frequently, suggesting that a 
demonstrated commitment to dividends facilitates access to external capital markets. 
Taken together, the results of this study provide the first evidence on why managers 
find dividend smoothing policy important. 
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APPENDIX 3.A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Size: the natural log of book assets (AT) in constant 1993 dollars. 
Age: the number of years since the firm first appeared in the CRSP database 
M/B: the market value of equity, plus the book value of assets (AT) minus the book 
value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets. 
Book value of equity: book assets minus book liabilities (LT) minus preferred stock 
plus deferred taxes (TXDITC). 
Preferred stock: equals the liquidation value (PSTKL) if not missing; otherwise we 
use the redemption value (PSTKRV) if not missing; otherwise the carrying value 
(PSTK). 
ln(ME): the log of market value of the firm as of June, t. 
ln(BE/ME): the log of the ratio of book equity to market equity, as of December, t-1; 
# Invest: total number of common shareholders (CSHR), in thousands. 
InstHold: we pick the holdings as they are reported in 13F at December of each year. 
It is defined as the sum of shares held by all the institutions, divided by the overall 
number of shares outstanding. If the data for institutional holdings is missing, we use 
the last available quarter of the year as a proxy for the end-of the year holdings. For 
firms that have no institutional reporting for the period we assign the value of zero. 
The variable is defined as the sum of shares held by all the institutions, divided by the 
overall number of shares outstanding. 
InstNum: the overall number of institutions that hold shares of a firm, as reported in 
13F. 
Tangibility: the ratio of net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) to total assets. 
Leverage: the sum of short-term (DLC) and long-term (DLTT) debt divided by total 
assets. 
Adver: advertising expenses (XAD), scaled by book assets. Values of zero are 
assigned to missing observations. 
R&D: expenses on research and development (XRD), scaled by book assets. Values of 
zero are assigned to missing observations. 
Cash: cash and short-term investments (CHE), scaled by book assets. 
Turnover: the annual average ratio of monthly traded volume of shares to total shares. 
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ROA: operating income before depreciation (OIBDP), scaled by total assets. 
DPS: dividend per share (DVPSP_C). 
EPS: earning per share (EPSPX). 
DivYield: common dividends (DVC), scaled by the contemporaneous year-end market 
capitalization 
TotYield: common dividends (DVC) plus repurchases, scaled by the contemporaneous 
year-end market capitalization 
Repurchases: total expenditure on the purchase of common and preferred stocks 
(PRSTKC) plus any reduction in the value of the net number of preferred stocks 
outstanding (PSTKRV). 
Payout: common dividends (DVC) divided by net income (IB). 
RetVol: standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns over a calendar year. 
Beta: is computed in two steps. First, we estimate “pre-ranking beta” for each stock 
based on contemporaneous and market returns for CRSP value-weighted index. The 
sampling window is 60 month, when we require at least 24 month of non-missing 
return observations. The estimates are updated every June of year t, so that in June of 
every year we estimate beta over the past 5 years. To estimate post-ranking beta, we 
first sort stocks into size deciles each month using Fama and French (1993) size 
breakpoints10. Size breakpoints are based on allocating all the CRSP-Compustat data 
into deciles based on NYSE breakpoints. We further divide each size decile into 10 
deciles, based on pre-ranking beta. For each of the resulting 100 size-beta portfolios 
we calculate equally-weighted monthly returns over the sample period. Finally, we 
regress the obtained monthly returns of each portfolio on the contemporaneous and 
lagged returns of the CRSP value-weighted index. The sum of the coefficient is the 
post-ranking beta used in the analysis, which is assigned to each stock in the specific 
size-postbeta group. 
  
                                                 
10 Obtained from Kenneth French website at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/ 
data_library.html 
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Table 3.B.1. Cross-sectional Distribution of Smoothing Measures 
The sample consists of Compustat firms for the period 1976-2008, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 
6000-6999). The speed of adjustment SOA is estimates as ߚ෨ from a modified partial adjustment model 
of Lintner (1956): ∆ܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ כ ݀݁ݒ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߳௜,௧, where ݀݁ݒ௜,௧ ൌ ܴܶܲ௜ כ ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ െ ܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ and 
ܴܶܲ௜ is defined as the firm-median payout ratio (common dividends divided by net earnings) over the 
sample period. DPS and EPS are common dividends and earnings per share, respectively. RelVol is 
defined as the ratio of root mean square errors from the following two regressions: ܣ݆݀ܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ߙଵ ൅
ߚଵ כ ݐ ൅ ߚଶ כ ݐଶ ൅ ൅߳௜,௧ and ܴܶܲ௜ כ ܣ݆݀ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ ߛଵ כ ݐ ൅ ߛଶ כ ݐଶ ൅ ൅ߟ௜,௧ where ܣ݆݀ܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧ and 
ܣ݆݀ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ are split-adjusted DPS and EPS series, and ܴܶܲ௜is as defined previously. The split adjusted 
DPS (EPS) series is constructed by first calculating the split-adjusted change in DPS (EPS) each year. 
The split adjusted series for year t is then defined as ܣ݆݀ܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ܦܲ ௜ܵ,ଵ ൅ ∑ Δ௧௜ୀଶ ܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧. Both 
measures are estimated for each of the 10-year rolling widow periods. As a result, we obtain a time-
series of speed of adjustment (SOA) and relative volatility (RelVol) for the period of 1985-2008. For 
each rolling time period we require at least 8 non-missing observations and one positive dividend 
observation for the SOA estimation, and 6 consecutive observations for the estimate of RelVol. We also 
remove observations before each firm’s first positive value for dividend per share and after each firm’s 
last positive DPS. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we trim the top and bottom 2.5% of the resulting 
distribution of SOA and RelVol, and remove negative SOA values. We start by obtaining the median of 
the time-series variable for each firm. Then firms are sorted into quintiles based on their median SOA 
(Panel A) and RelVol (Panel B) and the means of the firm median characteristics are reported. Size is 
the log of total book assets in constant 1993 dollars; Age is the number of years since the firm first 
appeared in the CRSP database; Tangibility is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets; M/B: the market value of equity, plus the book value of assets minus the book value of equity, all 
divided by the book value of assets; RetVol is the deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns over a 
calendar year; Beta is the firm’s post-ranking beta, following the Fama and French (1992) 
methodology. InstHold are obtained from 13F reports, as of December of each year. It is defined as the 
sum of shares held by all the institutions, divided by the overall number of shares outstanding. To 
aggregate institutional holdings across firms and years we use the mean, rather than median institutional 
holding of a firm. Turnover is the annual average ratio of monthly traded volume of shares to total 
shares; Payout ratio is defined as common dividends scaled by net income. DivYield is DPS divided by 
the year-end share price; Leverage is the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets. 
***, ** and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3.B.1 (Continued) 
 
  
Characteristic 1 2 3 4 5 t-stat (5-1)
SOA 0.034 0.091 0.150 0.235 0.440 ***
Size 6.996 6.856 6.681 6.415 6.155 ***
Age 26.51 26.19 23.29 20.26 18.03 ***
Tangibility 0.377 0.330 0.293 0.269 0.256 ***
M/B 1.273 1.318 1.290 1.396 1.457 ***
RetVol 0.020 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.025 ***
Beta 0.883 0.963 1.016 1.015 1.089 ***
InstHold 0.359 0.353 0.333 0.332 0.297 ***
Turnover 0.627 0.622 0.619 0.619 0.634 **
Payout 0.528 0.491 0.319 0.301 0.239 ***
DivYield 0.033 0.038 0.032 0.030 0.020 ***
Leverage 0.281 0.253 0.243 0.229 0.222 ***
Characteristic 1 2 3 4 5 t-stat (5-1)
RelVol 0.094 0.202 0.323 0.500 0.997 ***
Size 6.907 6.940 6.685 6.532 6.332 ***
Age 27.16 25.84 24.28 20.18 19.38 ***
Tangibility 0.395 0.320 0.292 0.256 0.260 ***
M/B 1.272 1.297 1.320 1.409 1.489 ***
RetVol 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.024 ***
Beta 0.856 0.944 0.995 1.026 1.013 ***
InstHold 0.354 0.354 0.342 0.328 0.327 *
Turnover 0.557 0.658 0.588 0.657 0.701 ***
Payout 0.450 0.369 0.520 0.285 0.325 ***
DivYield 0.036 0.029 0.037 0.027 0.022 ***
Leverage 0.268 0.265 0.243 0.214 0.217 ***
Panel A: Speed of Adjustment
Panel B: Relative Volatility
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Table 3.B.2. Time-series Distribution of the Dividend Smoothing Measures 
Table 3.B.2 presents the distribution of the smoothing measures (Panel A), and their stability over time 
(SOA in Panel B and RelVol in Panel C). The sample consists of Compustat firms for the period 1985-
2008, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). See Table 3.B.1 for description of the 
estimation methodology of SOA and RelVol. To calculate stability of the smoothing measures, very year 
the overall sample is divided into deciles based on SOA [RelVol]. The bottom SOA [RelVol] decile 
consists of firms with the highest degree of dividend smoothing, while the top SOA [RelVol] decile 
includes firms with the lowest dividend smoothing policy. In each year t we calculate the difference 
between the firm’s future ranking (as of years (t+1) and (t+5), respectively) and the firm’s current 
smoothing ranking and present the percentage of firms that experienced changes in their smoothing 
ranking of that magnitude. Thus, “0” refers to the percentage of firms which dividend smoothing 
ranking between year t and year (t+1) [(t+5)] remained unchanged. Negative changes indicate an 
increase in the degree of dividend smoothing of a firm, when it moves to a lower decile of SOA[RelVol] 
over time. Positive changes indicate transition to less dividend smoothing policy over time. By 
construction, the maximal possible change in ranking is +/-9, when a firm moves from the top to the 
bottom smoothing decile, or vice versa. 
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Table 3.B.2 (Continued) 
Panel A: Distribution of the Dividend Smoothing Measures 
Smoothing 
measure 
Mean Std Dev 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 
SOA 0.18  0.16  0.06  0.13  0.26  
RelVol 0.41  0.38  0.14  0.29  0.55  
 
 
 
  
9 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.15
8 0.10 0.5 0.05 0.34
7 0.21 0.84 0.12 0.78
6 0.43 1.23 0.14 1.04
5 0.60 1.95 0.44 1.92
4 0.92 3.07 0.80 2.95
3 1.80 5.7 2.25 5.34
2 3.96 9.21 5.54 9.05
1 (Rank increase of one decile) 12.79 14.08 15.76 14.07
0 (No change in ranking) 57.62 20.01 51.35 21.03
-1 (Rank decrease of one decile) 14.87 14.36 16.05 14.58
-2 3.73 10.08 4.46 10.19
-3 1.39 6.57 1.70 7.00
-4 0.71 4.63 0.70 4.97
-5 0.37 3.2 0.31 2.8
-6 0.24 1.97 0.13 1.92
-7 0.08 1.18 0.13 1.07
-8 0.06 0.79 0.05 0.60
-9 0.04 0.46 0.02 0.20
Percentage of 
firms after 
five years
Panel C: RelVolDifference between the rank of 
the smoothing decile in year 
(t+1) [(t+2)] and the rank of the 
smoothing decile in year t
Percentage of 
firms after 
one year
Percentage of 
firms after one 
year
Percentage of 
firms after five 
years
Panel B: SOA
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Table 3.B.3. Smoothing and Returns – Univariate Analysis 
Table 3.B.3 presents the distribution of stock returns across deciles of dividend smoothing measures 
(SOA in Panel A and RelVol in Panel B) over time. The sample consists of firms that appear both in 
Compustat and CRSP during the period 1985-2008, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). 
See Table 3.B.1 for description of the estimation methodology of SOA and RelVol. We first divide the 
sample into deciles based on the smoothing measure and then calculate average and median monthly 
returns across firms and years in each smoothing decile. ***, ** and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
 
 
  
Rank for SOA Mean Median Rank for RelVol Mean Median
low SOA 0.95% 1.09% low RelVol 0.94% 1.05%
1 1.10% 1.20% 1 1.03% 1.16%
2 1.05% 1.16% 2 1.07% 1.16%
3 1.13% 1.13% 3 1.12% 1.17%
4 1.05% 1.10% 4 1.02% 1.06%
5 1.10% 1.25% 5 1.11% 1.22%
6 1.18% 1.21% 6 1.16% 1.15%
7 1.17% 1.21% 7 1.20% 1.24%
8 1.34% 1.28% 8 1.23% 1.26%
High SOA 1.35% 1.31% High RelVol 1.20% 1.22%
t-stat (High-Low) 5.29*** t-stat (High-Low) 3.55***
Panel A Panel B
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Table 3.B.4. Factor Regressions on Portfolios of Smoothing 
Table 3.B.4 presents the intercepts of factor regressions of monthly returns of portfolios, formed based 
on the degree of a firm’s dividend smoothing, as a function of Fama and French (1993) three risk 
factors plus the momentum factor. The sample consists of firms that appear both in Compustat and 
CRSP during the period 1985-2008, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). The dependent 
variable is monthly stock returns of portfolios of different levels of dividend smoothing. Every year we 
assign the sample firms into deciles based on SOA [RelVol] and form three portfolios: High SOA 
[RelVol] portfolio consists of all the firms that belong to the top three SOA [RelVol] deciles; Low SOA 
[RelVol] portfolio consists of all the firms that belong to the bottom three SOA [RelVol] deciles; 
Medium SOA [RelVol] portfolio consists of all the firms that belong to deciles 4 through 7 of SOA 
[RelVol]. See Table 3.B.1 for the description of the estimation methodology of SOA and RelVol. We 
then compute equally or value weighted (by ME) returns on the portfolio for the following year. The 
sample is re-sorted into portfolios of smoothing every year. The time-series returns of each portfolio 
(ܴ௣,௧) is then regressed on four risk factors. The equation is 
ܴ௣,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵൣܴ௠,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧൧ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚଷ כ ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚସ כ ܯܱܯ௧ ൅ ߝ௧, 
 
where ( ௙ܴ,௧) is the risk-free rate; (ܴ௠,௧) is the market portfolio, based on all NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks; ܵܯܤ௧ is the small minus big factor return; ܪܯܮ௧ is the high minus low factor return; 
and ܯܱܯ௧ is the momentum factor. The table presents the values, standard errors and t Value of the 
intercept (α) of each regression. 
 
  
Portfolios
Parameter 
Estimate
Standard 
Error
t Value Parameter 
Estimate
Standard 
Error
t Value
High SOA 0.69 0.11 6.19 0.69 0.09 7.79
Medium SOA 0.56 0.10 5.78 0.49 0.08 6.30
Low SOA 0.46 0.09 5.38 0.49 0.07 6.61
High minus Low 0.23 0.09 2.54 0.20 0.07 2.95
Portfolios
Parameter 
Estimate
Standard 
Error
t Value Parameter 
Estimate
Standard 
Error
t Value
High RelVol 0.70 0.12 6.08 0.70 0.09 7.70
Medium RelVol 0.55 0.09 5.94 0.50 0.08 6.17
Low RelVol 0.49 0.10 4.68 0.48 0.08 6.30
High minus Low 0.21 0.09 2.27 0.22 0.07 3.19
Panel A: SOA
Value-Weighted Equally-Weighted
Panel B: RelVol
Value-Weighted Equally-Weighted
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Table 3.B.5. Smoothing and Returns – Characteristics Regression 
Table 3.B.5 presents the results of a Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation of monthly stock returns as a 
function of firm characteristics and dividend smoothing variables (SOA and RelVol in Panels A and B, 
respectively). See Table 3.B.1 for the description of the estimation methodology of SOA and RelVol. 
The sample consists of firms that appear in both Compustat and CRSP during the period 1985-2008, 
excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). Cross-sectional regressions of raw monthly stock 
returns are estimated every month (total of 278 estimations), and the distribution of the coefficients 
(mean and standard deviation) is reported in the table. ln(ME) is the log of market value of the firm as 
of June, t. ln(BE/ME) is the ratio of book equity to market equity, as of December, t-1; Beta is the post-
ranking beta, as estimated in Fama and French (1992); ln(DivYield) is the logarithm of 0.01 plus 
DivYield, where DivYield is common dividend divided by market value, ME, as of year t-1; ln(TotYield) 
is the logarithm of 0.01 plus TotYield, where TotYield is common dividend divided plus common share 
repurchases, divided by market value, ME, as of year t-1. Time-series standard deviation is reported in 
parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept  1.241***  1.526***  1.331*** Intercept  1.198***  1.411***  1.21***
(6.603) (6.527) (6.732) (6.726) (6.718) (7.021)
Beta  0.054 -0.046  0.04 Beta  0.091  0.024  0.115 
(5.337) (5.071) (5.173) (5.336) (5.051) (5.215)
ln(ME) -0.016 -0.007 -0.012 ln(ME) -0.014 -0.005 -0.004 
(0.685) (0.678) (0.685) (0.697) (0.689) (0.7)
ln(BE/ME)  0.079  0.17**  0.149** ln(BE/ME)  0.066  0.137**  0.13*
(0.843) (1.102) (1.113) (0.891) (1.132) (1.129)
ln(DivYield) -0.151** ln(DivYield) -0.125 
(1.11) (1.305)
ln(TotYield) -0.058 ln(TotYield) -0.059 
(0.945) (1.008)
SOA  0.524***  0.481**  0.532*** RelVol  0.165**  0.134*  0.157**
(3.068) (3.129) (3.242) (1.25) (1.256) (1.275)
Panel A Panel B
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Table 3.B.6. Dividend Smoothing as a Factor 
This table presents the results of estimating excess returns of stock portfolios as a function of Fama and 
French three factor model, dividend yield and dividend smoothing factors. The sample consists of 
Compustat firms for the period 1985-2008, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). The 
dependent variables are excess returns on the 15 Dividend payout yield - Smoothing portfolios. To 
construct them, we first sort the sample into deciles of dividend yield and allocate firms into groups of 
Low (deciles 1-3), Medium (deciles 4-7), and High (deciles 8-10) dividend yields. Next, we allocate 
firms in each dividend yield group into quintiles of dividend smoothing. Every year we compute the 
weighted average returns of each of the resulting 15 portfolios. The regression equation is: 
ܴ௣,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵൣܴ௠,௧ െ ௙ܴ,௧൧ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܵܯܤ௧ ൅ ߚଷ כ ܪܯܮ௧ ൅ ߚସ כ ܯܱܯ௧ ൅ ߚହ כ ܦ݅ݒܻ݈݅݁݀ܪܯܮ௧
൅ ߚ଺ כ ܵ݉݋݋ݐ݄ܮܯܪ௧ ൅ ߝ௧ 
where ( ௙ܴ,௧) is the risk-free rate; (ܴ௠,௧) is the market portfolio, based on all NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks; ܵܯܤ௧ is the small minus big factor return; ܪܯܮ௧ is the high minus low factor return; ܯܱܯ௧ is the momentum factor; Divܻ݈݅݁݀ܪܯܮ௧ is the dividend yield factor, and ܵ݉݋݋ݐ݄ܮܯܪ௧ is the 
dividend smoothing factor. DivYield is common dividend divided by market value. The table presents 
the values and t-stat of the intercept (α) and coefficients on dividend yield and dividend smoothing 
factors (ߚହ and ߚ଺, respectively) of each regression. In Panel A dividend smoothing portfolios and 
dividend smoothing factor is constructed based on SOA measure, and Panel B repeats the same analysis 
using RelVol. See Table 3.B.1 for the description of the estimation methodology of SOA and RelVol. 
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Table 3.B.6 (Continued) 
 
  
Low SOA 2 3 4 High SOA High-Low Low SOA 2 3 4 High SOA High-Low
Low 0.36 0.50 0.46 0.13 0.23 -0.12 2.68 3.04 2.69 0.84 1.39 -0.74
Medium 0.40 0.31 0.43 0.48 0.71 0.31 2.98 2.30 3.12 3.48 5.38 2.39
High 0.41 0.51 0.40 0.51 0.40 -0.01 0.41 0.51 0.40 0.51 0.40 -0.01
Low SOA 2 3 4 High SOA High-Low Low SOA 2 3 4 High SOA High-Low
Low -0.41 -0.37 -0.36 -0.51 -0.28 0.13 -7.25 -5.26 -5.00 -7.78 -3.87 1.89
Medium -0.11 -0.16 -0.30 -0.15 -0.18 -0.07 -1.91 -2.77 -5.01 -2.51 -3.21 -1.29
High 0.51 0.41 0.50 0.45 0.36 -0.15 9.07 7.34 7.97 7.08 5.69 -1.93
Low SOA 2 3 4 High SOA High-Low Low SOA 2 3 4 High SOA High-Low
Low -0.30 -0.30 0.15 0.43 1.03 1.33 -3.53 -2.80 1.39 4.27 9.52 12.38
Medium -0.03 0.01 0.17 0.27 0.54 0.57 -0.40 0.06 1.91 3.07 6.36 6.87
High -0.08 -0.23 0.07 0.11 0.55 0.63 -0.94 -2.66 0.71 1.20 5.70 5.32
Dividend 
Yield β5(DivYield HML) t-stat (β5)
Dividend 
Yield
α
Dividend 
Yield t-stat (α)
Panel A: SOA
β6(SmoothLMH) t-stat (β6)
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Table 3.B.6 (Continued) 
 
 
Low RelVol 2 3 4 High RelVolHigh-Low Low RelVol 2 3 4 High RelVol High-Low
Low 0.37 0.63 0.26 0.30 0.36 -0.01 2.28 3.63 1.63 1.77 2.18 -0.06
Medium 0.33 0.55 0.53 0.42 0.70 0.38 2.39 3.57 3.90 3.15 4.69 2.77
High 0.56 0.63 0.49 0.09 0.45 -0.12 3.90 4.18 3.21 0.48 2.59 -0.57
Low RelVol 2 3 4 High RelVolHigh-Low Low RelVol 2 3 4 High RelVol High-Low
Low -0.47 -0.54 -0.20 -0.31 -0.21 0.26 -6.55 -7.16 -2.94 -4.25 -2.88 3.39
Medium -0.22 -0.26 -0.15 -0.05 -0.12 0.10 -3.73 -3.89 -2.63 -0.92 -1.78 1.79
High 0.41 0.62 0.49 0.43 0.37 -0.04 6.63 9.60 7.44 5.35 5.02 -0.45
Low RelVol 2 3 4 High RelVolHigh-Low Low RelVol 2 3 4 High RelVol High-Low
Low -0.68 -0.37 0.15 0.48 0.59 1.26 -6.65 -3.40 1.46 4.59 5.68 11.56
Medium -0.15 -0.32 0.15 0.02 0.42 0.57 -1.76 -3.34 1.85 0.27 4.50 6.73
High -0.10 0.02 -0.12 -0.03 0.33 0.43 -1.10 0.17 -1.31 -0.24 3.12 3.33
Dividend 
Yield β6(SmoothLMH) t-stat (β6)
Dividend 
Yield β5(DivYield HML) t-stat (β5)
alpha t-stat (alpha)
Panel B: RelVol
Dividend 
Yield
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Table 3.B.7. Institutional Holdings by Dividend Yield and Smoothing 
This table presents the overall number of common shareholders, in thousands (# Invest), the overall 
number of institutions (InstNum) and the proportion of institutional holdings (InstHold) out of the 
overall investor holdings by quintiles of dividend smoothing and Div yield. The sample consists of 
Compustat firms for the period 1985-2008, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). The 
groups are formed by independently partitioning the sample by SOA in the left column [RelVol in the 
right column] and also partitioning the sample by Div yield quintiles. Reported averages are cross-
sectional averages for firm-year observation in each of the resulting 25 smoothing-Div yield groups. See 
Table 3.B.1 for the description of the estimation methodology of SOA and RelVol. Div yield is common 
dividend divided by market value, ME; InstNum and InstHold are obtained from 13F reports, as of 
December of each year. InstHold is defined as the sum of shares held by all the institutions, divided by 
the overall number of shares outstanding. 
 
  
Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High 
SOA RelVol
Low 13.3 15.7 18.8 28.2 41.7 Low 16.9 20.2 22.6 27.4 37.2
2 17.7 16.1 19.7 24.3 39.7 2 22.0 20.9 19.5 27.9 38.4
3 15.5 21.0 17.6 60.0 35.7 3 14.4 15.0 14.6 56.7 33.6
4 12.6 14.1 12.7 21.0 24.3 4 13.4 14.1 13.2 17.1 26.4
High 13.3 17.2 16.0 21.8 27.7 High 21.0 24.8 23.6 30.9 23.5
t-stat(High-Low)     *** t-stat(High-Low)     ***
Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High 
SOA RelVol
Low 153.4 164.3 167.6 148.6 108.4 Low 206.8 179.3 192.7 147.2 100.2
2 137.1 156.4 150.5 130.6 96.9 2 167.4 162.4 160.4 129.6 97.3
3 138.9 145.0 141.4 104.9 79.2 3 138.2 151.4 130.4 109.5 86.1
4 111.3 133.7 111.7 96.2 69.0 4 127.7 132.5 107.0 96.8 69.9
High 99.2 130.9 111.9 85.3 59.4 High 127.0 142.8 119.8 106.4 63.6
t-stat(High-Low) *** *** *** *** *** t-stat(High-Low) *** *** *** *** ***
Low 2 3 4 High Low 2 3 4 High 
SOA RelVol
Low 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.41 0.26 Low 0.56 0.51 0.49 0.41 0.24
2 0.41 0.46 0.42 0.37 0.24 2 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.38 0.22
3 0.40 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.22 3 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.34 0.23
4 0.39 0.42 0.37 0.33 0.21 4 0.42 0.42 0.37 0.33 0.21
High 0.34 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.20 High 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.33 0.22
t-stat(High-Low) *** *** *** *** *** t-stat(High-Low) *** *** *** *** **
Panel A: #Invest
DivYield DivYield
Panel B: InstNum
DivYield DivYield
Panel C: InstHold
DivYield DivYield
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Table 3.B.8. Multivariate Regression of Individual and Institutional Holding 
This table reports the results of estimating OLS regressions, where the dependent variables are the 
logarithm of shareholder base (ln(# Invest)), and the logarithms of 1 plus the number and the proportion 
of institutions, invested in a stock (variables ln(InstNum) and ln(InstHold), respectively. The sample 
consists of Compustat firms for the period 1985-2008, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-
6999). See Table 3.B.1 and Appendix 3.A for the description of the independent variables. All 
estimation models include year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are based 
on heteroskedastic consistent errors adjusted for clustering across firms (Rogers (1993)). ***, ** and * 
indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
Independent\Dependent variable ln(# Invest) ln(InstNum) ln(InstHold) ln(# Invest) ln(InstNum) ln(InstHold)
Intercept -5*** -2.851*** -0.085*** -5.078*** -2.774*** -0.052*
(0.17) (0.263) (0.026) (0.185) (0.29) (0.028)
SOA  0.225** -0.466*** -0.069***
(0.098) (0.128) (0.014)
RelVol  0.066 -0.231*** -0.023***
(0.044) (0.055) (0.006)
Size  0.567***  0.272***  0.012***  0.576***  0.275***  0.012***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.002) (0.014) (0.02) (0.002)
log(Age)  0.345***  0.225***  0.009*  0.334***  0.223***  0.006 
(0.033) (0.044) (0.005) (0.037) (0.051) (0.005)
Return -1.277*** -1.556*** -0.224*** -1.157*** -1.592*** -0.236***
(0.271) (0.353) (0.04) (0.295) (0.393) (0.045)
ROA -0.118  2.244***  0.297*** -0.089  2.658***  0.376***
(0.199) (0.337) (0.043) (0.241) (0.357) (0.04)
Adver  1.265***  1.464**  0.113*  1.486***  1.289*  0.098 
(0.342) (0.667) (0.061) (0.368) (0.696) (0.063)
R&D  3.195***  1.045  0.299**  2.75***  0.244  0.262**
(0.59) (1.213) (0.125) (0.649) (1.19) (0.124)
1/Price  0.083*** -0.061** -0.008**  0.156** -0.095 -0.013 
(0.031) (0.028) (0.004) (0.063) (0.061) (0.008)
log(Turnover)  0.089***  0.257***  0.073***  0.095***  0.257***  0.073***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.003) (0.026) (0.03) (0.003)
log(RetVol) -0.105** -0.11* -0.039*** -0.133*** -0.075 -0.029***
(0.041) (0.061) (0.006) (0.045) (0.066) (0.007)
M/B  0.242***  0.233*** -0.0003  0.235***  0.247*** -0.002 
(0.024) (0.036) (0.004) (0.026) (0.033) (0.004)
Leverage -0.091 -0.597*** -0.006 -0.16 -0.582*** -0.007 
(0.123) (0.159) (0.017) (0.135) (0.179) (0.019)
DivYield  2.831*** -2.169*** -0.392***  3.107*** -2.57*** -0.483***
(0.3) (0.352) (0.044) (0.454) (0.51) (0.064)
Tangibility  1.355*** -0.232* -0.064***  1.461*** -0.278** -0.074***
(0.089) (0.131) (0.009) (0.092) (0.139) (0.014)
Obs. 26023 29100 29100 24099 26667 26667
# of firms/clusters 2648 3081 3081 2445 2845 2845
R-squared adj. 0.623 0.346 0.356 0.644 0.368 0.377
Panel BPanel A
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Table 3.B.9. Multivariate Regression of Institutional Holding by Institutional 
Type 
This table reports the results of estimating OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the 
logarithms of 1 plus the weight of the institutional holding of each type out of the overall holdings of a 
stock. Only observations with positive holdings are included. Type1 is bank trusts, Type2 is insurance 
companies, Type3 consists of investment companies (primarily mutual funds), Type4 is investment 
advisors, and Type5 is all the other institutions. The sample consists of Compustat firms for the period 
1985-1998, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). See Table 3.B.1 and Appendix 3.A for 
the description of the independent variables. All estimation models include year fixed effects. Standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis and are based on heteroskedastic consistent errors adjusted for 
clustering across firms (Rogers (1993)). ***, ** and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 3.B.9 (Continued) 
 
  
Independent\Dependent variable Type1 Type2 Type3 Type4 Type5
Intercept -0.083***  0.014  0.227***  0.241***  0.081***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.008)
SOA  0.0018 -0.0087** -0.014*** -0.018* -0.006 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Size  0.013***  0.001*  0.001 -0.002*  0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0005)
log(Age)  0.006***  0.003 -0.001  0.003  0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Return -0.048** -0.05***  0.03* -0.032 -0.123***
(0.022) (0.016) (0.018) (0.031) (0.015)
ROA  0.077***  0.009  0  0.1***  0.041***
(0.024) (0.01) (0.01) (0.023) (0.01)
Adver  0.039 -0.046*** -0.041***  0.008 -0.005 
(0.041) (0.011) (0.015) (0.03) (0.009)
R&D  0.134***  0.043*  0.056*  0.171***  0.121***
(0.051) (0.025) (0.03) (0.056) (0.03)
1/Price -0.001  0.001 -0.028*** -0.008* -0.001 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) (0.0004)
log(Turnover)  0.011***  0.01***  0.018***  0.054***  0.013***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
log(RetVol) -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.006* -0.039*** -0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
M/B  0.003*  0.002*  0 -0.009***  0.003***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Leverage -0.041***  0.006  0.012**  0.033*** 0 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004)
DivYield -0.023 -0.039** -0.068*** -0.185*** -0.043***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.026) (0.009)
Tangibility -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.046*** -0.003 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.01) (0.008) (0.003)
Obs. 14052 11932 10827 14092 12616
# of firms/clusters 2049 1811 1759 2036 1897
R-squared adj. 0.240 0.069 0.312 0.294 0.424
Panel A: SOA
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Table 3.B.9 (Continued) 
 
  
Independent\Dependent variable Type1 Type2 Type3 Type4 Type5
Intercept -0.064***  0.017**  0.22***  0.285***  0.08***
(0.015) (0.008) (0.014) (0.02) (0.008)
RelVol -0.0045 -0.0002 -0.008***  0.0001 -0.001 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Size  0.015***  0.002***  0.0003 -0.002**  0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log(Age)  0.005*  0.002 -0.0001  0.004  0.006***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Return -0.054** -0.061***  0.018 -0.1*** -0.129***
(0.025) (0.019) (0.022) (0.038) (0.016)
ROA  0.109***  0.032*** -0.004  0.12***  0.055***
(0.025) (0.011) (0.02) (0.023) (0.01)
Adver  0.047 -0.051*** -0.06***  0.005 -0.008 
(0.046) (0.013) (0.017) (0.033) (0.009)
R&D  0.105*  0.049*  0.037  0.167***  0.127***
(0.054) (0.027) (0.032) (0.059) (0.031)
1/Price  0.002*  0.008 -0.038* -0.053** -0.003 
(0.001) (0.008) (0.022) (0.022) (0.005)
log(Turnover)  0.01***  0.011***  0.014***  0.053***  0.013***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
log(RetVol) -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.002 -0.026*** -0.006***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002)
M/B  0.003  0.001  0.002 -0.011***  0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Leverage -0.051***  0.006  0.016*  0.035***  0.003 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.004)
DivYield -0.046*** -0.058*** -0.082*** -0.223*** -0.052***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.039) (0.019)
Tangibility -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.051*** -0.005 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.016) (0.008) (0.003)
Obs. 12974 11084 10087 12965 11728
# of firms/clusters 1887 1853 1613 1873 1745
R-squared adj. 0.250 0.087 0.281 0.292 0.446
Panel B: RelVol
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Table 3.B.10. Logit Regression of SEOs and Dividend Smoothing 
This table reports the results of estimating logit regressions, where the dependent variables takes a value 
of one if a firm raises public equity (Seasoned Equity Offering) in year t, and zero otherwise. The 
sample consists of Compustat firms for the period 1985-2008, excluding financial firms (SIC codes 
6000-6999). Equity issues are obtained from SDC Platinum and include all public equity issues by US 
firms. See Table 3.B.1 for the description of the independent variables. All estimation models include 
year fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are based on heteroskedastic 
consistent errors adjusted for clustering across firms (Rogers (1993)). ***, ** and * indicate p-values of 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -4.385*** -4.591*** -4.611*** -4.183*** -4.413*** -4.457***
(0.253) (0.265) (0.265) (0.267) (0.274) (0.273)
SOA -0.592** -0.433* -0.421*
(0.261) (0.253) (0.253)
RelVol -0.554*** -0.494*** -0.481***
(0.137) (0.131) (0.131)
log(sale)  0.176***  0.169***  0.17***  0.156***  0.146***  0.146***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
M/B -0.051 -0.028 -0.026 -0.057  0.019  0.025 
(0.071) (0.08) (0.08) (0.072) (0.068) (0.068)
ROA -1.858*** -2.512*** -2.519*** -2.464*** -3.429*** -3.445***
(0.543) (0.802) (0.813) (0.482) (0.502) (0.503)
Lev  2.28***  2.254***  2.488***  2.44***
(0.192) (0.192) (0.204) (0.203)
Ret_mean  11.218***  11.269***  10.874***  10.983***
(1.087) (1.084) (1.213) (1.214)
DivYield  0.531  1.068**
(0.439) (0.489)
Obs. 29,144 29,084 29,077 26,713 26,674 26,668
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Likelihood Ratio 372.17 615.75 616.71 342.86 561.28 564.21
P(Chi-squared) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Panel A Panel B
 184 
REFERENCES 
Allen, Franklin, Antonio E. Bernardo, and Ivo Welch, 2000, A Theory of Dividends 
Based on Tax Clienteles, Journal of Finance, 55, 2499–2536. 
Almazan, Andres, Jay C. Hartzell and Laura T. Starks, 2005, Active Institutional 
Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation, 
Financial Management, 34, 5–34. 
Amihud, Yakov, 2002, Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series 
Effects, Financial Markets, 5, 31–56. 
Baker, M., S. Nagel, and J. Wurgler. 2007. The Effect of Dividends on Consumption. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:231–91. 
Baker, Malcolm, and Jeffrey Wurgler, 2010, Signaling with Reference Points: 
Behavioral Foundations for the Lintner Model of Dividends, Working Paper, Harvard 
University. 
Berk, Jonathan and Peter DeMarzo, 2007, Corporate Finance, Boston, MA: Pearson-
Addison Wesley. 
Boudoukh, Jacob, Roni Michaely, Matthew Richardson, and Michael M. Roberts, 
2007, On the Importance of Measuring Payout Yield: Implications for Empirical Asset 
Pricing, Journal of Finance, 62, 877–915. 
Brav, Alon, John Graham, Campbell Harvey, and Roni Michaely, 2005, Payout Policy 
in the 21st Century, Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 483–527. 
Brickley, James A., Ronald C. Lease and Clifford W. Smith Jr., 1988, Ownership 
Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments, Journal of Financial Economics, 
20, 267–291. 
Carhart, M., 1997, On Persistence of Mutual Fund Performance, Journal of Finance, 
52, 57–82. 
Cella, Cristina, 2010, Institutional Investors and Corporate Investors, Working paper, 
Stockholm School of Economics. 
Chen, Xia, Jarrad Harford, and Kai Li, 2007, Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 86, 279–305. 
Chordia, Tarun, Richard Roll, and Avanidar Subrahmanyam, 2000, Commonality in 
liquidity, Journal of Financial Economics, 56, 3–28. 
Daniel, Kent and Sheridan Titman, 1997, Evidence on the Characteristics of Cross 
Sectional Variation in Stock Returns, Journal of Finance 52, 1–33. 
 185 
DeAngelo, H., and L. DeAngelo. 2007. Capital Structure, Payout Policy, and Financial 
Flexibility. Working paper, University of Southern California. 
Easterbrook, Frank H., 1984, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, American 
Economic Review, 74, 650–659. 
Fama, Eugene F. and Harvey Babiak, 1968, Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis, 
Journal of the American Statistical Association 63, 1132–1161. 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1992, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock 
Returns, Journal of Finance 47(2), 427–465. 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1993, Common Risk Factors in the Returns 
of Stocks and Bonds, Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3–56. 
Fama, Eugene F., and James D. MacBeth, 1973, Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: 
Empirical Tests, Journal of Political Economy 81(3), 607–636. 
Fluck, Zsuzsanna, 1999, The Dynamics of the Management-Shareholder Conflict, 
Review of Financial Studies 12, 379–404. 
Gomes, Armando, 2000, Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation 
Effects, Journal of Finance 55: 615—646. 
Gompers, Paul A. and Andrew Metrick, 2001, Institutional Investors and Equity 
Prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 229–259. 
Graham, John R., and Alok Kumar, 2006, Do Dividend Clienteles Exist? Evidence on 
Dividend Preferences of Retail Investors, Journal of Finance 59, 1125–1165. 
Grinstein, Yaniv and Roni Michaely, 2005, Institutional Holdings and Payout Policy, 
Journal of Finance 60, 1389–1426. 
Grullon, Gustavo, George Kanatas and James P. Weston, 2004, Advertising, Breadth 
of Ownership and Liquidity, Review of Financial Studies 17, 439–461. 
John, K., and A. Knyazeva. 2008. Corporate Governance and Payout Commitments. 
Working paper, New York University. 
Kisin, Roni, 2010, The Impact of Shareholders on Corporate Investments: Evidence 
from Mutual Funds Holdings, Working paper, Washington University in St. Louis. 
Lakonishok, Josef, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, 1994, Contrarian 
Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk, Journal of Finance 49, 1541–1578. 
La Porta, R., F. López-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny. 2000. Agency Problems 
and Dividend Policies around the World. Journal of Finance 55:1–33. 
 186 
Leary, Mark T. and Roni Michaely, 2011, Determinants of Dividend Smoothing: 
Empirical Evidence, Review of Financial Studies, 24: 3197–3249. 
Lintner, John, 1956, Distribution of Incomes of Corporations among Dividends, 
Retained Earnings, and Taxes, American Economic Review, 46(2), 97–113. 
Loughran, Tim, and Jay R. Ritter, 1995, The New Issues Puzzle, The Journal of 
Finance 50, 23–51. 
Myers, Stuart, 2000, Outside Equity, Journal of Finance, 55: 1005–1037. 
Pastor, Lubos, and Robert F. Stambaugh, 2003, Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock 
Returns, Journal of Political Economy, 111, 642–685. 
Ritter, Jay R., 2003, Investment Banking and Securities Issuance, in Constantinides, 
G.M, Harris M., and R. Schulz, ed., Handbook of the economics and finance, Ch. 5. 
Rogers, Willard L., 1993, Regression Standard Errors in Clustered Samples. Stata 
Technical Bulletin, 13, 19–23. 
Shefrin, Hersh M., and Meir Statman, 1984, Explaining Investor Preference for Cash 
Dividends, Journal of Financial Economics 13(2), 253–282. 
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, 1997, A survey of corporate governance, Journal 
of Finance 52: 737–783. 
Warther, Vincent A., 1994, Dividend Smoothing: A Sleeping Dog Explanation, 
Unpublished Working Paper. 
Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996, Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial Entrenchment, 
American Economic Review, 86(5), 1197–1215. 
